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It is often assumed that unemployment increases the probability of armed conﬂicts, riots and political instability 
in general. However, there is a considerable shortage of empirical research on this topic and generally the 
evidence available does not conﬁrm the positive linkage between unemployment and political instability. Many 
have considered unemployment to be an important factor also behind the so-called Arab Spring. This thesis aims 
to analyse more closely what role unemployment played in the spark of these uprisings. From a theoretical 
viewpoint, relative deprivation theory and opportunity-cost approach can link unemployment to political 
instability. On the other hand several factors, stigmatisation and lack of collective resources, for example, are 
theorised to hinder the mobilisation of the unemployed.
The approach of this thesis is quantitative and its principal method is regression analysis. Most of the analyses 
are conducted using existent and extensive survey data sets, most notably the third wave of the Arab Barometer 
released in late 2014. In addition, the thesis explores descriptively data about the trends and patterns of the 
unemployment rates, protests, and organised violence. The study area of the thesis covers those Arab countries, 
where this data is available. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen are studied more closely.
The key ﬁnding of the thesis is that an unemployed respondent has not taken part in the protests of the Arab 
Spring more likely than an employed respondent. Several alternative operationalisations conﬁrm this ﬁnding. 
Survey data also suggest that unemployed people are less satisﬁed with their lives and politically less active 
compared to the employed. Further, satisfaction with life does not affect an individual's likelihood of protest 
attendance, but a higher interest in politics is a strong predictor of protest participation. As it seems that 
dissatisfaction does not turn to protesting, this might explain the low participation of the unemployed. This 
thesis ﬁnds scantly support that a higher unemployment rate would lead to a higher number of protests or a 
higher level of organised violence in the North African Arab countries. 
These results do not inevitably signify that unemployment was an irrelevant factor in the eruption of the Arab 
Spring uprisings. However, results suggest that unemployment was not a major driving force behind the Arab 
Spring. More generally, the outcome of this thesis together with earlier empirical research around the world 
suggests, that unemployment does not increase the likelihood of political instability as forcefully as it is often 
proposed.   
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Työttömyyden rooli arabikevään kansannousuissa 
Kulttuurimaantiede
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Helsingin yliopiston kirjasto, Kumpulan kampuskirjasto
Usein oletetaan, että työttömyys kasvattaa aseellisten konﬂiktien, mellakoiden ja myös muunlaisen poliittisen 
epävakaisuuden todennäköisyyttä. Asiaa on kuitenkin tutkittu empiirisesti huomattavan vähän ja yleisesti ottaen 
olemassa oleva näyttö ei osoita positiivista yhteyttä työttömyyden ja poliittisen epävakaisuuden välillä. Monet 
ovat pitäneet työttömyyttä myös merkittävänä tekijänä niin kutsutun arabikevään taustalla. Tämän tutkielman 
tavoitteena on tarkastella lähemmin, minkälainen rooli työttömyydellä oli näiden kansannousujen 
käynnistymisessä. Teoreettisesti työttömyys voidaan yhdistää poliittiseen epävakaisuuteen suhteellisen 
deprivaation tai vaihtoehtoiskustannusten näkökulmasta. Toisaalta useiden tekijöiden, esimerkiksi resurssien 
puutteen ja stigmatisaation, on teoreettisessa keskustelussa esitetty ehkäisevän työttömien aktivoitumista.
Tutkielma on luonteeltaan kvantitatiivinen ja sen ensisijaisena tutkimusmenetelmänä on regerssioanalyysi. 
Tarkastelu perustuu pääosin laajoihin valmiina oleviin kyselyaineistoihin, joista keskeisin on vuoden 2014 
lopulla julkaistu Arabibarometrin kolmas kierros. Lisäksi tutkielmassa tarkastellaan kuvailevasti dataa 
protestien, järjestäytyneen väkivallan ja työttömyysasteen vaihtelusta ja jakautumisesta. Tutkimusalue kattaa ne 
arabimaat, joista aineistoja on saatavilla. Tunisiaa, Egyptiä, Libyaa ja Jemeniä tarkastellaan lähemmin.
Tulokset eivät välttämättä tarkoita, että työttömyyden rooli arabikevään kansannousujen puhkeamisessa olisi 
ollut merkityksetön. Tulosten perusteella näyttää kuitenkin siltä, että työttömyys ei ollut keskeinen tekijä 
arabikevään alkamisen taustalla. Yleisemmällä tasolla tutkielman lopputulokset yhdessä aiempien eri puolilta 
maailmaa saatujen empiiristen tutkimustulosten kanssa viittaavat siihen, että työttömyys ei kasvata poliittisen 
epävakaisuuden todennäköisyyttä niin merkittävästi, kuin usein on esitetty.
Tutkielman keskeinen tulos on, että työtön kyselyn vastaaja ei ole osallistunut arabikevään protesteihin
työssäkäyvää vastaajaa todennäköisemmin. Useat vaihtoehtoiset mittaustavat vahvistavat tämän tuloksen.
Kyselyaineistojen perusteella näyttää myös siltä, että työttömät ovat tyytymättömämpiä elämäänsä ja poliittisesti
passiivisempia työssäkäyviin verrattuina. Tyytyväisyys elämään ei kuitenkaan vaikuta siihen, kuinka
todennäköisesti yksilö osallistuu protesteihin, poliittinen aktiivisuus puolestaan on vahva osallistumisen
todennäköisyyttä lisäävä tekijä. Koska tyytymättömyys ei näytä johtavan protestointiin, tämä saattaa selittää
työttömien vähäistä osallistumista. Tulokset tarjoavat niukasti tukea sille, että korkeampi työttömyysaste johtaisi
korkeampaan protestien määrään tai korkeampaan järjestäytyneen väkivallan tasoon Pohjois-Afrikan
arabimaissa.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Unemployment is often seen as a factor considerably increasing the likelihood for various
forms of political instability from rioting to terrorism and civil wars. This assumption is made
both by analysts and politicians, both in relation to the developing and developed world
(United Nations 2004: 54–70; World Bank 2011a: 72–96; International Labour Organization
2013a). For example, the two previous interior ministers of Finland have identified
unemployment as a potential threat to security. According to them unemployment can or is
likely to lead rise in violent extremism, criminality and terrorism (Eurooppatiedotus 2013;
Orpo 2015). This thesis will focus on the specific case of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011,
but unemployment has been blamed for riots in the Arab world already before that (Sadiki
2000; Middle East Online 2008; Ottaway & Hamzawy 2011: 4–6).
As it is assumed that unemployment causes political instability, this is then followed by
an assumption that employment creation is a way to foster peace in fragile states and in
conflict-affected areas. Indeed, according to Berman et al. the vast majority of aid money
spent by governments to restrain political violence is aimed at hindering the recruitment of
insurgents and fighters. The underlying logic is that those gainfully employed participate less
probably in political violence and on the other hand, employment lessens grievances and this
dampens the potential for political instability (Berman et al. 2011: 496–497).
However, it has been pointed out that there is scant empirical evidence to confirm either
this link between unemployment and political instability or the link between job creation and
increased stability. In 2010 Cramer argued that “There is no remotely convincing evidence at
the cross-country, large-N level, at the quantitative case study level, or at the ethnographic,
‘qualitative’ level, for any bold claims that unemployment is a mechanistic causal factor in
violent conflicts in developing countries. The evidence on youth unemployment is even
weaker” (Cramer 2010: 24). It seems that after 2010 not much has changed; the substantiation
is still missing.
As Holmes et al. gathered literature for their review on the impacts of employment
creation on stability and poverty reduction in fragile states, they found close to 10 000 articles
to assess. As they restricted their inclusion to studies providing primary quantitative or
qualitative evidence about these issues, only seven studies out of these 10 000 met the criteria.
Of these seven studies one examined the impacts of job creation on stability, others studied
impacts on poverty. Consequently it is possibly not surprising that the authors write that the
policy of employment creation as a mean to stabilise fragile states is primarily based on
2assumptions and that there is a considerable lack of empirical research in this area (Holmes et
al. 2013: v–vi). Mallett & Slater state similarly in their review, that in conflict-affected and
fragile areas the effects of employment creation programmes are mainly unknown. According
to them, this is particularly concerning as the information should be available to provide
policy guidance and to direct aid programming (Mallett & Slater 2015).
The abundance of assumptions concerning the relationship between unemployment and
political instability on one hand and the obvious lack of empirical evidence on the other hand
highlight the importance of empirical research in this field. As noted above, the determinants
of political instability are also a policy relevant research subject as governments often aim to
reduce political violence both domestic and abroad.
My thesis will study the role of unemployment in the case of the Arab Spring uprisings,
which was a wave of protests and rebellions starting from Tunisia at late 2010 and influencing
the life in most Arab countries during 2011. Unemployment is often regarded as an important
factor which sparked these uprisings, but as far as I know, also in this case, the role of
unemployment has not been studied thoroughly. This thesis aims at filling this gap. I will
especially concentrate on Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen as these countries were hard hit
by the Arab Spring and there is data available from these countries. Also some other Arab
countries are analysed but not with similar detail. Temporally the study concentrates naturally
on the years of the uprisings, but in some analyses a wider time span is also applied.
Specifications will be introduced and justified later in more detail. The thesis focuses on the
question why the Arab Spring erupted and more precisely what was the role of unemployment
in the eruption of the Arab Spring. I will not try to explain why and what has happened in
these countries after the Arab Spring and how different countries have followed different
paths since then, some leading to ongoing civil war, some to a military dictatorship, and some
towards more open democracy.
After this introductory chapter my thesis proceeds as follows. First I will shortly
introduce the Arab world and the Arab Spring, take a look at the characteristics of
unemployment in the Arab world and illustrate that unemployment indeed is often referred to
as a cause for the Arab Spring, although not many have paid much attention to it. Then I will
discuss diverse theoretical grounds why we could assume unemployment to cause political
instability and on the other hand, why such an assumption might be flawed. I will also review,
how varied outcomes earlier studies around the world have found when investigating the
relationship between unemployment and different forms of political instability.
3After this I will introduce my research questions, the data and methods used to answer
these questions and thereafter the results. In the first research question I will ask, if a higher
unemployment rate is connected to a higher number of protests or a higher level of organised
violence. Based on the data from some North African Arab countries it will be revealed, that
in some countries the years of a higher unemployment rate have also been years of higher
numbers of fatalities caused by organised violence. But this cannot be seen when studying
spatially; fatalities are not concentrated in the regions with higher unemployment rates. What
comes to protesting, a higher unemployment rate does not appear to have an influence in the
number of protests, neither temporally nor spatially. The second research question asks, if an
unemployed person is more likely to take part in protest than an employed person. Based on
rather extensive survey data from the Arab countries, evidence to support this hypothesis
remains slim. It seems that in general the unemployed are not more likely to take part in
protests than the employed. The third and fourth research question can be seen as attempts to
find out, why this could be the case. There I will study if the unemployed are less satisfied
with their lives and if they are politically active compared to the employed and further, if
satisfaction with life and being politically active are factors increasing the likelihood of an
individual to take part in protests. The results suggest that although the unemployed are less
satisfied with their lives, satisfaction with life does not have an appreciable effect on protest
participation. On the other hand being politically active increases considerably the likelihood
of an individual to take part in protest, and then, the unemployed are less interested in politics
and politically less active compared to the employed.
After presenting results I will discuss their reliability and explore, how they differ and
agree with the theory and results from earlier research. Finally I will conclude that
unemployment does not seem to have as significant role as I hypothesised and I will consider
some possible questions for future research.
42. UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE ARAB SPRING
2.1. Arab world
It is ambiguous which region exactly the Arab world covers, but in most cases countries
belonging to the Arab League (formally the League of Arab States) are defined as the Arab
world. There are twenty-two member states in the Arab League and they are Algeria, Bahrain,
Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen (Seib 2005: 604; League of Arab States 2016; UNESCO 2016; World Bank
2016).
The total population of these countries in 2010 was approximately 350 million. This
was about 5 percent of the world population or two thirds of the population of the European
Union. The Arab countries differ tremendously in the size of their population, the most
populous Arab country, Egypt, is a home for more than 80 million people whereas the
smallest Arab countries in population size, Comoros and Djibouti, have a population of less
than one million (World Bank 2015a). Most obviously the population of Arab states is
characterised by two factors, they speak Arabic and are Muslims. However, the population of
these countries is not homogenous in these respects. For example there are many Arab
Christians living in the region, about half of the Moroccans belong to the ethnic and linguistic
group of Berbers, and there are Kurdish minorities living in Syria and Iraq (Gelvin 2012: 1–
2). In Somalia, Djibouti, and the Comoros, most of the citizens do not speak Arabic nor
identify themselves as Arabs. Often when the Arab world is discussed, these three countries
actually get less attention (Byun & Hollander 2015: 32).
More generally, the Arab countries share some common features; the population is
characterised by relatively large youth cohort, the political and economic power is
concentrated for a small group of people, the security apparatus is wide-ranging, and political
freedoms and civil liberties are severely violated. Anyway, there are also considerable
differences between the Arab countries. Some countries have very rich natural resources
whereas some do not. In 2010, on the eve of the Arab Spring, the Arab countries were
represented at all levels of Human Development Index. The most developed Arab country
according to the index was United Arab Emirates which was ahead of Estonia and just behind
Slovakia, the least developed Arab country Sudan was ranked between Afghanistan and
Malawi. Some Arab countries were not included in the listing because of the lack of data, if
5Somalia were ranked, it would most likely been behind Sudan (United Nations Development
Programme 2010; Malik & Awadallah 2013: 297; Mirkin 2013: 13; Rand 2013: vii–ix).
Each of the Arab countries also has its own history. After the First World War and in
the times of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, many new states were established in the
region. Largely Europeans drew the new borders, which had little to do with ancient tribal
relations (Jones 2012: 452). Unlike any other Arab state, Tunisia and Egypt have a history of
state building starting from nineteenth century. This history has created strong national
identities in Tunisia and Egypt (Gelvin 2012: 36). In the other end Libya and Yemen have
experienced neither much institutional development nor unity. Yemen was divided into South
Yemen and North Yemen until 1990 and both in Yemen and Libya there are tribal divisions,
which regimes have used to divide their populations and to prevent the formation of a
consistent opposition. The population centres are located scatteredly, in addition, the countries
have lacked a functioning government and bureaucracy to rule their territory already before
the Arab Spring uprisings (Gelvin 2012: 73–78).
2.2. Arab Spring
Little less than six years ago the wave of protests and revolutions, which soon was dubbed as
the Arab Spring, swept through most of the Arab world. Somewhere the revolutions toppled
rulers who had governed for decades, somewhere they led to brutal civil wars. Today, its
impact is still clearly evident in the Arab world—and beyond.
Mostly the Arab Spring came as a big surprise for analysts and academics. Scholars had
paid their attention in explaining how unpopular and undemocratic regimes in the region were
able to hold on to their power for decades when most of the developing world had seen some
form of democratisation from the 1970s to 1990s (Gause III 2011: 81; Jones 2012: 447–448;
Rand 2013: vii–ix). Later, a lot of books and articles have been written exploring the progress,
origins and possible influences of the Arab Spring.
In December 2010 in a Tunisian provincial town, the fruit and vegetable vendor
Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest against the actions of corrupted local police.
This was followed by protests which erupted also in the capital Tunis and after some weeks
the protests unseated president Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia for twenty-three years.
Inspired by the peaceful revolution in Tunisia protesters took to the streets in Egypt, Jordan
and Algeria in January 2011. In February Mubarak who had been president of Egypt since
1981 was forced to resign after violent demonstrations and international pressure. During the
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Map 1. Demands and fatalities of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011.
7year 2011 protests and uprisings spread to most of the Arab countries. In Libya and in Syria
demonstrations and revolts were answered violently and the countries fell into civil war. Al-
Qaddafi, Libyan ruler since 1969, was killed in 2011 and the thirty-three year reign of Yemeni
president Saleh ended in February 2012 (Gause III 2011: 81; Kuhn 2012: 649; Masetti et al.
2013: 5; Rand 2013: 1–2).
Map 1 presents the progress of the Arab Spring in 2011 in the Arab League member
states. The map shows that the nature of the events varied greatly throughout the region. In
some countries there were no Arab Spring -related protests—countries filled with diagonal
stripes. In countries where protests occurred the demands made by protesters and the
opposition ranged widely, from economic reforms to regime change—demands shown with
different colours. Also the level of violence varied greatly, in some countries there were no
fatalities whereas some saw high numbers of deaths—the darker the shade the more fatalities.
In the beginning, many saluted the events of the Arab Spring with great hopes. There
was optimism in the air that, after protesters had demanded an end for authoritarianism and
the revolutions had toppled several dictators, the Arab Spring would guide the Arab world to
the path towards democracy. However, Libya did not settle down after the al-Qaddafi regime
fell, since then a brutal civil war has captured also Yemen, and the civil war in Syria has
continued now for more than five years and caused over 250 000 fatalities. From 2011 to
2015 the death toll has exceeded 1 000 in Egypt, and thousands of people have died in Iraq,
Libya, and Yemen. The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—a terrorist organisation
better known by its abbreviation ISIS—controls areas in Iraq and Syria, and in Libya too. The
only country which has seen some positive progress is Tunisia, after the Arab Spring there
have been two free elections, people have greater rights than before, and the country is largely
peaceful. But otherwise, after five years the Arab Spring has mainly led to armed violence and
the resurgence of authoritarian regimes (Robbins 2015; United Nations 2015a; The
Independent 2016; Yassin-Kassab et al. 2016).
Because this thesis tries to trace what the role of the unemployment was in the onset of
the Arab Spring, I will not go into details in what has happened in the years following the
Arab Spring. For the theoretical considerations of this thesis it is important, that due to the
Arab Spring there was political instability of many kinds in the Arab world, including
demonstrations, riots, rebellion, armed insurgencies, civil wars and terrorism.
The term Arab Spring reflects the optimism which was associated with the events in the
beginning. The Arab revolutions of 2011 were compared to the 1848 revolutions in Europe,
which demanded more democracy and have been entitled as the Spring of Nations (Goldstone
82011: 8). “Democratic waves” in East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan
Africa were also mentioned (Gause III 2011: 81–82; Gelvin 2012: 31). After political
instability has captured much of the region these optimistic voices have faded, at least for
now. The term Arab Spring is maybe not fully justifiable, as we have not seen the awaited
summer, the blossom of democracy, following from it. Rather, some have suggested that the
Arab Spring turned to Islamist or Arab Winter (Totten 2012; Kurzman et al. 2013; Wolff
2014). Nevertheless, I will use the term Arab Spring in this thesis with all its connotations.
This is simply because it still seems to be the most used term for these uprisings, and as other
terms, Arab uprisings for example, might be confused with some other rebellions in history.
The beginning of the Arab Spring has been seen as an outcome of various factors.
Proposed factors include high unemployment, the large share of youth in the population,
autocratic and bad governance, human right violations, increased food prices, an increase in
educational attainment, the social media, a weak private sector, a state dominated economic
system, and oil (Gause III 2011; Goldstone 2011; Allansson et al. 2012; Campante & Chor
2012; Gelvin 2012; Hoffman & Jamal 2012; Malik & Awadallah 2013).
The protests and revolutions of the Arab Spring shared various common features. Most
notably they emerged roughly at same time and this is maybe the main reason which makes us
to study them as one phenomenon. Generally protesters in other countries were clearly
encouraged by the success of toppling rulers in Tunisia and Egypt and the later uprisings
copied techniques of mobilisations from earlier ones. Throughout the Arab world protesters
utilised tactics of peaceful resistance and upheavals manifested through large demonstrations.
Everywhere the protests took place in central squares of major cities, and squares were
renamed as “Tahrir” square according to the main scene of demonstrations in Cairo. The
uprisings were also marked by the absence of particular protest leaders (Allansson et al. 2012:
45; Gelvin 2012: 31, 53–54; Rand 2013: 1–2).
On the other hand there were notable differences between the countries as to how the
Arab Spring appeared. As the map 1 showed the demands by protesters and opposition varied
greatly between countries. Similarly outcomes were remarkably different (Allansson et al.
2012: 46; The Independent 2016). There are some clear connections between the demands
and the outcomes. As can be seen from the map, in all countries where protesters demanded
regime change there were more than 25 deaths in the first year of the Arab Spring, and
respectively in countries where demands were limited to economic or political reforms, there
were less than 25 fatalities. Further, eight of the Arab states are monarchies, and they were
less challenged, only one Arab monarchy, Bahrain, faced demands for regime change
9(Allansson et al. 2012: 46, 55). This has been explained by the greater flexibility of political
structures in monarchies (Goldstone 2011: 13). Also the composition of the armies is
suggested to have an impact in the outcomes. In Tunisia and Egypt the armies were fairly
independent and institutionalised and in the times of revolutions the military turned against
their rulers and forced Ben Ali and Mubarak to leave. In Libya and Yemen less
institutionalised armies fell apart, some units stayed to support the regime, while some
defected to the opposition and some did not take part in hostilities at all. In some countries the
regime represented an ethnic or regional minority, and the army was taken from the same
minority. In these cases it was in the interests of the army to support the ruler; if the ruler
would have been overthrown, the army would likely have been replaced as well (Gause III
2011: 84–85; Goldstone 2011: 12–13). There were also other differences between the Arab
states during the upheavals, in some countries the regime or its opponents got support from
other countries and in other cases there were no involvement from outside (Allansson et al.
2012: 52–55).
Later, when we turn to explore the significance of unemployment in these uprisings, it is
important to remember that several factors have influenced in the manner in which the events
have evolved in each country. This means that even if unemployment did play a role in the
onset of the revolutions, it does not necessarily mean, that higher unemployment would
simply be connected to a higher likelihood of violence. All intermingling variables would
make this kind of modelling quite complicated.
Already before the Arab Spring, protesting had been common in the Arab countries.
According to the World Barometer Survey conducted in 2001–2006 the citizens of the Arab
world had protested or demonstrated considerably more often compared to any other
developing world region—East Asia, South Asia, Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa
(Bratton 2009: 3, 9–11). Many Arab countries saw large and violent riots against the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its neoliberal economic policy in the 1980s and 1990s
(Gelvin 2012: 17). There were riots throughout the Arab countries in 2007 because of the
climbing food prices (Gelvin 2012: 22). In Tunisia and Egypt workers had been striking for
their rights for decades, Algeria had witnessed almost constant strikes, demonstrations, and
riots since 2001, human rights groups had started their actions in Syria in 2000, successive
waves of protests had emerged in Jordan and Morocco, and in Bahrain protests on political
issues had been on the rise for two decades (Ottaway & Hamzawy 2011: 5; Gelvin 2012: 136,
142–143). During these years before the uprisings many states had cut down benefits of the
middle-class, and consequently several countries throughout the region experienced also a rise
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in labour activism. In Egypt between 2004 and the start of the Arab Spring there were more
than three thousand labour actions which involved more than two million workers (Gelvin
2012: 18–19, 55–56). So in short, protesting was nothing new in the Arab countries when the
Arab Spring uprisings started, but the magnitude and the consequences of these protests were
unexpected. Gelvin has suggested that the people in the Arab world took to the streets because
authoritarian states offered few other options to inﬂuence in politics. Political institutions
were weak and it might have been impossible to vote down those who really used power
(Gelvin 2012: 5, 24).
2.3. Labour markets and unemployment in the Arab world
This chapter explores the characteristics of the Arab labour markets in general and especially
the nature of unemployment. My emphasis is in describing labour markets of the region
before the Arab Spring.
Figure 1. Unemployment rates in the Arab world, the European Union, and globally 1991–
2014.
As ﬁgure 1 shows, unemployment in the Arab world is, generally speaking, substantial
compared to the world average. Especially the youth unemployment rate is high. The 2008
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financial crisis caused a considerable increase in unemployment in the European Union, but
the Arab countries as a whole did not see this increase after 2008. Actually in 2010, on the eve
of the Arab Spring, the average of the unemployment rates of the Arab countries was at the
lowest level since 1991. From 2010 to 2011 the unemployment rate, and especially the youth
unemployment rate, of the Arab world rose significantly. But the uprisings of early 2011 did
not provoke this rise, instead the rise from 2010 to 2011 followed from the Arab Spring and
the turbulences it caused (International Labour Organization 2012a: 7; Mirkin 2013: 22).
There are three socio-economic groups whose unemployment rate is notably high in the
Arab countries: the youth, the educated and women. It is not uncommon that the
unemployment rate among the youth is higher than the unemployment rate on average. Figure
1 shows that the young are unemployed more often also globally and within the European
Union. As mentioned earlier the population of the Arab countries is characterised by the high
share of the youth. This creates pressure on labour markets which should provide jobs for
numerous young citizens reaching the working age. Thus the large youth cohort might also be
partial explanation for the high total unemployment rate (Chaaban 2010: 7; Assaad 2014: 1;
World Bank 2015a).
Another group considerably affected by unemployment are the highly educated. In
general in the Arab world the highly educated are suffering from unemployment as much as
people with a lower education level, and in some countries, for example in Tunisia and Egypt,
the unemployment rates are even higher among the highly educated than among the less
educated. This, in turn, is a unique situation in the world as generally education enhances
chances to get a job (Chaaban 2010: 20; Durac 2013: 180; Mirkin 2013: 24). In Egypt from
1998 to 2006 there was a widespread decline in the total unemployment rate. However,
university graduates were the only educational group whose unemployment rate rose from
1998 to 2006. This was possibly because of the swift accretion of university graduates
entering the labour markets since 2000 (Assaad 2007: 17–19, 34). Also in other Arab
countries the numbers of people acquiring high education has risen during decades preceding
the Arab Spring, but there have not been enough jobs available for these graduates (Goldstone
2011: 12). More generally, another factor explaining the high unemployment rates in the Arab
world is the mismatch between skills demanded by labour markets and the education provided
for the labour force (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 10–11; Chaaban
2010: 7).
Lastly, in the Arab world women are more often unemployed than men and the
differences are considerable. In 2010 the unemployment rate for women was more than twice
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as high as that of men, and similarly the unemployment rate for young women was more than
twice as high as that of young men. Also globally both total and youth unemployment rates
are higher for women than for men, but at a global scale these differences are minimal
compared to differences between genders in unemployment in the Arab world (United
Nations Development Programme 2009: 10–11; World Bank 2015a).
Figure 2. Unemployment rate in 2010 in Arab League member states.
As noted, unemployment in general is prevalent in the Arab world, but there are still
outstanding differences in the unemployment rates between the Arab countries. This is clearly
demonstrated by ﬁgure 2. In Yemen and Tunisia, for example, the unemployment rate has
during 1991–2014 ﬂuctuated around 15%, but during the same years the unemployment rate
for Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates has constantly remained under 5%, and for Qatar at
the most at 2%. Where many Arab countries faced signiﬁcant problems in providing
employment opportunities for their citizens, there has been a large volume of labour migration
to oil exporting countries. Although many Arab countries face high unemployment rates,
especially among the youth, comparison is always relative; there are from 2011 onwards no
Arab countries, where the International Labour Organization (ILO) would have recorded
higher youth unemployment rate than in Spain (Mirkin 2013: 17, 28; World Bank 2015a).
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Notably, in the Arab world more than 10% of the employed work in the informal sector.
This include people working for unregistered companies, those who are self-employed, and
other unskilled workers. Employment in the informal sector is characterised by seasonal and
part-time terms, fluctuating income, and limited benefits, in other words the absence of
pension, paid maternity and annual leave (Chaaban 2010: 18–19; Arampatzi et al. 2015: 8).
The high unemployment rates are rooted in the economic structures of the Arab states.
Firstly, in the Arab economies, the states are dominant economic actors, the public sectors are
oversized (Malik & Awadallah 2013; Assaad 2014: 1). Oil and gas are the most important
sources of revenue for many states, for example, before the uprisings Libya got some 95% of
its revenues from oil (Gelvin 2012: 76; Malik & Awadallah 2013: 297). Also foreign aid is an
important source of money for the region. Every year from 1960 to 2008 the net aid per capita
has been higher in the Middle East and North Africa compared to Sub-Saharan Africa or
South Asia (Malik & Awadallah 2013: 298). Compared to any other region of the world, the
Arab states get a considerably lower portion of their revenue from taxation. The fact that the
Arab states are economically less dependent on their citizens is perhaps also a partial
explanation for why authoritarian governments are so common (Gelvin 2012: 7–8). As
hydrocarbons are dominated by the public sector and also foreign aid runs through
governments, this allows the states to dominate economic actions.
Secondly, in the Arab countries private sectors are weak (United Nations Development
Programme 2009: 10–11, 72; Malik & Awadallah 2013; Assaad 2014: 1). Private sectors are
also unlikely to develop, as the Arab world has remained fragmented and economic linkages
across the region are frail. Fragmentation prevents companies from producing for bigger
markets (Malik & Awadallah 2013: 297). More generally, it is hard for small- to medium-size
enterprises to do business in many Arab countries, although differences between countries are
tremendous (World Bank 2011b: 1–2). As aid money received from abroad and fuel exports
are important sources of revenue for Arab states, these means do not employ many people. On
the other hand manufacturing would be labour intensive, but it remains scarce in the Arab
world. A vibrant private sector would be needed to provide jobs for people, and, as said, that
is missing (Campante & Chor 2012: 174; Malik & Awadallah 2013).
2.4. Unemployment as a driver behind the Arab Spring in the literature
Unemployment is one of the factors most often mentioned when considering what launched
the Arab Spring, if not the most often mentioned. In some sources the relationship is seen
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directly as causal, some are more cautious in their wordings. Goldstone wrote soon after the
wake of the Arab Spring that “[r]ising food prices and high unemployment have fuelled
popular protests from Morocco to Oman” (Goldstone 2011: 8). Malik & Awadallah posed that
“Arab revolutions were fueled by poverty, unemployment and lack of economic opportunity”
(Malik & Awadallah 2013: 296). ILO titled its analysis about the events more
straightforwardly: “Youth unemployment in the Arab world is a major cause for rebellion”
(International Labour Organization 2011b). Also many others have, in one form or another,
suggested unemployment to be a factor which led to the Arab Spring in particular countries or
more generally (see for example Johnstone & Mazo 2011: 13; Lotan et al. 2011: 1376;
Ottaway & Hamzawy 2011: 4–6; Campante & Chor 2012; Hoffman & Jamal 2012: 168;
Kuhn 2012: 649; Mirkin 2013: 7).
In addition to scholars and academic publications, this relationship between
unemployment and the Arab Spring has also been promoted widely through mass media (see
for example CNN 2011; Daily Mail 2011; The Guardian 2011a; The Guardian 2011b;
Helsingin Sanomat 2015).
Although unemployment is often stated to be significant factor in the onset of the Arab
Spring, this topic is seldom studied closely. Next I will introduce studies which have paid
some more attention to the relationship between unemployment and the Arab Spring than just
suggested unemployment as a driver for the uprisings.
In their article contemplating the causes of the Arab Spring, Campante & Chor discuss
extensively the relationships between education, unemployment and different kinds of
political actions. Authors divide world countries into four categories according to their
unemployment level and increase in average schooling years during the past 30 years. They
show that people are more willing to protest in countries with high unemployment and a rapid
increase in years of schooling, and most of the Arab countries are positioned in this quarter.
Campante & Chor also find that at the global scale with some model specifications a high
unemployment rate, an increase in the years of schooling, and an increase in the share of the
youth population raise the likelihood that the rulers will be changed, either democratically or
violently. The authors argue that the combination of an increased education level and high
unemployment can be seen “as an important root cause of the Arab Spring” (Campante &
Chor 2012).
Korotayev et al. have modelled quantitatively factors which influenced the outcome of
the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. More precisely they have studied the impact of five
theoretically justified explanatory variables on how resistant each Arab country was against
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Arab Spring events: in their model, countries which experienced a successful revolution in
2011 showed the lowest level of resistance and those extremely resistant faced only small-
scale protest actions. One of the explanatory variables in the model measures “combustible”
social groups in the society, in other words the share of youth, the youth unemployment rate,
the proportion of unemployed youth compared to the total adult population, and the
proportion of the highly educated unemployed among the youth. Korotayev et al. find that the
presence of “combustible” social groups in a country has low statistical significance when
predicting the country’s resistance for instability caused by the Arab Spring, some other
variables in their model perform considerably better (Korotayev et al. 2014).
Byun & Hollander run a similar analysis, they first categorise Arab countries according
to the level of unrest they experienced during the Arab Spring. They then test a large set of
variables which are proposed as causes of the Arab Spring and find that unemployment does
not have a significant impact on the likelihood of unrest. Corruption was the factor most
significantly correlated with the levels of unrest and the next most powerful explanatory
variable was inflation (Byun & Hollander 2015). After discussing earlier regime type, the
consistency of the army, and all other factors which have arguably influenced the outcome in
each country, it is possibly not surprising that the impact of unemployment is hard to find in
country level models, especially with this small sample size.
Some studies have, based on different survey data sets, aimed to find out which factors
had an impact on the likelihood of protest participation at the individual level.
Grounded on the first wave of the Arab Barometer survey, Hoffman & Jamal study the
values and behaviour of Arab youth, but also shortly the factors which increase the
engagement in protest participation in Arab countries included in the data set. They observe
that—“[c]ontrary to what might be expected” —unemployment does not seem to drive
citizens to protest, actually the other way around; all their models indicate that being
unemployed statistically significantly lowers the likelihood of an individual to take part in
protest (Hoffman & Jamal 2012).
Shafiq & Vignoles note that “perhaps surprisingly” their descriptive data do not show
that the unemployed would be more likely to protest. However, their main focus is to study
whether those males who earn less than expected based on their educational level protest
more often. Authors run their analyses in seven Arab countries and use data collected between
2010 and 2014. Still, they do not specifically study protest participation in the Arab Spring
protests, but instead, whether people have generally participated in a protest, march, or sit-in
in the year of the survey or during the two preceding years. In general the results do not
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support their hypothesis; labour force participants whose actual earnings are lower than
expected earnings are not more likely to protest. Mostly there is no statistically significant
relationship between the income gap and protesting, and when there is, it often indicates that
those earning more than expected on the basis of their education, protest more often (Shafiq &
Vignoles 2015).
Doherty & Schraeder study individual-level factors that affected political participation
in three occasions in Tunisia, participation in protests that led to the ouster of Ben Ali, voting
in the elections which followed, and participation in protests after the elections. The authors
find that there were no statistically significant differences between the unemployed and the
employed in how often they took part in protests, this applies both for protests before the
ouster of Ben Ali and for protests after elections. In contrast, employed citizens were
statistically significantly more likely to vote in the elections than the unemployed (Doherty &
Schraeder 2015).
Hoffman & Jamal have analysed the second wave of the Arab Barometer to find out if
religious individuals were more likely to engage in the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia and
Egypt. They have included unemployment status as a control variable and through all their
model specifications being unemployed is not a statistically significant predictor of Arab
Spring protest participation (Hoffman & Jamal 2014: 599, 603–604). Using the same data set
Beissinger et al. have also studied protest participation in Tunisia and Egypt, not surprisingly
then they find similarly that unemployment does not have a statistically significant impact on
protest participation in either country (Beissinger et al. 2012: 13).
Similarly the International Republican Institute provides findings about individual level
attitudes and behaviours. The institute conducted a survey in Tunisia in March 2011, two
months after the Arab Spring revolutions toppled Ben Ali. There respondents were asked to
indicate the single biggest problem facing Tunisia. Unemployment was the most often
specified problem, 60% of the respondents mentioned it as the first or the second biggest
problem. Second in line was internal security, which was mentioned first or second by 46% of
respondents, followed next by living standards (20%) and government corruption (17%)
(International Republican Institute 2011a). The International Republican Institute conducted a
survey also in Egypt in April 2011 three months after the uprisings there had overthrown
Mubarak and found that two thirds of the respondents regarded low living standard or the lack
of jobs as the factor which most influenced their support of or participation in the Arab Spring
protests. The second most often mentioned factor was lack of democracy and political reform,
which got about one fifth of the answers (International Republican Institute 2011b). These
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results indicate that people in Tunisia and Egypt indeed considered unemployment as a major
problem at the time of the uprisings.
Some have explored trends in unemployment in the years preceding the uprisings.
Mirkin suggested that in the decades preceding the Arab Spring uprisings the frustration on
employment opportunities was growing among the youth as oil exporting Arab countries had
increasingly turned to employ South Asian migrant workers instead of Arabs. This had
blocked an employment opportunity which many have utilised (Mirkin 2013: 8, 17).
According to Goldstone, governments in Egypt and Tunisia had long created jobs to keep
citizens satisfied but these subsidises had been cut out in the 2000s to reduce expenses
(Goldstone 2011: 12).
Cincotta points out that from 1998 to 2008 ILO had recorded an increase in the total
numbers of the unemployed youth in the Middle East but in North Africa there was slight
decline—noteworthy, in these figures Egypt is placed within North Africa. Thus Cincotta
notes that “an analyst trying to predict unrest from ILO reports may have looked more toward
the Middle East and away from North Africa to discern a turning point after which youth
might more readily mobilize” (Cincotta 2011: 32).
Korotayev & Zinkina have concentrated on the proposed causes of the Arab Spring in
Egypt. They note that after the mid-2000s the unemployment rate in Egypt started to decrease
because of economic reforms. Unemployment increased slightly from 2008 to 2009 following
a financial crisis, but not as much as in many other countries. In 2010 the unemployment level
decreased again and at the beginning of the revolutions it was about 9%. This was a lower rate
than in the United States, lower than the average of the European Union, and half of the
unemployment rate of Spain. Anyway Korotayev & Zinkina see that high youth
unemployment constituted “the main striking force of the Revolution” as about half of the
unemployed of Egypt were young people aged 20–24 (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011).
Taken together, this existent research provides a mixed picture about the relationship
between unemployment and the Arab Spring. A few notions support the assumption that
unemployment was a significant factor leading to the Arab Spring, but mainly support for this
remains scarce. As indicated, hardly any of these studies have actually paid much attention to
unemployment, instead their focus have been elsewhere. In chapter 4 where I will present
research questions and hypotheses, I will also specify what new information this thesis will
offer compared to these existent studies.
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3. UNEMPLOYMENT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: THEORETICAL
BACKGROUND AND EARLIER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
3.1. Theoretical background
In those sources suggesting high unemployment rates to be a cause for the Arab Spring
uprisings it is rarely specified which theoretical grounds led authors to assume so. However,
there are various theoretical arguments which link higher unemployment rates with a higher
likelihood for political instability, and political instability is here understood as the whole
scale of actions from protesting and rioting to terrorism, insurgency and armed conflicts. On
the other hand some argue that this kind of link does not exist, and further, some scholars see
that the connection runs vice versa, that the higher level of unemployment predicts less
political instability. In this chapter I will take a closer look at the theoretical arguments of this
field, first at those supporting positive connection between unemployment and political
instability and thereafter at those assuming that there is no connection or the connection is
negative. After going through this from a theoretical perspective, I will turn to empirical
results from earlier research. It is relevant to study the connection of unemployment both to
protesting and to organised violence, as the Arab Spring manifested itself in both ways.
3.1.1. Theoretical approaches supporting positive linkage of unemployment and political
instability
The opportunity-cost approach is based on the idea that individuals take part in armed
rebellions and collective acts of violence because of material inducements. When options for
non-violent employment are scarce, soldiering might offer people alluring opportunities to
gain money. Consequently high unemployment rates can fuel a conflict by easing the
recruitment of rebels (Justino 2012: 15–16). Further, Lichbach argues that the unemployed
will also participate in protests more probably because they face no opportunity-costs from
losing time at paid work (Lichbach 1995: 342). The opportunity-cost approach can be traced
back to Becker, who introduced it in relation to criminology in the 1960s (Becker 1968;
Cramer 2010: 3; Berman et al. 2011: 498).
Where opportunity-cost is primarily an economic approach, the relative deprivation
theory has been more in favour with social psychologists. When the relative deprivation
theory is discussed, Gurr is often raised as notable contributor to it (Sambanis 2002: 223;
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Fearon & Laitin 2003: 78; Caruso & Gavrilova 2012: 1). According to Gurr, relative
deprivation is experienced by those whose actual conditions and goods achieved do not equal
what they expected to gain and to what they think they are rightfully entitled. What is
important is the individual’s perception of deprivation, people whose expectations are not met
can feel themselves deprived even if an objective outsider would not consider them to be
deprived. Gurr sees that the relatively deprived use political violence to struggle against their
position and to rectify the situation (Gurr 1970). Gurr writes primarily about relative
deprivation as a cause for political violence, but according to Klandermans the scholars of
social movements have often equated relative deprivation also with protesting, those
relatively deprived protest to redress the deprivation they face (Klandermans 2011: 40–42).
Greed or grievance is a dichotomy often mentioned when discussing the causes of civil
wars. This juxtaposition was originally constructed by Collier and Hoeffler (Buhaug et al.
2014: 419). In their study Collier & Hoeffler suggested that “greed” can be a key factor in the
onset of civil wars; when opportunities for rebellion are suitable, civil wars will break out.
They argued that suitable conditions for civil war prevail when finance for rebellion is
available, costs for rebellion are low—in other words recruiting rebels is cheap—and the
population is dispersed—a dispersed population giving military advantage to rebels.
According to their results grievances, such as inequality, ethnic polarisation or religious
fractionalisation, were insignificant when predicting the outbreak of civil wars (Collier &
Hoeffler 2004). Buhaug et al. note that the grievance side of the dichotomy is nowadays often
associated with the relative deprivation theory introduced above (Buhaug et al. 2014: 419).
On the other hand, according to Spittaels & Hilgert, there is no unified grievance camp. This
is because the category of grievance literature was created by Collier and other scholars
favouring greed as an explanation, and when they started the debate “we” versus “them” they
identified most of the other literature on the causes of civil wars as grievance approach
(Spittaels & Hilgert 2008: 6). The greed approach lets us assume that unemployment
increases the likelihood for civil war because recruiting rebels is easier, in this respect the
greed argument overlaps with opportunity-cost approach. On the other hand the grievance
approach, however diverse it might be, can also be used in explaining the aggression of the
unemployed; if being unemployed is a grievance, it should lead to rebellion. Urdal states that
the differences between greed and grievance perspectives should not be overstated since the
same factors can be seen as causes both through greed and grievance lenses (Urdal 2006:
610). Low income can ease recruiting rebels and thus increase the opportunity for violence
from the greed perspective but equally well it might be considered as a grievance. Spittaels &
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Hilgert see as a shortcoming of the debate that it limits the potential factors leading to armed
conflicts down to two (Spittaels & Hilgert 2008: 11).
3.1.2. Theoretical approaches challenging positive linkage of unemployment and political
instability
There is a large body of literature arguing that whether causes for political instability are
framed as greed, grievances, deprivation or opportunities and costs, these approaches are too
simplistic especially when the unemployed and their supposed struggles are considered.
Firstly, instead of driving people to protest or to other activities, it is pointed out that
unemployment causes passivity and resignation. Kieselbach et al. describe that among
European youth, unemployment has led to stigmatisation, those who try to find a job can be
blamed for their inability in succeeding to find one, and those who do not try are blamed for
misusing the welfare system. In addition the young unemployed have reported passivity,
boredom, depression and feelings of interiority (Kieselbach et al. 2001: 67–68).
Unemployment can also risk young people’s overall integration into society (Kieselbach et al.
2001: 24). If public opinion and elected officials consider unemployment to be a personal
fault of an individual, the protests of the unemployed lack legitimacy (Chabanet & Faniel
2011: 392–393). Stigmatisation has been considered one of the most important obstacles for
the collective action of the unemployed (Perry & Reiss 2011: 32).
Secondly, to think that the employed are wealthy and happy and the unemployed are
deprived and unhappy might be both simplistic and western mindset. Even in Finland the
salary of some employed people is so low that they queue to get food aid (Huili 2015: 8). And
if we think globally, there are millions of working poor, people who are employed but whose
working conditions are so dreadful that it is likely to be no more difficult to recruit rebels and
soldiers among them than among the unemployed (Cramer 2010: 17). There are also two
aspects worth noting when discussing unemployment in the developing economies. As the
definition of unemployment includes that an individual is looking for work, people who are
without work and willing to work but are not looking for work are not classified as
unemployed. This might be the case in developing economies where people are largely self-
employed. Alternatively people are maybe not looking for work because they consider job
opportunities limited or they consider seeking work with conventional means useless, if most
of the working opportunities are in the informal economy (World Bank 2015b). In addition,
when in the developing countries state welfare benefits are mostly non-existent, people cannot
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be unemployed in the sense we understand it, but people have to have some form of work to
survive (United Nations 2004: 67; Cramer 2010: 15). These remarks related to the concept of
unemployment in the developing economies also apply to some extent for the Arab countries.
Thirdly, collective identity is important in collective action such as protesting. As being
unemployed is a transitory state and people often want to get rid of being unemployed we
might ask, how the unemployed could identify with a group they do not wish to belong to
(Klandermans 2011: 46). In addition, the unemployed are a socially heterogeneous group,
they are men and women, young and old, educated and uneducated, rural and urban, and their
only common denominator is that at the moment they do not have a job. The subgroup within
the unemployed which has shared identity to a greater extent are the long-term unemployed.
But then again they are likely to suffer even more from stigmatisation, limited resources and
the desocialising effects of unemployment (Chabanet & Faniel 2011: 394).
Fourthly, following Chabanet & Faniel, social movements are never spontaneous
events. It is always required that there are actors who define and rationalise social action and
raise awareness (Chabanet & Faniel 2011: 397). Although the Arab Spring protests have been
labelled spontaneous time to time, this is not the whole truth. Gelvin reminds how the April 6
Movement among other organisations was coordinating the Egyptian uprisings. The
movement for example organised twenty-one marches to Tahrir Square instead of one,
because one march could easily have been broken by the security forces. These tactics
Egyptian activists adopted from the Serbian youth movement Otpor, which had earlier headed
the overthrow of the Serbian ruler Slobodan Milosevic (Gelvin 2012: 54–55). Chabanet &
Faniel emphasise that good relations with labour unions are crucial for the mobilisation of the
unemployed, but labour unions rarely raise the situation of the unemployed to a priority. There
are still notable differences between the labour unions in how they take the jobless into
consideration (Chabanet & Faniel 2011: 401–402). As Chabanet & Faniel, della Porta and
Baglioni et al. stress that relations with various kinds of organisations—unions, secular and
religious non-governmental organisations and political parties—play significant role in the
emergence of the protests of the unemployed, without these relations mobilisation is far less
likely (Baglioni et al. 2010: 161–167; della Porta 2010). According to Perry & Reiss,
following from the lack of organisation and employment in the informal sector, the sustained
mobilisation of the unemployed rarely happens in the developing world (Perry & Reiss
2011: 35).
Fifth, the unemployed lack resources needed in protesting. Among others Schlozman &
Verba argue that even if certain preconditions for protests are fulfilled, preconditions
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including a sense of economic dissatisfaction and the perceived idea of a problem being
shared, the political mobilisation might not ensue without resources. By resources they mean
money, political skills, but also leadership, organisational resources, communications
networks and at least some degree of solidarity (Schlozman & Verba 1979: 12–19). For a
protest to emerge it is important that the organisers of the protest reach potential participants.
This is maybe not easy in the case of the unemployed, as their social networks are limited and
the population of the unemployed is as heterogeneous as it is. Klandermans argues that
because the unemployed lack resources, often the most deprived do not protest, but instead
those somewhat better off do (Chabanet & Faniel 2011: 397; Klandermans 2011: 46). Krueger
& Malečková hypothesise that the same applies to terrorism as “terrorism resembles a violent
form of political engagement”; those who have “enough education and income to concern
themselves with more than minimum economic subsistence”, are more likely to engage in
terrorism (Krueger & Malečková 2003: 142).
Further, protests most often do not provide employment opportunities to the protesters
(Klandermans 2011: 55). Schlozman & Verba theorise that the unemployed can be expected
to mobilise only if they feel that the government is responsible for their problems. If
individuals do not find that the government can or should help them we should not anticipate
protests (Schlozman & Verba 1979: 13–14). In addition, Schlozman & Verba suggest that
maybe it is more rational for the unemployed to devote their time and skills to finding work
than to engage in political activities (Schlozman & Verba 1979: 351). This is linked with the
so called free rider problem. Those who take part in protests against an authoritarian regime
can be punished. On the other hand if some collective good is achieved by protesting, people
will benefit from it regardless of whether they took part in the protest or not (Moore 1995:
417). As the goods which protests on unemployment aim (e.g. new jobs or better social
benefits) are collective goods this will lead us to ask why any rational unemployed person
would waste his or her time in protesting when free riding is an option (Lahusen 2013: 2).
This question can be asked even more emphatically in the case of authoritarian Arab states
where protesting is risky indeed.
Finally, if a protest of the unemployed has surpassed all the problems mentioned
above—a protest has been organised in the first place but also an unemployed person has
overcome his or her stigma, believes that government is guilty for the unemployment status, is
ready to identify with other unemployed, has heard about the protest through limited social
networks, had found time and money to participate and has ignored the free rider problem—
there is still one thing. As Klandermans argues, the significant final step is to actually take
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part. A study showed that 60 per cent of those who told that they were prepared to participate
in a demonstration the following day still did not do so (Klandermans 2011: 48).
The following notions are more connected to why we might not assume unemployment
to be a factor causing organised violence.
The only conceivable motivation for an individual to join groups that use violence is not
money. Based on studies involving drug dealing gangs in the United States, Cramer argues
that people have joined gangs, not because employment opportunities were not available, but
because employment opportunities available were “demeaning, insecure, and exploitative”.
On the other hand people have joined drug gangs because of friends, solidarity, and respect
which formal employment markets were not able to provide. All gang members did not even
receive an income. Cramer suggests that there are emotional reasons for joining groups or
organisations which use violence whether they are drug gangs, insurgent militias, police
forces or army units. United States citizens volunteering for military service in Iraq were often
from broken homes and had remote relationships with their own parents. Cramer describes
that “the violence of war was also often viewed as redemption, a way out of drudgery or a
way out of shallow consumerism” (Cramer 2010: 9–11). Based on different data sources
Gutierréz-Sanín discusses the motivations people have given for why they joined the
Colombian guerrilla movement FARC. Some recruited tell that they were promised good
payment, but in FARC a salary is not paid except for some exceptional circumstances and the
ornaments of the guerrillas are confiscated, too. Motivations to join are manifold; the allure of
military life, getting a gun, which gives a sense of security but is also a symbol and a source
of status, personal problems, the boredom and miseries of daily life, sexual harassment at
home, belief that life as a guerrilla can provide training and an education, and some
mentioned political ideologies as well (Gutierréz-Sanín 2008: 14, 17, 20–25).
Further, Berman et al. present three implicit assumptions under the logic that large
numbers of unemployed should ease recruiting insurgents and thus increase the likelihood of
organised violence.
"[Firstly,] participation in insurgency is a full-time occupation, in the sense that
individuals cannot be legitimately employed and active insurgents at the same time.
[Secondly,] insurgency is a low-skill occupation so that creating jobs for the marginal
unemployed reduces the pool of potential recruits. [And thirdly,] the supply of labor is a
binding constraint on insurgent organizations.” (Berman et al. 2011: 497).
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Berman et al. remind, that all three assumptions are in some contexts debatable.
As shown above, it is not so simple that the unemployed are deprived and frustrated and
thus they start protesting. Instead, a bunch of other conditions should be taken into
consideration too. Similarly it seems that it is too simple to assume that the unemployed are
deprived, frustrated and in need of money and so they start rebelling.
Berman et al. also present some relationships, in which higher unemployment could be
connected to a lower level of political violence. The first they label rent capture or predation:
if violence is used to gain economic assets, the more wealth there is the more there is
something to expropriate by violence, and consequently the more violence there should be. At
the same time more wealth is arguably connected to a lower level of unemployment, so we
can expect more violence in the times and in the areas of lower unemployment rates.
Secondly, security measures (check points, road blocks and other means to restrict the
movement of people and goods) are likely to increase security and reduce violence but they
simultaneously disturb the economy and thus lead to an increase in unemployment.
Additionally, when the unemployment rate rises, citizens are more desperately in need of
income and more willing to gain money by selling their information about insurgent activities.
Thus counterinsurgents get more information with the same budget and are better prepared to
prevent insurgent attacks in times of higher unemployment. Lastly, if insurgence is considered
as something people do by choice, possibly people start fighting when their basic needs are
filled. This again rather suggests that an improved economic situation would lead to higher
levels of violence at the same time when as it leads to lower levels of unemployment (Berman
et al. 2011: 497–498, 501–502, 516). I think the same logic about basic needs might be
applied also in connection with protesting.
These four points by Berman et al., suggesting that higher unemployment might be
linked to a lower level of political violence also highlight the fact that the relationship
between unemployment and political violence is maybe not direct but can be more complex
and include additional factors (such as security measures or trade of information about
insurgent activities) which affect both variables. Similarly in relation to protesting, Schlozman
& Verba note that people do not only protest when their own interests are at stake. Political
action on unemployment can be taken by citizens who are not unemployed themselves.
Schlozman & Verba argue that unemployment as an issue has more impact on politics than the
unemployed as a group do (Schlozman & Verba 1979: 20). These points are interesting and
worth noting, but they will be given less attention in this thesis. This is because most of the
theory presented is based on the premise that the unemployed themselves are those who
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protest and revolt—or then do not. In addition, my research design is primarily intended to
test whether the unemployed are more active protesters. Only based on the first research
question can these indirect relationships between unemployment, protests and political
violence be discussed.
3.2. Empirical evidence
This chapter introduces earlier empirical findings from various contexts and conflicts around
the world. Results will be presented in four categories. Firstly I will go through studies
showing a positive connection between the unemployment and protesting, then studies
indicating either no connection or a negative connection between the unemployment and
protesting, thirdly I will turn to research suggesting that there is a positive connection between
unemployment and organised violence and lastly I will proceed to research which has found
either no connection or a negative connection between unemployment and organised violence.
This categorisation is the framework of the chapter but it is not followed thoroughly as some
results do not completely fit into these categories.
There is a large body of literature studying relationships between unemployment and
different types of crimes. Since that is not central to this thesis I will not spend much time
with it. But in general, there is no consensus among scholars that the unemployed would be
more likely to commit violent crimes. Poutvaara & Priks conclude in their review on the topic
that empirical evidence supports the assumption of a positive relationship between
unemployment and property crime. But instead, unemployment seems to have no effect on
violent crime, or at least the link is considerably weaker (Poutvaara & Priks 2007: ii, 1).
3.2.1. Empirical research finding positive linkage between unemployment and protesting
Kerbo & Shaffer have studied the relationship between the unemployment rate and protests in
the United States between 1890 and 1940. The numbers of protests are based on the New
York Times newspaper and only protests by the unemployed themselves are included. They
find that if the whole period is studied there is a strong correlation between the unemployment
rate and protests. However, it seems that this correlation is mainly caused by the very high
unemployment rates and massive protests in the 1930s. If these years are ignored the
relationship turns out to be considerably weaker (Kerbo & Shaffer 1986).
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Perhaps the most comprehensive empirical study which lets us expect a positive
relationship between unemployment and participation in the Arab Spring protests is made by
Campante & Chor. They have not studied unemployment as such, but based on World Values
Survey data, they have analysed the role of income in protest participation among 190 000
respondents around the globe. They find that individuals who earn less than expected taken
into account their education level, age and other biographical characteristics are more likely to
take part in demonstrations, strikes, and the occupation of buildings. Campante & Chor
suggest that grievances might partially although probably not fully explain the results. They
note that conclusive forecasts for specific countries should not be performed based on their
models (Campante & Chor 2014). Earlier Campante & Chor have illustrated, again, based on
World Values Survey data, that globally in countries where the unemployment rate is above
the global median and average years of schooling have increased rapidly, individuals are more
keen to take part in peaceful demonstrations compared to countries with lower unemployment
rates or a slighter increase in years of schooling (Campante & Chor 2012: 174–177).
According to Lahusen protests by the unemployed in Sweden, France and Germany
between 1994 and 2004 illustrate that this kind of collective action does happen, and it is
more common than often assumed. Mainly the street protests by the unemployed have still
been local (Lahusen 2013). A comparison between ten European countries, focusing on the
period 1980–2007, has shown that some countries have seen major mobilisations of the
unemployed but in other countries the level of mobilisation has remained limited or been
residual (Chabanet & Faniel 2012).
A collection of essays edited by Reiss & Perry presents fourteen case studies which
show that the unemployed have protested in various countries and with varying levels of
intensity during the two last centuries. Mostly the case studies cover Western countries, but
also one study exploring Palestine is included (Reiss & Perry 2011). In general the
movements of the unemployed in the period between the world wars are studied extensively,
but later there is less research. The editors argue that “often the unemployed are submerged in
the mass character of revolution, and historians have largely failed to identify the specific
contribution made by the unemployed and their networks to this process” (Perry & Reiss
2011: 25, 35). I will come back to this point when discussing the results. In the concluding
chapter Chabanet & Faniel write that the unemployed have mobilised considerably more often
than is thought. Generally mobilisation takes place during periods of high unemployment, but
this does not necessarily mean that there is a direct connection between these two variables. In
addition, in some countries no protests have emerged despite high unemployment and then
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again, in some other countries the unemployed have mobilised even though the
unemployment rate is rather low (Chabanet & Faniel 2011: 404–405).
ILO claims based on its social unrest index, that “[r]esults from the empirical analysis
indicate that economic growth and the unemployment rate are the two most important
determinants of social unrest”. The social unrest index created by the ILO is based on the
Gallup World Poll survey data and it is calculated at country level. Five variables of the
survey are used to generate the index: how much confidence respondents in a country have in
their national government, do they feel that their living standards are becoming worse, how
people in a country perceive local job markets, do people feel that they have freedom in life,
and do they have access to internet. No reasons are given why these factors are considered to
be important in measuring “social unrest” (International Labour Organization 2013b: 14–15).
To me it seems that this index rather aims to measure discontent among people than actual
social unrest. As shown above, many scholars argue that there are various conditions which
have to be met for discontent to materialise as unrests. Thus, discontent is not necessarily
equal to unrest. Further, one variable included in the index is the respondent’s perception of
job markets and another variable is his or her impression about living standards. As authors
note about the variable measuring experienced living standards, this variable “also captures
the effect of unemployment and/or underemployment on families” (International Labour
Organization 2013b: 15). Thus it is reasonable to assume that unemployment has an effect on
at least two out of five of these variables included in the index. This might then partly explain
that, when the index is taken as the explained variable and the unemployment rate is used as
the explanatory variable, there appears to exist a relationship between the index and
unemployment. Eventually I would not consider this evidence provided by the ILO about the
unemployment rate as an important determinant of social unrest fully convincing. ILO has
included a social unrest index also in earlier reports based on the same five variables,
although the weights of the variables have been changed slightly (International Labour
Organization 2011a: 26; International Labour Organization 2012b: 20).
3.2.2. Empirical research finding negative or no linkage between unemployment and
protesting
In the beginning of the 1930s a group of researchers conducted a study in Marienthal, a
village in Austria. In Marienthal roughly three quarters of the families were dependent on
unemployment relief or emergency assistance and only in one fifth of the families of the
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village one or more family members were working. This study found that being unemployed
had made people in the village passive and desperate and particularly their political interest
and activity had become very limited (Jahoda et al. 1933/2002). Some other case studies from
Germany and the United Kingdom during the 1930s concluded similarly that finally
unemployment led to a stage of ideological and especially political indifference (Perry &
Reiss 2011: 3–4). Research conducted in Marienthal has been considered a landmark study
and Lahusen and Baglioni et al. have seen that because of it scholars for a long time after it
took for granted that unemployment leads to exclusion and apathy (Baglioni et al. 2010: 152;
Lahusen 2013: 1).
Bagguley has studied the protests of the unemployed in Britain in 1980s. In the first
years of the decade the number of the unemployed rose sharply and by 1983 the
unemployment rate was one of the highest compared to any advanced Western country.
However, no mass political movements of the unemployed emerged during the 1980s. Instead
there had been widespread political protests among the unemployed half a century earlier.
Bagguley argues that political protests of the unemployed are not dictated by the
unemployment rates per se, but the changing relationship between the unemployed and the
state. In the 1980s unemployment is not so clearly connected to poverty and maybe that is
why there is less to protest about compared to the 1930s (Bagguley 1991).
Giugni studied the mobilisation of the unemployed in six European countries from 1995
to 2002 based on data produced as a part of the UNEMPOL project. The acts of political
claim making which are included in the data are coded based on newspaper articles in six
newspapers, one from every country under study. Giugni concludes that political participation
among the unemployed is rather low compared to, for example, migrants or peace and
ecology activists. There are country specific differences in how the unemployed have
mobilised. Giugni hypothesis that opportunity structures (for example the openness of
political system and the relationships with the elite) and a discursive context (for instance how
legitimate the claims are considered) explain the differences between the countries in the
levels of the mobilisation of the unemployed. This hypothesis receives partial support (Giugni
2008). Della Porta has analysed existing research and used the same UNEMPOL data set to
study unemployment protests in six European countries. She concludes similarly that although
rare, these protests do exist (della Porta 2010: 46, 67).
Baglioni et al. have studied protests of the unemployed in France, Germany, and Italy in
the late 1990s and in the beginning of the 21st century. Their primary empirical data is
collected through interviewing 117 representatives of labour unions, employers’ associations,
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the organisations of the unemployed, and other civil society groups. They find that although
high levels of mobilisation often occur in times of high unemployment, the actions by the
unemployed are in general sporadic or even marginal. Baglioni et al. write that industrial
change in these countries during the 1980s and 1990s left many people unemployed and that
this hit especially certain regions, and in these regions protest movements of the unemployed
have also been more common. The authors discuss conditions which affect the emergence of
protests, these are mostly the same factors which I have introduced earlier in this thesis. They
emphasise that protests are more likely if those who confront unemployment have lost rights
or goods to which they were entitled earlier (Baglioni et al. 2010). This argument is grounded
on the relative deprivation theory as those who had jobs supposedly had higher expectations
for the future than to become unemployed. Additionally, in a situation where the loss of jobs
is caused by industrial change, protests might be more probable since the unemployed have a
shared identity as former workers in certain industries.
There are two studies from Nigeria analysing protest participation, both based on
different survey data. Oyefusi has surveyed some 1 300 people living in the Nigerian delta.
According to his results, after controlling for age, education and a set of other variables,
unemployment statistically significantly lowers the likelihood that an individual is willing to
take part in violent protests. The relationship between unemployment and peaceful protest is
also negative, but statistically insignificant (Oyefusi 2010). Scacco reports similarly that
respondents with paying jobs are, in all her models, more willing to take part in violent
demonstrations than the unemployed and in five out of six models this relationship is
statistically significant. The results also show that the respondents who have attended
community meetings are across all models statistically significantly more willing to take part
in violent demonstrations. Scacco interprets this as an indication that social networks are an
important resource for protesting (Scacco 2007). However, as both these studies explore the
willingness to protest, the importance of an individual’s resources to actually take part in a
protest action should play a minor role compared to studies where actual participation is
studied. In this sense these results might hint that it is not only the lack of resources which
hinders the protest participation of the unemployed.
As noted earlier, using data from seven Arab countries, Hoffman & Jamal have also
modelled factors which have an impact on an individual’s likelihood to take part in a protest.
According to their results the unemployed are statistically significantly less active protesters
than the employed (Hoffman & Jamal 2012: 182, 184).
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3.2.3. Empirical research finding positive linkage between unemployment and organised
violence
There are two studies investigating the relationship between political violence and the
unemployment rate in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Sayre has concentrated
on Palestinian suicide bombings between 1993 and 2004. He finds that a higher
unemployment rate among men 15 to 24 years old predicts statistically significantly more
suicide bombings in all his model specifications. On the other hand, if all terrorist attacks or
all bombings are examined, not only suicide bombings, the unemployment rate loses its
statistical significance as a predicting factor. Sayre offers two explanations for why a higher
unemployment rate is linked with a higher number of suicide attacks. Either there are more
people willing to commit suicide bombing in times of higher unemployment or alternatively
terrorist groups recruit more bombers when the public is more supportive for attacks (Sayre
2009). Caruso & Gavrilova have studied terrorism and politically motivated violence
perpetrated by Palestinian groups and individuals between 1997 and 2007, more precisely
they have analysed the numbers of terrorist incidents and their brutality proxied by the
numbers of victims of the incidents. They find that the growth rate of the youth
unemployment rate is statistically significantly related to the brutality of Palestinian violence,
but not with the count of incidents. In addition, youth unemployment is a better predictor than
total unemployment. The growth rate of the male youth unemployment rate however
performed best as it was statistically significantly associated with both the brutality and the
incidence of violence under study. The growth rate of female youth unemployment was not a
statistically significant predictor (Caruso & Gavrilova 2012).
One study interviewed a total of 53 boys and girls who had joined armed groups before
they were 18 years old. They were fighters from Colombia, Northern Ireland and from seven
countries in Asia and Africa. Some of these 53 young soldiers told that the lack of
employment opportunities was the main reason for them to join armed groups, but based on
this study it is hard to estimate what is the share of those who considered poor employment
opportunities as a reason to join. Also education, social contacts, and cultural and ideological
grounds were named as reasons to start soldiering (Brett & Specht 2004).
In Somalia, 88 former al-Shabaab fighters were interviewed. Half of them were
unemployed when they were recruited and all those who were employed had low-income
jobs, largely because they did not have an education. Al-Shabaab promised monthly payments
for fighters and about every fourth interviewed person said that their reasons to join al-
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Shabaab were economic, and another quarter of respondents told that their reasons were
“religious and economic” (Botha & Abdile 2014: 5, 7–8).
3.2.4. Empirical research finding negative or no linkage between unemployment and
organised violence
To my knowledge, the most comprehensive paper studying relationship between
unemployment and different forms of violence is the one written by Cramer. As I cited
Cramer already in the introduction, he concludes that there is barely any decent evidence that
unemployment or youth unemployment would cause violent conflicts in the developing
world. In addition to reviewing existent literature Cramer has compared trends in the
casualties of conflicts with the unemployment rates although data about unemployment is
scarce and unreliable in many countries affected by an armed conflict. If data quality issues
are ignored and a comparison is performed anyway, there is no clear connection between the
intensity of violence and unemployment. In a few cases the unemployment rate and casualties
follow same patterns but in most cases they do not. Neither is there evidence that the onset of
violent conflict would in general be preceded by a rise in the unemployment rate. Based on
proof available and taking into account the scarcity of the data we should, Cramer argues, be
wary with assuming a causal relationship between unemployment and violent conflict
(Cramer 2010: 13–16, 25, 35–36).
Another study which concentrates on exploring the relationship between unemployment
and armed conflicts and analyses several countries is the study by Berman et al., who study
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. The main empirical input of the article is to model at
the province or district level the relationship between the unemployment rate and the amount
of insurgent attacks against government forces and their allies per capita. They find that in all
three countries there is a statistically significant relationship between these variables; the
higher the unemployment rate the lower the level of insurgent violence (Berman et al. 2011).
Gutierréz-Sanín has inspected FARC members in Colombia based on several databases.
Based on a data set of 99 fighters he notes that “contrary to the standard identikit of irregular
combatants as young, unemployed males” most of the FARC members were working before
joining the group, and in addition, many of them had had a salary higher than the national
average. Based on another data set of 195 fighters Gutierréz-Sanín writes “...not one declared
having being unemployed, though one probably was (he characterized himself as an “aimless
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wanderer”). We do not have information from ten recruits. The rest were either employed or
housewives” (Gutierréz-Sanín 2008: 17–18).
Oyefusi, who had studied peaceful and violent protesting in the Nigerian delta had also
surveyed people’s willingness to take part in armed struggle. He finds that if all respondents
are included, being unemployed statistically significantly lowers an individual’s likelihood to
be willing to take part in an armed struggle. Oyefusi has also run his model in two
subsamples, the first subsample including only respondents living in communities with oil,
and the second including only young respondents. Interestingly, in the youth sample, being
unemployed increases statistically significantly the likelihood that a respondent is willing to
take part in an armed struggle. This difference between the main sample and the subsample is
hard to explain as the model run for all respondents included a control variable for age. In
addition, in two other forms of civil unrest, peaceful and violent protest, the coefficient for
unemployment was in both subsamples and in the main sample negative. In the youth sample
some control variables, including marriage, have been dropped out, but it is difficult to say if
this can explain the positive coefficient for the unemployment in the youth sample. In the
subsample of respondents living in communities with oil, unemployment is negatively
associated with the willingness to participate in an armed struggle, but this relationship is
statistically insignificant (Oyefusi 2010).
An interesting case is the conflict in Northern Ireland, where, we might assume,
unemployment data, and maybe also data about fatalities are of better quality compared to
many developing countries. White has found in two different articles that the unemployment
rate is not connected to a higher level of political violence in Northern Ireland. The first
article studies the violence of the Irish Republican Army IRA in Derry City, in Northern
Ireland, in the beginning of the 1970s. There the relationship between the monthly change in
the unemployment rate and IRA violence was statistically insignificant (White 1989: 1288–
1289). Similarly when Northern Ireland is studied as a whole between 1969 and 1980, there is
no statistically significant relationship between the unemployment rate and the deaths caused
by political violence. If deaths are disaggregated it turns out that deaths by Loyalists and
deaths by Security Forces are statistically significantly and negatively associated with the
unemployment rate, meaning less violence in times of a higher unemployment rate. The
relationship between deaths by Republicans and the unemployment rate is again statistically
insignificant (White 1993: 580–582). Thompson finds the same, depending on model
specifications there either is no statistically significant relationship between the
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unemployment rate and fatal violence in Northern Ireland or if there is the relationship is
negative (Thompson 1989).
Honaker argues that these results by White and Thompson are flawed by the use of
aggregate unemployment data. Instead Republican paramilitary violence should be linked to
the Catholic unemployment rate and maybe the Protestant unemployment rate could similarly
explain Loyalist violence. Because this kind of disaggregated data mostly does not exist,
Honaker imputes it. Consequently he finds that both Republican as well as Loyalist violence
killing civilians are statistically significantly connected to unemployment, the level of
violence targeting civilians rises as the unemployment rate rises. He also writes, that here “the
direction appears to predominantly be that unemployment causes violence”, and not vice
versa (Honaker 2010).
There are some studies concentrated in terrorism, which is a special type of organised
violence. Hassan has studied suicide bombers in Palestine in the late 1990s. She interviewed
some 250 people, mostly volunteers who did not manage to complete their suicide missions,
and the families of dead suicide bombers. According to her “None of them [suicide bombers]
were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class
and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs” (Hassan 2001: 37–38). Berrebi has data
about the labour force status of 166 terrorists and suicide bombers of Hamas and PIJ (Islamic
Jihad Movement in Palestine). None of them are unemployed. Supportive to this, he finds that
also people with a higher income are more likely to be members of these organisations and to
become suicide bombers (Berrebi 2007). Krueger & Malečková find similarly that 50
members of Hezbollah’s militant wing in Lebanon and 48 suicide bombers in Palestine do not
have poor family background more often compared to the same age population; if there is a
difference it is the other way round. The same applies to 27 members of the Jewish
Underground who terrorised Palestinian civilians, they were in high-paying occupations
(Krueger & Malečková 2003). Although sample sizes are rather small, they all indicate similar
results. It is interesting that as discussed earlier, studies conducted by Caruso & Gavrilova and
by Sayre found that the unemployment rate has a positive relationship to political violence in
Israel–Palestine at least when measured in certain ways. Still, the unemployed themselves are
rarely suicide bombers or members of terrorist organisations.
Kivimäki & Laakso write that there is evidence also from outside Israel that economic
deprivation is not a factor increasing the likelihood of an individual to commit a terrorist act.
According to them, interviews done by Kivimäki himself among others in Indonesia,
Thailand, Malaysia, Sudan, and Pakistan seem to confirm this, as well as quantitative
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evidence from Egypt (Kivimäki & Laakso 2003: 87). Krueger & Malečková also conclude
that what they find in the case of Israel–Palestine and Lebanon is consistent with earlier
research, apparently participation in terrorism and an individual’s income are not related and
if they are, they are actually positively related (Krueger & Malečková 2003: 141–142).
It has to be remembered that by analysing those who are terrorists we do not necessarily
find out which socio economic factors make people willing to become terrorists, because
becoming a terrorist works through recruiting. Hassan, who also interviewed those
responsible for recruiting Palestinian suicide bombers, was told by one interviewee that “The
selection process is complicated by the fact that so many wish to embark on this journey of
honour. When one is selected, countless others are disappointed”. Some characteristics are
said to be assets in selecting process, for example religiousness and being discreet with other
people, and other factors then again disadvantages, for example those who are married and
have family responsibilities are generally not accepted (Hassan 2001: 39–40). Thus it could
be that, for one reason or another, the unemployed were not accepted, although they were
willing to become terrorists. Maybe employment is seen as a proof of an efficient and target-
oriented personality, which is considered important for suicide bombers.
On the other hand there is evidence that the unemployed do not accept political violence
more often than others. Krueger and Malečková present data of an opinion poll in which
about 1 300 Palestinians were interviewed. The unemployed supported armed attacks against
Israeli targets more seldom than students, the employed, or even housewives. The result was
the same when asked about armed attacks against Israeli soldiers. When asked if it under any
circumstances is justified to use terrorism to achieve political goals, 38.4% of the unemployed
answered “yes” or “definitely yes”. The corresponding share among other groups of
respondents varied between 34.6% and 43.3% (Krueger & Malečková 2003: 125–126). If the
support for the use of political violence is not higher among the unemployed or is even lower,
maybe they are also not more willing to become terrorists compared to their fellow citizens.
Consequently selective recruitment is maybe not very central as explanation.
3.2.5. Summarising empirical evidence available
Based on my review on empirical literature studying the relationship between unemployment
and protesting on one hand and organised violence on the other some observations can be
made. Firstly, it seems that most of the studies about protesting have concentrated on Western
countries, this is problematic in the sense that employment markets and the concept of
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unemployment are somewhat different in the Arab countries. Secondly, almost all studies
concentrate on one or some countries, they are often case studies, or in some situations
collections or reviews of case studies. In many cases the findings presented above are also
drawn from studies which do not focus on unemployment, but unemployment is mentioned,
for example, as one topic which the interviewees have brought up. I have found no systematic
global scale study about the relationship between unemployment and protesting nor between
unemployment and organised violence—compared to studies such as those by Campante &
Chor which analysed in 84 countries around the world if an individual’s income affects the
likelihood of protest participation, or by Urdal whose study about “youth bulges” and political
violence covered all sovereign states (Urdal 2006; Campante & Chor 2014).
Thirdly the methods and fourthly the results of these studies are both diverse. Methods
include quantitative analysis of survey data, analysing newspaper articles about protest
movements and organised violence and connecting this information with the unemployment
rates, review of earlier research, participatory research, interviews with people who are
unemployed and interviews with people not unemployed (for example terrorist leaders, the
representatives of labour unions, political parties etc.). Also the results are diverse. In the case
of unemployment and organised violence, some studies indicate positive relationship between
unemployment and organised violence, perhaps most suggest no relationship, but some
studies have found, maybe most interestingly, a negative relationship. The results about
unemployment and protesting are contradictory as well, in sum they show that unemployment
either leads to protests, this depends on the situation and context, or that unemployment rarely
leads to protests, no matter the context. However diverse the conclusions are, I have not found
a study which would clearly indicate that the unemployed are active protesters, and even less
have I become convinced that the unemployed would be active protesters compared to the
employed. Rather the evidence seems to run in an opposite direction; although unemployment
has led to protests this happens sporadically and, in general, the protests of the unemployed
appear to be rare.
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4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
4.1. Research questions and hypotheses
All research questions and hypotheses are set and will be studied in the context of the Arab
world and the Arab Spring in particular.
Research question I. Is the higher unemployment rate connected to a higher number of
protests and organised violence?
Hypothesis 1. There have been more protests and organised violence in the years of higher
unemployment.
Hypothesis 2. The protests and organised violence are concentrated to the same areas as the
highest unemployment rates.
It is already presented earlier that based on an opportunity-cost approach, the relative
deprivation theory, or greed and grievance we can expect the unemployed to rebel. The
approach of the first research question assumes simply that the more there are unemployed
people the higher is the potential and likelihood for protests and organised violence both
spatially and temporally. People can feel relatively deprived after comparing themselves with
fellow citizens, but in addition, Gurr argues that relative deprivation occurs if people expect
goods and conditions to remain the same but they deteriorate, or if goods and conditions are
expected to improve but they remain the same (Gurr 1970: 46–56). Thus I will in hypothesis 1
first observe, if the trends move in parallel, in other words, if the years of high unemployment
are also years of severe violence and hefty protesting. But we might also assume more
protesting and more organised violence if the unemployment rate has kept stable but then
starts to rise or if the unemployment rate has decreased but then levels out or begins to
increase.
Many studies presented above have searched for a relationship between unemployment
and political instability in different corners of the world following this same logic which I will
apply in research question I. Most of the studies have done this temporally at the country level
(Kebro & Shaffer 1986; Thompson 1989; White 1989; 1993; Sayre 2009; Honaker 2010;
Caruso & Gavrilova 2012).
As shown in the chapter presenting earlier research of the relation between
unemployment and the Arab Spring, there are studies which have illustrated that those Arab
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countries which experienced higher unemployment rates were not more prone to the
revolutions and the turmoil of the Arab Spring. This result has been achieved by modelling
the impacts of several proposed drivers of the uprisings (Korotayev et al. 2014; Byun &
Hollander 2015). I will not try to replicate or develop this manner of country level analysis
here. Instead, in hypothesis 2 I will take a look to see if there is a relationship between
unemployment and political instability at the subnational level, in other words within
countries. Looking for a spatial relationship at the subnational level is a more geographical
approach. It is also more rarely applied than temporal comparison in hypothesis 1. However,
Berman et al. have modelled unemployment and political violence at the district and province
level in their study (Berman et al. 2011).
The following research questions investigate if the unemployed are likely to protest. It
might be that the unemployment rate and the level of political instability correlate even if the
unemployed are not active protesters. This is to say that, as discussed earlier, the relationship
between unemployment and political instability might be indirect. Maybe the unemployed
themselves do not protest or get involved in organised violence, but people not unemployed
themselves tend to get frustrated when the unemployment rates rise.
In general the weight of the first research question will be smaller compared to research
question II. This is mainly because of data sufficiency and quality issues in the first research
question which will be discussed in greater detail later.
Research question II.  Are the unemployed more likely to protest?
Hypothesis 3. The unemployed are more likely to protest than the employed.
Hypothesis 4. The young unemployed are more likely to protest than the young employed.
Hypothesis 5. The educated unemployed are more likely to protest than the educated
employed.
Research question II is the main question of interest in the thesis. In hypothesis 3 grounds to
expect 3 that the unemployed protest more likely have been already presented in the theory
chapter. In addition to theoretical grounds hypothesis 3 is justified because, as also presented
above, a high number of media sources and scholars have named unemployment a factor
leading to the Arab Spring.
Also for hypothesis 4 there are both grounds related to the Arab Spring which lead us to
hypothesise this, and this assumption could also be made more generally. In the context of the
Arab Spring, among others Bjorvatn & Høigilt have stated that the young were “at the
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forefront” in the Arab Spring uprisings (Bjorvatn & Høigilt 2016). Furthermore, many have
suggested that it was especially youth unemployment which sparked the Arab Spring (see for
example the International Labour Organization 2011b; Hoffman & Jamal 2012: 168; Mirkin
2013: 7). More generally, Urdal has argued that we can expect countries experiencing
exceptionally large youth cohorts, so-called “youth bulges”, to have a higher risk of political
violence and he has empirically shown that youth bulges substantially increase the likelihood
of riots or violent demonstrations, domestic armed conflict and terrorism (Urdal 2006). At the
micro level, Oyefusi and Hoffman & Jamal found that young age is a factor increasing
significantly an individual’s likelihood to take part in a protest, both violent and peaceful
(Oyefusi 2010: 334, 337; Hoffman & Jamal 2012: 184). Thus we are interested to learn
whether being unemployed and being young have together a specific impact on the protest
participation of an individual. This is to say, that even if the unemployed in general were no
more active to protest than the employed, it might still be that the young unemployed are
extremely willing to protest. Maybe the older unemployed are so passive in protesting that
studying all the unemployed together will dampen the high protest participation among the
young unemployed.
Again, higher protest participation among the highly educated unemployed, which is
studied in hypothesis 5 can be justified both in the specific case of the Arab Spring or more
broadly. In relation to the Arab Spring, when Goldstone discusses reasons for discontent he
highlights that the numbers of citizens with a high education rose sharply before the uprisings
in many Arab countries, and the governments were not able to provide jobs for them
(Goldstone 2011: 12). Campante & Chor expressed that it was specifically the combination of
high unemployment and an increase in education which resulted to the onset of the Arab
Spring (Campante & Chor 2012). Furthermore, in many Arab countries the unemployment
rates were higher among the highly educated compared to those with lower education levels
(Chaaban 2010: 20; Goldstone 2011: 12; Mirkin 2013: 24).
More universally, Campante & Chor state that “the strong positive correlation between
schooling and political participation” is “one of the best-known empirical relationships in the
social sciences”. A higher level of education predicts a higher level of participation in various
kinds of political activities, ranging from discussing politics to taking part in demonstrations
(Campante & Chor 2014: 495–496). As in hypothesis 4, we can hypothesise a joint effect
here, this time between unemployment and education. Following relative deprivation theory,
we could also expect high protest participation among the highly educated unemployed
because those who did educate themselves probably had higher expectations for life and when
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these expectations were not met and the people remained unemployed they became deprived,
frustrated and eager to take to the streets.
Although not our main interest, we will also observe whether youth and education as
such have an impact on protest participation. This will be tested as both education level and
age will be included as control variables in the regression models.
Research question III. Are the unemployed dissatisfied and politically active?
Hypothesis 6. The unemployed are less satisfied with their lives than the employed.
Hypothesis 7. The unemployed are politically less active than the employed.
Research question IV. Are dissatisfied and politically active citizens more likely to protest?
Hypothesis 8. People who are less satisfied with their lives are more likely to protest.
Hypothesis 9. Politically active people are more likely to protest.
Research questions III and IV have a common theoretical logic behind them. They study the
mechanisms which determine whether the unemployed participate in the protests or not.
Research question III asks whether the unemployed are as we think they are, and research
question IV asks if those factors which we assume to drive people to protest really do so. Two
factors are studied in this thesis more closely.
The first factor studied more closely is satisfaction with life. Satisfaction is an essential
theme in relative deprivation theory. According to relative deprivation theory, the unemployed
are expected to start rebelling because they are dissatisfied. Hypothesis 6 tests if the
unemployed really are dissatisfied with their lives and hypothesis 8 tests if satisfaction in life
has an impact on protest participation. If we find that the unemployed are not dissatisfied, it is
debatable if relative deprivation theory then even gives us reason to expect them to start
rebelling. On the other hand, if we would find that the unemployed protest even though they
are not dissatisfied, we should possibly turn our attention away from relative deprivation
theory and try to explain this outcome by means of some other theoretical approach, for
example an opportunity-cost approach. Lichbach assumes that the unemployed are more
active protesters, not because of relative deprivation, but because they face no opportunity
costs from losing time at paid work (Lichbach 1995: 342). At first sight it might seem so
obvious that the unemployed are dissatisfied that it is not even worth testing. However
Hoffman and Jamal found that compared to any other age cohort the Arab youth was, despite
their high unemployment rates, more satisfied with the economic situation and more
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optimistic that economic situation will improve in the future. In addition, compared to older
respondents the young people thought most often that leaders care about ordinary citizens and
create conditions that enable prosperity. These results came from surveys conducted a couple
of years before the Arab Spring. In short Hoffman & Jamal write that “[t]he data suggest that
youth mobilization [of the Arab Spring] against the regime was not caused by grievances with
the regime” (Hoffman & Jamal 2012: 177–181, 185).
Being politically active is the second factor theorised to increase protest participation
which this study will look at more closely. As discussed earlier, for example Jahoda et al.
argued that unemployment reduces considerably both people’s interest in politics and political
activity (Jahoda et al. 1933/2002: 39–41). Schlozman & Verba found in their study conducted
in the United States that the unemployed were much less satisfied with their accomplishments
in life than the employed. But this dissatisfaction did not turn to political participation, the
unemployed were less interested in politics and less likely to vote compared to the employed
(Schlozman & Verba 1979: 346–349). Also Cramer has argued that there is no reason to
believe that frustration about work or life prospects automatically turns to rebellion. He points
out that Egyptian youth showed low interest in opposition politics despite their high
unemployment rates (Gelvin 2012: 20–21). According to Gestrich, the unemployed “are still
widely perceived as passive if not apathetic victims of circumstances which are beyond their
control” (Gestrich 2011: v). On the other hand, Schlozman & Verba among others assume that
political skills are a critical resource needed in the process of mobilisation (Schlozman &
Verba 1979: 19–20). These notions give us reason to study how politically active the
unemployed are. If the unemployed are politically passive and political skills are important in
protest participation, maybe we should not then expect the unemployed to protest. On the
other hand the question could be, is dissatisfaction alone enough to drive people to the streets.
If the unemployed do protest despite being politically passive, it indicates that there is
something wrong in the theoretical argument emphasising the importance of political activity
in the mobilisation process. Hypothesis 7 explores whether the unemployed are politically
active and hypothesis 9 tests whether being politically active has an effect on protest
participation.
One might point out here that there is a logical contradiction in the hypotheses. If we
hypothesise that the unemployed are politically less active (hypothesis 7) and that politically
active people are more likely to protest (hypothesis 9) this is not in line with the hypothesis
that the unemployed are more likely to protest (hypothesis 3). The contradiction between
these hypotheses arise from contradicting theoretical arguments. If all hypotheses in research
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questions III and IV will be confirmed, the empirical work can then be seen as a contest of
two rival explanations. If grievance and dissatisfaction are more important drivers behind
protest participation, the unemployed should protest. If being politically active has a bigger
role, then we should not see the unemployed protesting in the streets.
The exact operationalisations will be presented later. Some further remarks about the
hypotheses are still reasonable to make here. Firstly, as already mentioned, the hypotheses are
studied only in the Arab world, and primarily they will be tested in relation to the protests of
the Arab Spring. However, I will also utilise survey data including information about
protesting in general. Especially the first research question will be studied more broadly in the
Arab world.
In the hypotheses the unemployed are compared with the employed instead of
comparing unemployed people to all other respondents. From the theoretical point of view the
argument is that unemployed people would calm down if they were given jobs. Or if seen
from the perspective of relative deprivation theory, the unemployed are deprived because they
compare themselves with the employed. Nobody argues that unemployed people should retire
or become housewives to pacify the society. Thus I consider it is also justified to compare
specifically the unemployed and the employed.
With “protesting” I mean in the context of this thesis taking part in demonstrations, sit-
ins, protest marches, violent riots or equivalent forms of collective action. Although signing a
petition or boycotting for example can also be considered as protesting, they are not included
in this study.
4.2. What new information could this thesis give us compared to the existent research?
This thesis will concentrate on studying the role of unemployment in the context of the Arab
Spring. As far as I know there are no prior studies which would have this clear focus on
unemployment and the Arab Spring. As presented earlier, there are some studies which have
explored unemployment in the context of the Arab Spring, but in these studies unemployment
has been one factor among others in a regression analysis or it has otherwise received lesser
attention. The main data set of my thesis is the third wave of the Arab Barometer survey
which was released in late 2014. To my knowledge it was the first this extensive data set
where people were asked specifically whether they took part in the Arab Spring protests.
Some papers have been published based on this data, and some of them study the Arab
Spring—but again, as far as I know, neither has any of these papers focused on
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unemployment. Further, as the highest attention fell upon the Arab Spring soon after the
uprisings, most of the research in this field has not been able to utilise this data set. In other
words, the studies exploring the factors affecting individual level protest participation have
modelled protest participation during the Arab Spring are based on some other protests.
As pointed out earlier, even outside the Arab Spring, there is not too much research
conducted about the relationship between unemployment and political instability. In this sense
the thesis can serve as one empirical case study to widen our understanding in relation to the
struggles about unemployment. Further, this is the first time that I see that research questions
III and IV are asked: do the unemployed really feel dissatisfied and consequently, does
dissatisfaction at the individual level lead to protests. Neither have I seen a study which would
at the same time test the association between unemployment and political instability both by
studying the unemployment rate and the level of political instability and by testing whether
the unemployed participate in these struggles more often.
Lastly, some studies have used differing operationalisations for the unemployed than I
do. Hoffman & Jamal for example have defined as unemployed all those who have not
reported being employed. Thus they have categorised also those who are retired, housewives
or students as “unemployed”1. One might argue that this is a somewhat inaccurate definition.
The great numbers of retired respondents and housewives in the category of the
“unemployed” might also explain why Hoffman & Jamal have found that being
“unemployed” statistically significantly reduces the likelihood of an individual to take part in
protests (Hoffman & Jamal 2012). In my thesis I try to find a more sophisticated way to
measure “unemployment”, which is maybe not easy when the Arab world is in question. To
overcome this I will actually test several possible operationalisations and compare their
differing outcomes.
Taken together I argue that there are aspects in which this piece of study could help us
to understand better the relationship between unemployment and political instability,
especially in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings.
1 Although Hoffman & Jamal have not emphasised this themselves, their operationalisation of
“unemployed” can be discovered based on their listing of questions they have used (p.188).
See also the codebook of the first wave of the Arab Barometer, which is the data Hoffman &
Jamal have used. This operationalisation further explains why Hoffman & Jamal report
outstandingly high shares of unemployed respondents in figure 3 (p. 175).
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN
5.1. Methods
This thesis is based on quantitative methods. This is in the first place because the data
available is quantitative. Secondly, the first research question is asking whether there is a
connection between the unemployment rate and the number of protests or the level of
organised violence and the three sequential questions ask whether one group is more likely to
do something than another. These kind of questions can be answered better with quantitative
methods.
The analysis of the first research question is mainly based on creating diagrams and
maps and interpreting them. Some correlations are calculated too but the scarcity and the
uncertainty of the data do not enable the use of more sophisticated statistical methods. The
units of analysis are country-years and administrative regions.
The main method of analysis in research questions II, III and IV is regression analysis, I
will use both binary logistic regression and linear ordinary least squares regression (from now
on referred as linear regression). There the unit of analysis is one respondent of a survey.
Linear regression is used with hypotheses 6 and 7, where explained variables are satisfaction
with life and interest in politics. In other cases, where the explained variable is binary, as
protesting is when it is coded as (1) did protest or (0) did not protest, binary logistic
regression is applied.
Although linear regression is a widely used method there is dispute as to which are the
assumptions which should be met when using it. Arguably the most important assumptions
are the validity of the model and a linear relationship between dependent and explanatory
variables (Gelman & Hill 2007: 45–47). As argued above we have theoretical reasons to
expect that being unemployed has an effect on the individual’s interest in politics and
satisfaction with life. I will discuss the validity of the chosen variables and operationalisations
later in more detailed but I consider that also in this respect the model is valid. As for the
assumption of linearity, here the explanatory variable in which we are most interested in is
binary—whether a respondent is unemployed or employed. Because for this explanatory
variable there are only two possible values it does not make sense to ask if the relationship is
assumed to be linear, exponential, logarithmic, or something else, we simply assume that
there is a difference between unemployed and employed respondents. In this sense the
assumption about linearity is irrelevant for employment status, otherwise we have no reason
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to expect relationships other than linear and as it will be seen later, relationships are indeed
linear.
A condition of debate which is linked to my research design is the use of Likert scale
variables in the linear regression model. Only interval scale and ratio scale variables can be
included in a linear regression model, nominal scale and ordinal scale variables can be used if
they are converted to binary variables (i.e. dummy variable) (Heikkilä 2014: 222). The
question of debate is then whether a Likert scale variable can be considered as an interval
scale variable, or is it “just” an ordinal scale variable. Discussion around this topic has been
going on for more than 50 years (Carifo & Perla 2008: 1150–1152). The Likert scale refers to
a type of question where the respondent is asked to express his or her views using a certain
scale (Vehkalahti 2008: 36–38; Heikkilä 2014: 51–52). In my case respondents are asked how
satisfied they are with their lives as a whole using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means
“completely dissatisfied” and 10 means “completely satisfied”. Heikkilä sees the Likert scale
unambiguously as an ordinal scale (Heikkilä 2014: 52). Vehkalahti instead argues, that “The
Likert scale can be seen as an interval scale, where deviations from equal intervals are caused
by -- measuring errors. Without those [measuring errors], a Likert scale would be a pure
interval scale. This is, nevertheless, unrealistic, since some measuring error is included in all
measuring” (Vehkalahti 2008: 37). Bailey writes that Likert variables are often used in
regression, both as explanatory and explained variables (Bailey 2007: 112). Similarly
according to Newsom, most researchers treat Likert-type scales as continuous variables and if
the variable has five categories or more “there is relatively little harm in doing this” (Newsom
2013: 2).
Following Vehkalahti and Newsom I consider that the use of Likert scale variables is
justified in linear regression. In all my linear regression models the explained variable is a
Likert scaled question or in some cases, a combination of two Likert scaled questions. And in
all cases there are at least five categories in these variables. As Carifo & Perla note, it would
be better to combine more Likert scaled questions instead of using one single question or a
combination of two questions (Carifo & Perla 2008: 1150–1152). But my data does not
provide more questions which could be combined. Another option would be to convert these
Likert scale explained variables to binary variables and use binary logistic regression also
here. I think that is a weaker option because of the significant loss of information which
would occur if the scale of ten possible answers would be reduced to two possible answers.
There are also other assumptions for linear regression. Some of them are presented
when interpreting the results and evaluating the models. Still, it is necessary to discuss two
45
assumptions now as they are preconditions which define whether it is justifiable to even start
to build the model. Firstly, observations have to be independent. Secondly, the normal
distribution of the explained variable is often seen as a necessary assumption. However,
Lumley et al. argue that it “is widely but incorrectly believed” that linear regression would be
valid only with normally distributed explained variables. The normal distribution of the
explained variable is irrelevant especially if samples are large enough. Some previous studies
have found that the normal distribution loses its significance with sample sizes of some 100
observations, and Lumley et al. conclude that 500 is enough even with their data which is
extremely non-normal (Lumley et al. 2002). In my case there are explained variables which
are not normally distributed. However, the models using linear regression which I will present
all have sample size above 4 000 so this should not be a problem. In addition to that, Gelman
& Hill for example do not even mention the normal distribution of the explained variable as
an assumption for linear regression model (Gelman & Hill 2007: 45–47). Thus I consider that
the non-normal distributions of some of my explained variables do not prevent me from
building a linear regression model. The assumption of the independence of observations
means that the value of one observation should not affect the values of other observations, this
is especially worth scrutiny when observations are successive days, months, years etc. or
regions close to each other (Anselin & Rey 1991; Heikkilä 2014: 235). Here observations are
single respondents so there should be no problems with this assumption; it is hard to imagine
how the answers of one respondent could affect the answers of another respondent when the
respondents are interviewed separately.
Some could argue that the use of linear regression is not appropriate here because some
preconditions of its use are not fully met. However I think that the key assumptions are
fulfilled and there is no such violation with any assumption which would invalidate the
explanatory power of the method. Bearing in mind all that is discussed above I will run the
analyses and return to this when evaluating the validity of the results towards the end of my
thesis.
Also for binary logistic regression there are some assumptions, which have to be met.
Maybe most importantly—and most obviously—the explained variable has to be binary.
Further, the independence of observations is an important assumption for binary logistic
regression, too. As with linear regression, the model has to be valid. But unlike the linear
regression model, in binary logistic regression model explanatory variables do not have to be
interval or ratio scale but also ordinal scale explanatory variables will do. As shown above, it
is arguable how important the distribution of the explained variable is in linear regression, but
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in the case of binary logistic regression there are no requirements about the distribution of
explained variable. Although often ignored, as the name binary logistic regression might hint
this method assumes the relationship between the explanatory variable and the explained
variable to follow the logistic curve, or more colloquially the S-curve. This is to say that at
low values and high values of the explanatory variable its effect on the explained variable is
assumed to be minor compared to values around the middle, where the effect of the
explanatory variable on the explained variable should be more substantial (Cabrera 1994:
227–229; Peng et al. 2002; Mattila 2003; 2009; Harrell 2015: 219–224).
In all my analyses utilising binary logistic regression the explained variable is binary, as
“has protested” or “has not protested”, so the firstly presented assumption is always met. As
discussed above there should be no problems with the independence of observations in this
data. Again, in short I would state that also my models used to predict participation in protests
are valid. They are theoretically justified as shown above and the operationalisations used are
likewise reasonable, as pointed out in the following section. Since also ordinal scale variables
can be used in binary logistic regression, there should be no dispute about the use of Likert
scale variables either. In relation to the assumption of the logistic-curve-like relationship
between the explanatory and explained variables it is worth mentioning also here, that the
observation of unemployment status is dichotomous—the respondent either is unemployed or
is employed—so it cannot be said whether the relationship is logistic-curve-like or not and
thus the assumption is in this regard irrelevant here. This same applies to some control
variables which are binary, such as gender. With some control variables such as education
level or age it is hard to say, whether the line illustrating the relationship is actually closer to
linear or logistic. But as will be shown, the difference between the linear and logistic curves is
rather minor so for our purposes the precondition about the logistic curve does not make a
great concern. To conclude, these conditions of binary logistic regression are also well, and at
the least well enough, fulfilled.
In this thesis I have tested the possible joint effect of education and being unemployed
in hypothesis 4 by splitting the data. In practice I have run the model of hypothesis 3 but
included only those respondents with a high education level. Similarly, when studying
hypothesis 5, I have run the same model as in hypothesis 3 but excluded respondents who are
not young.
To run analyses I have used SPSS Statistics releases 20.0.0 and 23.0. I have also utilised
ArcGIS release 10.3.1 in hypothesis 2.
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5.2. Data
In this section I will first present the data sets. Later I will introduce the operationalisations of
variables and at the same time I will discuss their validity. Thereafter will be a separate
chapter for the reliability of the data. Although both validity and reliability are important
when considering if the model is accurate, it is useful to distinguish between these two.
Validity tells whether a chosen indicator really is measuring what we wanted to measure, as
for reliability, it tells how precise and flawless the measurement is (Vehkalahti 2008: 41). In
my case, for example, I will measure the level of organised violence with the number of
fatalities caused by conflicts in which at least the other side is an organised actor. I will
discuss the validity of this indicator; is it possible that there is organised violence without
fatalities and if so, is my indicator valid? On the other hand I will discuss the reliability of the
data; are there reasons to assume that all lethal incidents of organised violence are not
included in the data?
5.2.1. Data in research question I
The data of protests in the first research question of my thesis is based on two separate data
sets, the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) version 3.1 and the Armed Conflict
Location & Event Data (ACLED) version 5 (Raleigh et al. 2010; Salehyan et al. 2012). These
data are used in parallel, in other words in both hypotheses 1 and 2 an examination of protests
is performed with both data sets. This is done to compare the results as there are certain biases
in both data sets. SCAD and ACLED are said to be “the most elaborated and most often used
geo-referenced datasets on low-level violence” (Ide & Scheffran 2014: 271). These data sets
include also other kinds of incidents than just protests, but as I will explain later, for my use I
have filtered only protests. I also took a look on the widely used Cross-National Time-Series
(CNTS) Data Archive—the so called Banks event data—but as Salehyan et al. notice, there
are substantially less incidents recorded in the Banks event data and, for my purposes, the
number is too low (Salehyan et al. 2012: 510). The information in ACLED is based on press
accounts from several regional and local news sources and humanitarian agencies (Raleigh et
al. 2010: 656). The information of SCAD is collected by conducting keyword searches of
news wires of two news agencies, Associated Press (AP) and Agence France Presse (AFP)
(Salehyan et al. 2012: 505). Both these data sets cover the African continent as a whole, but
not the countries in the Middle East. The timespan of SCAD reaches from 1990 to 2013 and
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ACLED goes from 1997 until 2014.
The data of organised violence is based on the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
(UCDP GED) version 3.0 offered by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of Uppsala
University (Sundberg & Melander 2013). Also ACLED provides information about events of
organised violence. I have chosen to use UCDP GED here because the data is considered to be
better in quality compared to ACLED when studying lethal organised violence (Eck 2012).
Version 3.0 of UCDP GED covers Africa, Middle East and Asia from 1989 to 2014 except for
Syria which was not yet included. The UCDP GED data is drawn from media reports, but also
from NGO reposts, case studies, databases and historical archives (Sundberg & Melander
2013: 527).
The national unemployment rates used in hypothesis 1 are based on data provided by
ILO and they are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) data set by the World
Bank. I have used the latest version available at the time of my final data analyses, which was
updated in December 2015 and which includes the unemployment rates from 1991 to 2014
(World Bank 2015a). The ILO or the World Bank do not provide the governorate level or the
rural and the urban unemployment rates so for hypothesis 2 the governorate level as well as
rural and urban unemployment data are collected from local statistical offices. The availability
of this data varies by country.
Although the word governorate is not used for all countries studied here, for the sake of
clarity, I will use the same term for all these countries. Governorate will be here the word
used for the highest administrative division, in other words the largest administrative regions.
The term is often used in this meaning in English when referring to Arab speaking countries,
and most often it is translated from an Arabic word muḥāfaẓah (ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ). In this data the
number of governorates per country varies from 13 in Mauritania up to 48 in Algeria.
When studying hypothesis 2 also information about population density is utilised.
Supposedly there are more protests and violence in regions where more people are living. So
information about population density is used to get an understanding about the number of
protests or the level of violence in proportion to the population in each area. This information
is based on the widely used WorldPop data set, and its version 1.0 (WorldPop 2015). The
WorldPop data combines real census data with modelling. The modelling of population
density is based on satellite images of night time light, information about distance to roads,
elevation and so on (Sorichetta et al, 2015; Stevens et al. 2015).
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5.2.2. Data in research questions II, III, and IV
Research questions II, III and IV are based on three different survey data sets. These data
constitute the main empirical evidence of my study. These three data sets used are the third
wave of the Arab Barometer (later in the thesis referred as ABIII), the second wave of the
Arab Barometer (ABII) and the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS6). From WVS6
only respondents living in the Arab countries are included in my analyses and when I later in
the thesis mention all countries of WVS6 this always stands for all Arab countries of WVS6.
Some countries included in these data sets are excluded from my analyses because some
questions are not asked in those particular countries. These cases will be pointed out later
more precisely. Altogether there are in these three data sets some 36 000 respondents whose
answers I have analysed, they come from thirteen different Arab countries. In those countries
included in the thesis the field period of collecting data in ABIII was from December 2012 to
April 2014, in ABII from November 2010 to October 2011 and in WVS6 from May 2011 to
2014.
I think there are good reasons to have several survey data sets in the study. Firstly, and
most importantly, I want to make sure that my results are not skewed by some unnoticed bias
in one data set. I have studied Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen also one by one, since these
were countries hard hit by the Arab Spring and thus more interesting. When I have three data
sets I have each of these countries included at least in two data sets which again ascertain
results from these countries. Secondly, there are slightly different questions in different data
sets. Having three data sets enables each hypothesis to be studied with valid
operationalisations. Results from one data set can again be backed up with other data sets
having rather similar but not exactly as valid operationalisations.
Data in these data sets are collected using face to face interviews. Almost all the
interviews are conducted in Arabic, some people in Iraq are interviewed in Kurdish, some in
Morocco and Algeria in French and in Berber. The data collection has been carried out by
country specific partners, often local universities or research organisations focused on
surveying, such as the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Palestine. The
data represents adults 18 years old and older in each country.
There are also earlier waves of the Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey
available. However, the first wave of the Arab Barometer had a shortage difficult to overcome
here; when respondents were asked about employment status in ABI, the option of being
unemployed was not given. The two previous waves of World Values Survey before wave six
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had four and five Arab countries compared to wave six, which is used here, which has twelve.
To be precise, four of these twelve countries in WVS6 are excluded because all questions
needed are not asked in those countries but still, the number of Arab countries is considerably
higher in WVS6 than in WVS5 and WVS4. In addition, in WVS4 and WVS5, Egypt was the
only country included in which I have special interest, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya were
missing. The Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey are not the only openly accessible
survey data sets available from this region. The latest wave of the Afrobarometer was one
option, but it only included four Arab countries and further, the question about protesting did
not define when the respondent took part in the protest. This is problematic since if somebody
took part in a protest decades ago it hardly makes sense to try to model it with his or her
current employment status. Also a survey called the Global Barometer Survey is used by
scholars, but of the four countries which will gain more attention here none is included in this
survey. Then again ABIII and ABII have a remarkable asset compared to all other data sets
mentioned; there respondents are asked if they took part particularly in the Arab Spring
protests. Taken together, I consider that ABIII, ABII and WVS6 are the most suitable data sets
for my use. On the other hand, although I argued that it is reasonable to have several data sets,
I think three survey data sets are enough for my purposes.
5.3. Study area
The study area of the thesis is presented in map 2 and table 1. In short the study area is mainly
determined by those Arab countries where the data is available in the data sets used.
5.3.1. Study area in research question I
The study of the first research question focuses on North African Arab countries. This is
primarily because of the Arab countries, ACLED and SCAD only cover those located on the
African continent. In other words we do not have data about protests from countries outside
Africa. The UCDP GED data which is used to study organised violence covers also the
Middle East except Syria. In hypothesis 1 where the national unemployment rates are
compared to the number of protests and the level of organised violence in a country, the
countries studied are Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. Although there is no data
about protests for Yemen, I will perform the comparison between the unemployment rate and
the level of organised violence there since it is a country considerably affected by the Arab
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1
Yemen
Saudi Arabia
Palestine
Lebanon
Kuwait
Jordan
Iraq
Algeria
Libya
Sudan
Egypt
Mauritania
Morocco
Tunisia
Table 1. Study area
Map 2. Study area
Research Question
I
II, III & IV
Egypt X X* X*
Libya X X* X*
Tunisia X X* X* X*
Yemen X X* X* X*
Algeria X X X X
Iraq X X X
Jordan X X X
Kuwait X
Lebanon X X X
Mauritania X
Morocco X X X
Palestine X X
Saudi Arabia X
Sudan X X
ABIII 
data
WVS6 
data
ABII 
data
* Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen are studied
separately in research questions II, III, and IV
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Spring, and thus especially interesting for the thesis. Libya, Mauritania and Sudan are not
studied in hypothesis 1 because the yearly unemployment data provided by the ILO is not
considered to be reliable enough in these countries. This will be illustrated when discussing
the data reliability.
In hypothesis 2 we assumed that there is a spatial connection between unemployment
and the number of protests and the level of organised violence. More precisely the main
expectation is that in those governorates where the unemployment rate is higher, there are
more protests and more organised violence in proportion to the population. This hypothesis is
studied in the North African Arab countries. More attention is here given to Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco because from these countries there is data available
concerning the governorate level unemployment rates. From other North African Arab
countries we have information about the rural and the urban unemployment rates.
Apart from Egypt and Morocco, administrative regions, the borders of the governorates,
are taken from the database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM) (Global Administrative
Areas 2015). In the case of Egypt and Morocco the local statistical authorities have used a
different division of administrative regions than those available in GADM. Because the
governorate level unemployment data are taken from the local statistical authorities I have
followed the division of administrative regions which the local statistical authorities have
used. The division of administrative regions, which is applied in the data of the Egyptian
statistical authority CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) was
only used for three years (Al-Ahram 2011). Thus it is understandable that there is a different
set of administrative regions recorded in GADM. As can be seen from the map, I do not have
a separate country of Western Sahara in my study area. Western Sahara is a disputed area
which is recognised as an independent state by more than 40 states (Uppsala Conflict Data
Program 2016a). However, since it is claimed by Morocco, it is not surprising that it is
counted as Moroccan territory in the unemployment data provided by the HCP (High
Commission for Planning, the national statistical office of Morocco. My demarcation of
Western Sahara as part of Morocco should not be considered as a political statement, instead it
is made because of the divisions in this source data I have used. I have digitised the
governorates of Egypt based on a map in a publication of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (El-Nahrawy 2011: 5). The borders of the
governorates of Morocco in the thesis follow a map published by the national statistical office
of Morocco (High Commission for Planning of Morocco 2012: 7). In the data of governorate
level unemployment of Morocco there is a combined unemployment rate for the three
53
southernmost governorates, so in the analyses these governorates are treated as one (High
Commission for Planning of Morocco 2012: 9). When I have located incidents of ACLED,
SCAD, and UCDP GED into governorates I have naturally used these same borders of
governorates.
5.3.1. Study area in research questions II, III, and IV
In research questions II, III and IV all those countries are studied which were included in the
data sets used and where all the necessary questions were asked.
There are good reasons to assume that there are differences between countries in how
actively different socio economic groups took part in protests. As demonstrated earlier there
are also considerable differences in the unemployment rates between Arab countries. This
already might let us expect that in countries with higher unemployment rates the unemployed
are more frustrated and thus willing to take part in protests. Whereas in countries with low
rates of unemployment an unemployed person maybe thinks that he or she will soon get a job
and thus the unemployed are less eager to protest. Among others, Chabanet & Faniel write
that it substantially increases the likelihood of the unemployed to mobilise if labour unions
encourage them to do so and organise collective action. And there are differences between
countries in how labour unions deal with the unemployed (Chabanet & Faniel 2011: 398–
404). Also empirical evidence supports this. When ten European countries are studied, there
are substantial differences between the countries in the level of mobilisation of the
unemployed (Chabanet & Faniel 2012). This is another reason to expect that there are
differences in the protest participation of the unemployed also between Arab countries. As
discussed, it is also noted by scholars that there are differences in which groups did mobilise
in the Arab Spring. In Tunisia protests started from the countryside, in Egypt the international
and urban youth started the uprisings, in Libya armed rebels started the protests and territorial
and tribe based disputes arose, in Morocco the ethnic group of Berbers, who felt themselves
economically marginalised, were active in the protest movement (Anderson 2011: 2; Gelvin
2012: 129).
The assumption that there are differences between countries in who participated in the
protests also indicates that it would be rational to observe countries separately. Because I am
first and foremost interested in the Arab Spring uprisings and the role unemployment played
in them, I will take a closer look at countries which were more influenced by the Arab Spring.
To determine these countries I use the categorisation of Allansson et al. who have analysed
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how the Arab Spring manifested itself in the Arab league member states in 2011, the first year
of the Arab Spring (Allansson et al. 2012: 46). Following them Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria,
Tunisia, and Yemen are considered here as the countries most affected. These are the
countries where protesters or the opposition demanded a regime change, in other countries
demands were limited to demands for political or economic reform, and in some countries
there were neither any demands nor any Arab Spring -related protests, as in Qatar. The
countries where a regime change was demanded, namely Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria,
Tunisia, and Yemen, were also exactly the same countries where 25 or more people were
killed in Arab Spring -related violence in 2011. Of these six countries four, Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen, are included in the survey data sets, and I will study them individually
whereas I will study all other countries as one group. This is justified because if I would test
the hypotheses with just a sample including all countries and some statistically significant
relationships arise I would not know if these relationships would be there because of Egypt,
Tunisia, Yemen, or Libya or because of some country which did not see many protests during
the Arab Spring and in which we are not so interested.
5.4. Variables in research question I and their validity
5.4.1. Protesting and organised violence
5.4.1.1. Definitions
Among other types of events, different kind of protests are included in the SCAD. More
precisely, what I call here protests, are in the SCAD referred to as demonstrations and violent
riots. A demonstration is defined as “[d]istinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action
directed toward members of a distinct “other” group or government authorities.” A violent riot
is similarly “distinct” and “continuous” “action directed toward members of a distinct “other”
group or government authorities.” But where a demonstration is “largely peaceful”, violent
riot is violent action where “[t]he participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property
damage” (Salehyan & Hendrix 2014). In my analyses both demonstrations and violent riots
are evenly counted as protests. I have also counted as protests all events which have started as
something else and then escalated into a demonstration or violent riot and events which have
started as a demonstration or violent riot and then escalated into something else. In SCAD a
demonstration or violent riot continuing more than one day is counted as one event and there
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is a separate column where the duration of a protest is recorded—as precisely as possible. I
follow here this logic and count a protest only once no matter how long it has lasted. SCAD
also provides information on how many people have been participating in an event, this is
done with a seven step scale: less than 10, 10 to 100, 101 to 1000 and so on. Arguably it is
more notable if there is a protest with 100 001 to 1 000 000 participants than a protest with 10
to 100 participants. Thus the information about the numbers of participants is included in the
graphs presented when studying hypothesis 1. Otherwise than that, it is unclear how this
information could be operationalised. And more importantly, in some one third of the protests
this information about the number of participants is missing. Thus one protest is counted as
one protest no matter how many people took part.
In ACLED there are again several event types, and among them is an event type labelled
as “riots/protests”. There, in short, a “protest describes a non-violent, group public
demonstration, often against a government institution [and] rioting is a violent form of
demonstration”. However, if rioters use violence against civilians “for example [against] a
political official, or a representative of a business” or if there arises violence against peaceful
demonstrators, the event will not fall in the category of “riots/protests”, but is coded as
“violence against civilians”. The peaceful demonstrators, who were faced by violence are still
“coded as Protesters, to distinguish [this] from wider patterns of violence against civilians not
engaged in demonstrations” (Raleigh & Dowd 2015: 9, 12–13). Thus for my analyses I have
not classified protests based on event type, but on interaction code instead. With interaction
code I have selected all those events where at least other side involved in the event are
“protesters” or “rioters”. Doing this captures all events where protesters or rioters are
involved despite the event type, in other words also in the case that a demonstration has for
example turned to being “violence against civilians”. In ACLED an event lasts only one day,
this is to say that if a protest in reality lasts more than one day, it is coded as several events in
ACLED.  Still, if it is said in the source material used by ACLED that an incident occurred
during three months, only those days are coded when reported activity took place (Raleigh &
Dowd 2015: 16). Then again, if there are two events in the same location on the same day but
there are different actors in these events or the event type is different, these are coded as two
separate events. In the protest data of I will use there are slightly more than 7 500 protests
recorded in ACLED between 1997 and 2014 in those seven North African Arab countries in
which we are interested. Without going through them one by one it is not easy to figure out
how many of them are protests which are continuing for more than one day and therefore
coded as several events. However, there are about 2 000 such protests which occur in a
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location where there has on a previous day been or where there on the same day is another
protest event. Most likely some of these 2 000 events are separate protests which just happen
to occur in the same location on successive days. But this is to say that at least a vast majority,
about 5 500, of these 7 500 protest events should be unique events in the sense that they occur
on one day in one place and not protests continuing from the previous day or previous days
and therefore coded as several events.
The level of organised violence is measured with the number of fatalities caused by
organised violence. I define organised violence following the definition of the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP). This can be practically seen as a necessity since I am using
UCDP GED data which is provided by UCDP and coded according to its own definition, but
this definition is also justifiable in a sense that it is widely used. UCDP defines that there are
three types of organised violence which are state-based conflict, non-state conflict and one-
sided violence (Croicu & Sundberg 2015: 15). Further, state-based conflict “is a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25
battle-related deaths in one calendar year”. Non-state conflict instead refers to the “use of
armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a
state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year”. And one-sided violence is
defined as the “use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised
group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year” (Uppsala Conflict Data
Program 2016b). It is easy to note, that 25 deaths is mentioned as a threshold in all three
definitions. However, there is a slight change to this rule in UCDP GED which I apply here. If
a conflict or the use of one-sided violence has, in a single year, crossed the threshold of 25
deaths and it has caused one or more fatalities also in previous or in subsequent years, these
years and deaths are included in the UCDP GED, even though the death toll has not crossed
25 (Croicu & Sundberg 2015: 15). In my analyses I have included all fatalities of organised
violence no matter to which of the three above mentioned categories they belong.
5.4.1.2. Validity
If we then take a look at the validity of these operationalisations of protests and organised
violence, it is worth asking, what would actually be the most valid way to measure protests.
Should the duration of protests be taken into consideration? Should a protest continuing for
five days be counted as five protests or as one? If there are two separate protest marches in a
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single city in one day in favour of the same subject, should they be counted as two different
protests? How about if two different groups of people are marching together and both of them
have their own issues they want to advance by protesting? Is that one or two protests? This
apparently was the case during the Arab Spring; there were several different groups of people
with highly different agendas. How about the number of protesters? If we agree on that it
matters, should we then count protesters instead of protests? This would mean that in analyses
a protest of 100 000 participants would get 1 000 times more weight than a protest of 100
participants. Or should measuring participants somehow be exponential because the
difference is more substantial if 10 000 people protest instead of 100 than if 1 000 000 protest
instead of 990 100? The diversity of possibilities for the operationalisation of protests can be
considered absurd, but this might have significance for the results. The operationalisations I
have presented above and which I will use can be seen as valid, but at the same time there
remains a multitude of other valid alternatives which might be tried if the data would enable
it. In practice, however, my choices are restricted by the data available.
I would argue that fatalities caused by organised violence are a rather valid indicator to
measure the level of organised violence. Of course one could say that there can be organised
violence also without fatalities. Maybe this is true—if a government shoots at peaceful
demonstrators or a rebel group tortures members of a rival rebel group, maybe this is
organised violence even if no lives are lost. But on the other hand I think that if this kind of
organised violence goes on, fatalities will soon appear; a government cannot shoot at an
endless number of demonstrators before somebody gets killed. In the analyses of this thesis
the yearly number of the fatalities of organised violence in a country ranges from zero to more
than 3 000. If we agree that at the higher levels of organised violence it causes fatalities, it is
not a crucial shortage that our indicator performs weakly when measuring the lowest levels of
organised violence, where no fatalities occur. As a generalisation it appears reasonable to
assume that the more organised violence there is the more there will be fatalities caused by it.
5.4.1.3. Excluded events in hypotheses 1 and 2
In hypothesis 1 we observe whether there is a connection between the unemployment rate and
the number of protests or the level of organised violence. This is done by country and by year,
so in every data set the events of protests and organised violence are accordingly sorted out by
country and by year. The inspection is carried out in each case for all possible years, in other
words for all years when both unemployment data and data about protests or organised
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violence are available. There are some protests in SCAD which have started in one year and
ended during another year. In hypothesis 1 when taking the temporal viewpoint I have copied
these protests into all the years during which they have lasted. In UCDP GED and ACLED
there are no such events. In SCAD there are protests which have occurred in several towns
simultaneously—if this is the case the protest with all its attributes, including the number of
participants, is copied into each location. These events are specifically marked and, in the
codebook, users who are not interested in locations are advised to filter off these “multiplied”
events. As locations are not studied in the first hypothesis I have followed this advice. Since I
have also included the numbers of participants in my graphs, not removing these copied
events would lead to the inclusion of the same protesters at various times.
In hypothesis 2 I study if protests and organised violence are located in the same
governorates as the highest unemployment rates. The time span used reaches from 2006 to
2011. In other words I have located the protests and incidents of organised violence from
2006 to 2011 into governorates according to their latitude and longitude. These are then
compared with governorate level unemployment data from the latest year available between
2006 and 2010. Years after 2011 are not studied because uprisings in the countries under study
might have changed the spatial patterns of unemployment so hugely that results from the
comparisons would be irrelevant. During these six years, from 2006 to 2011, 40% of all
protests in the region under study took place in 2011 according to SCAD—according to
ACLED the corresponding share was close to 70%. If protests would be spread evenly
between these years the yearly share would be one sixth, which equals some 17%. In 2011
there were considerably more protests than in the other years. So in this sense I am also
considering whether differences in the unemployment rates before 2011 have had an effect on
where protests emerge in 2011. This is a possible interpretation especially with ACLED, since
more than two thirds of all protests during six years emerged in 2011. The share of protests
which took place in 2011 is considerably different according to SCAD (40%) and ACLED
(70%). This might be explained by different coding procedures. Some of the protests in 2011
continued for long periods of time. As noted, where ACLED has coded these protests as new
events every day, SCAD has coded them as single events. When looking at UCDP GED and
fatalities caused by organised violence, the year 2011 does not stand out so clearly, 30% of all
fatalities during six years occurred in 2011.
The data about protests and events of organised violence are available as point data sets.
I have located these points into governorates based on the coordinates of the points. When I
located the points there were 63 points in UCDP GED, ACLED and SCAD whose location I
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changed because according to the original coordinates they were located in the sea or in the
neighbouring country. I was able to find the right governorates because for every point the
name of the intended governorate and the intended country were included in the data. Mostly
points were some hundreds of meters away from the shoreline. It is not unusual that when
combining geospatial data from different sources some inaccuracies in the locations emerge.
For example Kuusterä has reported that when she located points of ACLED into the
Democratic Republic of Congo, all events which were coded in the country did not locate
inside its borders (Kuusterä 2011: 94–95). There are various reasons why this kind of small
inaccuracies can occur, for example people coding the coordinates for the incidents might
have had a map where the shoreline or the borderline of a state is located in a slightly
different place from the GADM map I used.
There are two reasons why the analysis in hypothesis 2 is done at governorate level.
Firstly, the unemployment data is available for the governorate level. Secondly, although
coordinates allow the events to be located in theory as precisely as one wants, for example
with the precision of a centimetre, in practice the data of UCDP GED, ACLED or SCAD are
not this precise but better suited for governorate level study. The coders of the data set have
added coordinates for every event. These coordinates always seem to be exact, although in
some cases the coders have in reality not been able to locate the events exactly. To deal with
this issue, all data sets include information on how precisely each event is located. Based on
this information some events are excluded from the analysis of hypothesis 2 because of the
impreciseness of the location. In more detail, I have excluded from UCDP GED those events
whose “geo-precision” code is 5, 6, or 7, in other words these events could not have been
located at precision of a governorate (i.e. ADM1) or they have taken place over water or in
international airspace (Croicu & Sundberg 2015: 35–38). I have worked similarly with
SCAD, there I have excluded those events whose “locnum” code is 7 or –99, these meaning
that the events have been “nationwide” or the location has been unknown (Salehyan &
Hendrix 2014: 5). According to the ACLED codebook no such event is included in the data
set which has not been possible to locate at the provincial level (Raleigh & Dowd 2015: 15–
16). Thus I have not excluded any event from ACLED because of spatial inaccuracy.
It is worth noting, that as a rule in ACLED, those events which have not been possible
to locate precisely are given the coordinates of a nearby town or provincial capital (Raleigh &
Dowd 2015: 15–16). This might be a justified solution because it is likely that violence often
occurs where there are people. And indeed, it might be questionable, instead, to place the
event into a random location where nobody lives. But as Eck notes, this principle can lead to
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incorrect outcomes if the data is used incautiously. A scientist studying for example whether
the violence took place in densely populated areas or in locations easy to access, will get
invalid results because events which in reality took place in rural areas are in the data located
in towns and cities (Eck 2012: 132). In UCDP GED, when the exact location within an area
(province for example) is not known, the centroid point of the area is often used (Croicu &
Sundberg 2015: 35–38). As in UCDP GED also in SCAD the coordinates of the centroid point
of an area is often used when the exact location within an area is unknown (Salehyan &
Hendrix 2014: 8). It is disputable whether using the centroid as a reference point is a better
option than using a nearby city or provincial capital. When using the coordinates of the
centroid point the data is not systematically biased, but there hardly is any reason to assume
that the centroid would represent characteristics (altitude, terrain, population density etc.) of
the actual site of protest or incident of organised violence.
I have some data on urban and rural unemployment rates. However, because of the
above presented coding procedures I cannot analyse whether more protests and more
organised violence occur in urban areas and whether urban areas then have higher or lower
unemployment rates. Therefore I will study whether more protests and organised violence are
concentrated in urban governorates because the data should be better suitable for this. Then I
will take a look on urban and rural unemployment rates. However, not much weight will be
given to the analysis of rural and urban unemployment because of the validity issues.
5.4.2. Unemployment
As stated, in hypothesis 1 I have used the annual unemployment rates of the ILO which are
included in the WDI data set collected by the World Bank. More precisely I have used
modelled ILO estimates of the total unemployment rate, which are expressed as a share, or
percentage, of the unemployed in the total labour force. Following ILO the unemployed are
defined as “members of the economically active population who are without work but
available for and seeking work, including people who have lost their jobs or who have
voluntarily left work”. These modelled ILO estimates of the unemployment rates are based on
household labour force sample surveys. The figures include nationally reported and imputed
data. According to the data description this data which I will use is “harmonized to account
for inconsistencies resulting from data source, definition, reference period, coverage, age
group, and collection methodologies”, and thus the figures should be comparable between
countries and through years (World Bank 2015b).
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For hypothesis 2 I have found governorate level unemployment data for one or more
years between 2006 and 2010 from ﬁve of those North African Arab countries which
comprise the study area of research question I. This data is drawn from national statistical
authorities. I have used data for 2010 if it has been available, in other cases I have used the
latest year available, however 2006 being the earliest year I have accepted. As mentioned, this
governorate level unemployment data will be compared to protests and the level of organised
violence between 2006 and 2011. Because the idea is partly to observe whether the
unemployment rate before the Arab Spring could be used to predict where the protests and
violence took place during the Arab Spring, I have not used governorate level unemployment
data of 2011 even if it has been available. Because I want to know if those governorates
within a country where the unemployment rate is higher have seen more protests and
organised violence, I will not use the actual unemployment rates as such. Instead I will divide
the governorates of every country into four categories, or in other words into quarters. The
highest quarter will include the governorates with the highest unemployment rates within a
country, the governorates with the lowest unemployment rates comprising the lowest quarter
while the two quarters in the middle respectively include the governorates with intermediate
unemployment rates.
Map 3. Unemployment by governorate in Morocco in 1999 and 2004.
It can seem dubious to use a timespan of six years when studying hypothesis 2, as the
unemployment rates have ﬂuctuated during that time. Morocco is the only one of these
1999 2004
Lowest quarter
Highest quarter
Source of data: 
High Commission for Planning 
of Morocco 2015
500 km
N
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countries where the governorate level unemployment rates are available for every year for a
relatively extensive period of time, from 1999 to 2013. I have calculated the unemployment
rate quarters described above for each of these years. Map 3 presents the quarters for the years
1999 and 2004, which have the same six years difference as 2006 and 2011, the first and last
years of the timespan used when studying hypothesis 2. From 1999 to 2004 the national
unemployment rate in Morocco changed from 13.9% to 10.8% according to modelled ILO
estimates. The national statistical authority of Morocco gives the same figures for 1999 and
2004 (World Bank 2015a). This change of 3.1 percentage points is more substantial than
between any other six years from 1999 to 2013. However only in three out of 14 governorates
the unemployment rate quarter has changed. In one governorate the change has been two
quarters (from second lowest to highest) and in two governorates the change has been one
quarter.
I have observed all possible pairs of two years with six years intervals (the first pair
consists of the years 1999 and 2004, the second of the years 2000 and 2005 and so on) and all
governorates of Morocco; there are 140 pairs of two figures, the first figure representing the
unemployment rate quarter in a given governorate of Morocco in one year and the second
figure representing the unemployment rate quarter in the same governorate six years later.
Consequently, during six years, in 68% of the governorates the quarter has remained the
same, in 30% there has been a change of one quarter, in other words the quarter for the latter
year is one higher or lower than for the first year. And in 2% of the governorates there has
been a change of two quarters. In none of the governorates has the change been three
quarters—a change of four quarters is impossible, a jump from the first to the fourth quarter
or vice versa equals a change of three quarters. I think that based on these calculations, the
timespan of six years should not cause considerable problems; in general the patterns of the
unemployment rates within a country remain similar during six years even if the national
unemployment rate increases or decreases. Those governorates which have high
unemployment rates within the country in one year have higher unemployment rates within
the country also six years later, the same applies for governorates with lower unemployment
rates. Thus one additional benefit from using quarters instead of the actual unemployment
rates is that yearly differences in the unemployment rates between countries will not have a
great impact on quarters based on the unemployment patterns within a country. Lastly, since I
combine data from different years, using the actual unemployment rates might give an
impression that the data is more accurate and comparable than it actually is.
The governorate level unemployment data I have used is in Morocco for the year 2010,
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in Mauritania and Tunisia for 2008, and in Egypt and Libya for 2006 (National Office of
Statistics of Mauritania 2009: 158; National Institute of Statistics of Tunisia 2010: 146;
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics of Egypt 2014; High Commission for
Planning of Morocco 2015; Knoema 2015). The data of Libya is downloaded from Knoema,
an online data catalogue, which collects openly accessible data. Knoema links to the original
web page of the General Authority of Information of Libya, but I have not been able to access
this original web page. In other cases than this I have found that data available at Knoema is
consistent with the data from original data sources. In this data of Libya the unemployment
rates were not originally included, but I have calculated the rates because the data included
numbers of people employed in different ways (employee in a foreign company, employee in
government, employer...) and a number of people seeking work. In the data provided by the
Egyptian national statistical authority the unemployment rates were calculated based on the
same logic and categories: the unemployment rate was the number of people seeking work
divided by the sum of those employed and those seeking work.
Data about urban and rural unemployment rates are available for one or more years
between 2006 and 2010 from five countries, Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Sudan
(Assaad 2009: 21; National Office of Statistics of Mauritania 2009: 158; Nour 2011: 16;
National Office of Statistics of Algeria 2014; High Commission for Planning of Morocco
2016). In Egypt and Libya the figures are apparently based on census data. In other countries,
finding out how exactly the national statistical authorities have gathered the governorate level
unemployment data is not an easy task.
Because we in the first research question ask whether the unemployment rate is
connected to the number of protests or the level of organised violence, there should be no
problems with the validity of the indicator. We simply use the unemployment rate to measure
the unemployment rate. When studying governorate level unemployment, the quarters of the
unemployment rate are used instead of the actual unemployment rates. There are some
disadvantages in doing so: quarters do not tell how wide the variation is between the lowest
and the highest unemployment rates, in addition it can be that the dividing lines between
quarters do not settle into natural breaks, for example it might be that the unemployment rate
in the first governorate of the second quarter is very close to last governorate of the first
quarter and clearly apart from other governorates of the second quarter. But still, taken
together these issues and advantages of using quarters discussed above, I think the advantages
outweigh disadvantages. It can be seen that the fact that the data about the governorate level
unemployment rates and urban and rural unemployment rates are from differing years affects
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the validity. However, as shown with the data of Morocco, this should be a minor issue. In
general, the unemployment rate or quarter is a valid indicator taking into account our research
question.
5.4.3. Population density
The WorldPop data set includes population density in a spatial resolution of 0.008333 decimal
degrees. This is equivalent to approximately 1 square kilometre at the equator. This resolution
might be too sharp taken into account the original data which are used to model population
density, in addition if presenting in one map a large part of the African continent with this
resolution it is hard to interpret the map because it contains so much information. Thus for the
map presenting population density I have calculated the population density in squares of 0.25
x 0.25 decimal degrees, which corresponds to about 770 square kilometres at the equator.
Because of the globular shape of our planet and the geographic coordinate system, the length
of one decimal degree of latitude in kilometres changes when moving from the equator to the
poles. More precisely, a move of one degree from east to west is equivalent to about 111
kilometres at the equator but in northern Tunisia to only about 89 kilometres. When
presenting and calculating population densities, I have taken this into account. In the map,
population density is presented per square kilometre.
5.5. Variables in research questions II, III, and IV and their validity
Here I will go through those operationalisations which are used in the thesis. Those
operationalisations which are only essential when looking at the results presented in the
appendixes are also explained only in the appendixes. ABIII will be the main data for
studying research questions II, III and IV, the exception being hypotheses 6 and 8 which will
be primarily answered with WVS6. Accordingly I will look through ABIII here in the most
detail and WVS6 only when necessary. I will also make some observations about the ABII
data. In nearly every question there are some respondents who have refused to answer, who
did not know what to answer, who have given unspecific answers or whose answer is for
some other reason missing. Such respondents are always excluded from analyses where those
answers are needed.
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5.5.1. Protesting, main explained variable
In research questions II and IV the explained variable is protesting. In each three data sets the
question about protesting is asked differently. In ABIII respondents are asked (q800a)
whether they in 2011 and 2012 had participated in demonstrations and rallies, to which the
Arab Spring led. The main reason why ABIII is my primary data is that the question is asked
especially about Arab Spring related protests. This is coded as a binary variable where 1 is for
respondents who did protest and 0 for those who did not protest. In WVS6 the question (v87)
is whether the respondent has attended peaceful demonstrations, he or she might attend or
would never under any circumstances attend. Those who answer that they have attended a
peaceful demonstration in the first place are later asked (v92) how many times they have
attended in the last year. I have used both these questions, first I have taken those respondents
who have attended a peaceful demonstration and then I have dropped out those respondents
who have not attended a peaceful demonstration in the last year. Consequently I have coded
those who have during the last year attended a peaceful demonstration once or more often as 1
and all other respondents as 0. In Qatar and Kuwait the question about attending
demonstrations is not asked in WVS6 so I have excluded all respondents from these countries
when analysing WVS6.
I have merged multiple questions about protesting when studying ABII. In Tunisia
respondents were asked separately if they (t902) participated “in the protests against former
president Zain Al-Abdeen Ben Ali between December 17th, 2010 and January 14th, 2011”
and (t912) if they participated “in the protests after Ben Ali ceded power”. In Tunisia
respondents who have answered either to both or to one of these two questions that they did
participate are coded as 1 and those respondents who have participated in neither protest are
coded as 0. In Egypt people are similarly asked whether they (eg802) participated “in the
protests against former president Hosni Mubarak between January 25 and February 11, 2011”
and it they (eg812) participated “in the protests after Mubarak ceded power”. Again
respondents who have answered at least once affirmatively are coded as 1 and other are given
0. In other countries than in Tunisia and Egypt questions are not asked particularly about the
Arab Spring protests. Instead respondents are asked whether they during the past three years
participated “in a protest, march or sit-in”. Respondents who have participated once or more
are coded 1 and those who have not participated, 0. Thus in ABII the one explained variable
stands for three different sets of protests.
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If combining questions which ask about participation in different protests seems
incoherent, it is worth noting that also in WVS6 the answers to the question about
participating in peaceful demonstrations are dependent on time and country. And for sure,
respondents in different countries have answered concerning different protests. Although
questions used to measure protesting vary between these data sets, the results are in general
very similar, as will be shown. This indicates that mainly the same factors drive people to take
part in different kinds of protests and thus it is justified to use primarily ABIII to examine
most of the hypotheses but WVS6 for hypotheses 6 and 8.
5.5.2. Unemployment, main explanatory variable
Employment status is asked both in ABIII and WVS6. This question can be considered to be a
direct way to measure employment status. The line between being unemployed and being
employed is not so strict in the context of labour markets in the Arab world as it is in Finland
or in other Western countries. For that reason we cannot know what respondents exactly mean
when they answer that they are unemployed. Perhaps they do not have the definition of
unemployment by ILO in their head. To understand in what kind of situations respondents
possibly have answered that they are unemployed, I think it is useful to see which other
options respondents are given.
The options given differ slightly in WVS6 and ABIII. In ABIII people are first asked if
they work or not. Respondents who answer that they work are then asked, if they work full
time or part time. The dividing line between part time and full time working is set at 30 hours,
those working 30 hours a week or more are full time workers and those working less than that
work part time. Respondents answering first that they do not work are asked if they are
retired, housewives, students, unemployed, or if they have some other employment status. The
group under study, the unemployed, are obviously those respondents who answered that they
are unemployed. The unemployed are compared to employed people and here I define only
full time workers to be employed. The problem with part time workers is that we do not know
if they work one hour a week or 25 hours a week, which to my mind hugely influences if
somebody actually should be considered to be employed or not. All respondents who are
neither full time workers nor unemployed are grouped as having “other” employment status.
In WVS6 data set there is a question asking if a respondent is working full time, working part
time, is self-employed, is retired, is a housewife, is a student, is unemployed or if his or her
employment status is some other. Similarly in WVS6 the dividing line between full time and
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part time working is set at 30 hours. I have separated the respondents of WVS6 into three
groups, as I did with ABIII. The respondents answering that they are unemployed form the
group of the unemployed, full time workers are considered to be employed and respondents
with any other employment status constitute the group of others.
This division of respondents into three groups according to their employment status is
coded to two separate binary variables for regression analyses. In the first variable named
“Employed” the employed are coded as 1 and they are compared to unemployed and other
respondents, which are both coded as 0. In the second variable named “Other” respondents
with other employment status are coded as 1 and they are compared to unemployed and
employed respondents, which are both coded as 0. This makes the unemployed a reference
category and allows us to compare the unemployed and the employed but it also allows us to
have a larger sample size, in other words to keep more respondents in the analyses.
As I argued already when introducing the hypotheses, I find it reasonable to compare
unemployed and employed people instead of comparing unemployed people to all other
people.
Again, as argued earlier, the nature of labour markets in the Arab world challenges the
concept of being unemployed. Robbins, project director of the Arab Barometer, assumes that
some respondents, particularly those working in the informal sector, might have answered that
they work, when they mean that they work in general even if they are not currently working.
According to the definition of ILO they would not have been counted as employed, but
instead, in the case that they are looking for work, as unemployed. In the Arab Barometer no
further questions are asked to define unemployment status more precisely (Robbins 2014).
The World Youth Report 2003 highlights this same problem the informal sector causes for the
definition of unemployment. The report suggests that young people are increasingly turning to
the informal sector to make their livelihood. Thus the “distinction between employment and
unemployment is gradually losing much of its meaning as young people move into and out of
the informal sector, where neither term has any real relevance” (United Nations 2004: 68). In
this sense the question about employment status is not completely valid, it is not measuring
unemployment as we would like it to. To handle this issue I also use incomes to measure
employment. Since most people arguably get most of their money from work it is reasonable
to assume that people who are factually unemployed have a low income, even though they
would work time to time in the informal sector. People having permanent work instead should
have a higher income. Using the question of income can be seen as an indirect way to
measure employment. Incomes are used to measure employment status only in hypothesis 3.
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I use two ways to measure income which I call absolute income and relative income.
Absolute income is the actual amount of money which somebody gets. With relative income I
measure if the money received is enough to cover the expenses of living. To measure absolute
income I have used a question in ABIII asking for the respondent’s monthly income including
all wages, salaries and rent allowances (q1014). I have taken the answers to this question
within a country and calculated the deciles of monthly income. Based on this I have recoded
the respondents income into ten groups so that respondents in group 1 have the lowest income
within a country and respondents in group 10 have the highest income in a country. This is
done country specifically because of differing price and payment levels between the countries.
For respondents telling that they have no income I have coded the amount of monthly income
to be zero dollars.
The relative incomes are based on question (q1016) “I will read you some statements
related to your household income. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your
household income?”. Four different options are given: “Our household income does not cover
our expenses and we face significant difficulties in meeting our needs”, “Our household
income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in meeting our needs”,
“Our household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties”, and “Our
household income covers our expenses well and we are able to save”. These answers are
coded on a scale from 1 to 4 where respondents facing significant difficulties in meeting their
needs are given 1. At the other end respondents answering that they are able to save are coded
to be 4. It is reasonable to include the question about relative income. The question about
absolute income does not necessarily tell whether the respondents’ incomes cover their needs
because there are differences in price levels within the countries. Also, for example, people
farming do not need that much money to buy food, which in the Arab countries takes a
substantially large part of the citizens’ income.
Together these three ways of operationalising unemployment should provide enough
evidence to study the hypothesis with sufficient validity.
5.5.3. Being satisfied with life and politically active, variables serving both as explanatory and
explained variables
In hypotheses 6 and 8, where satisfaction with life is involved, analyses reported in the results
are based on WVS6 data. The question utilised is simply (v23) “All things considered, how
satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”. The scale for answers ranges from 1
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to 10, where 1 means “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means “completely satisfied”, there is
no verbal description for values between. This scale is used straight as it is. A potential
problem with this variable is that satisfaction with life might be a consequence or a cause for
someone’s employment status. Maybe someone is not willing to apply for a job because he or
she is dissatisfied with his or her life. It is hard to detect the direction and causality of this
possible relationship. However, the question used should be a valid indicator to measure
satisfaction with life as it is seen from the point of view of relative deprivation theory.
I use two indicators to measure whether the respondent is politically active, measuring
first the interest in politics and then measuring voting. The hypotheses concerning political
activity are analysed here with the data of ABIII. To measure the respondent’s interest in
politics two variables are combined. The two questions used are (q404) “In general, to what
extent are you interested in politics?” and (q405) “To what extent do you follow political
news in your country?”. Both questions give four options to respondents, in the first question
varying from “not interested” through “slightly interested” and “interested” to “very
interested” and in the latter one from “I don’t follow political news at all” through “to a
limited extent” and "to a medium extent” to “to a great extent”. In both cases answers are
coded from 1 to 4 so that the more interest in politics the answer indicates the higher is the
value. After that the average of the two answers is calculated and the mean is used as a
measure of political interest. A respondent who is “very interested” in politics and follows
political news in his or her country “to a great extent” gets 4, for someone who is “not
interested” in politics and follows political news “to a limited extent” is given 1.5. The
correlation between combined variables is understandably strong (Pearson’s r 0.750, p-value
≤ 0.005), which also supports the idea of combining them. Only respondents who have
answered both questions are included.
Voting is another indicator of measuring whether a respondent is politically active.
Respondents are asked (q 301) whether they voted in the last parliamentary elections, the
exception being Algeria, where the question is asked about legislative elections. The question
is coded as a binary variable where those who voted are coded as 1 and those who did not as
0. The survey offers also other ways to measure political activity, such as being a member of a
party or attending activities related to any electoral campaign. I consider voting to be the most
suitable because people can vote despite of where they live, how much time or money or other
resources they have. Voting is legal in all countries surveyed, and, maybe for these reasons,
relatively many people vote in comparison to many other ways of engaging in politics.
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I consider these questions to be valid indicators for measuring whether the respondent is
politically active or not.
5.5.4. Control variables
The same set of control variables is used in all regression analyses.
A basic factor, which influences the individual’s behaviour in many respects is age.
Already when the presenting research questions I argued that we can expect a higher protest
participation among younger individuals. This was my reason to add hypothesis 4 where the
protest participation of the young unemployed and the young employed is compared. For
those same reasons it is also reasonable to have age as a control variable. When using age as a
control variable, the values of Age -variable equals simply the age of the respondents in years.
This is asked both in WVS6 (v242) and ABIII (q1001). In hypothesis 4, youth is defined as
people from 18 to 35 years of age. 15 years is regularly used as lower limit for youth (United
Nations 2004: 5; Urdal 2006: 615; Bjorvatn & Høigilt 2016: 54). However, 18 is an
unavoidable lower limit here because there are no respondents younger than that. The upper
limit of youth instead is oftentimes set at a lower level than at 35 years, but I follow here the
definition of youth used by Bjorvatn & Høigilt, who argue that this is a more appropriate limit
in the context of the Arab world, where youth is often associated with not having established
oneself with families or secure jobs (Bjorvatn & Høigilt 2016: 54).
Education is another factor which obviously has grounds to be included. As with age, I
have already earlier discussed why we can assume that people with higher education levels
protest more probably. For binary logistic regression analyses education is coded as a four
step ordinal scale variable. Compared to the original data some categories are combined. In
the case of ABIII, those respondents who have answered the question about education level
(q1003) that they are illiterate or have no formal education I have coded as 1, those having
some education but lower than secondary, in other words elementary school, basic or
preparatory school or pre-high school diploma, I have coded as 2, those who have a secondary
education I have coded as 3 and those who have a higher education than that, in other words a
mid-level diploma, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree or above I have coded as 4. In the case
of WVS6 those who have answered (v248) that they have no formal education I have again
coded as 1, those whose highest educational level attained is either incompleted or completed
primary school I have coded as 2, respondents with secondary school education either
incompleted or completed and either technical/vocational type or university-preparatory type I
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have coded as 3, and respondents with some university-level education, either with a degree
or without, I have coded as 4. When I use linear regression in hypotheses 6 and 8 no ordinal
scale variable can be included and thus I have coded education as three binary variables.
Respondents with no formal education serve as a reference category and for three other
educational levels I have coded their own binary variables.
In the Arab world men are active in politics more often than women. This lets us assume
that men also protest more often. It is also found by Hoffman & Jamal that at the individual
level females certainly take part in protests more seldom in the Arab countries than men
(Hoffman & Jamal 2012: 184). The gender of the respondent is also included both in ABIII
(q1001) as well as in WVS6 (v240). I have coded gender as 1 for males and 0 for females.
As gender is simply what we would like to measure and it is measured here, there
should be no problem with the validity of this indicator, the same applies to the control
variables presented above, age and education.
Allansson et al. have noted that large-scale demonstrations and the use of central
squares in major cities were common traits for the Arab Spring uprisings (Allansson et al.
2012: 45). The notion that Arab Spring related protests often took place in urban centres is
one ground to include the urban residence of the respondent as control variable. In general
there are also other reasons which can let us assume that protests take place more often in
urban than in rural areas. As a rule, urban areas are more easily accessible, this means that it is
easier for people to gather in cities than in the countryside. Protesters often hope to get as
much attention as possible for the issue they are protesting for and thus it makes sense to
gather in urban areas, where more people and arguably also more media are present. Further
we may suppose that people living in urban areas more often take part in protests because it is
easier for them to just go out into the streets than it is for their fellow citizens living in rural
areas to travel to cities to protest. Thus I have added the respondent’s urban residence as a
control variable, where 1 stands for respondents living in urban areas and 0 for respondents
living in rural areas. Urban residence is included as a control variable also because in many of
these countries, for example in Morocco and Egypt, the unemployment rates are higher in
urban areas (Egypt State Information Service 2014; High Commission for Planning of
Morocco 2016). If the unemployed would protest more often than the employed this might be
simply because the unemployed live more often in urban areas, where taking part in protests
is easier. Then again, if it should turn out that the unemployed are less active protesters than
the employed, this might also in some cases be because of the differences in the rural and the
urban unemployment rates. At least in Tunisia unemployment is claimed to be higher in rural
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areas (African Development Bank 2007: 11). To tackle this potential flaw in results it is
important to include urban residence as a control variable.
In ABIII in most of the countries the data set includes information whether the
respondent is living in an urban or rural area (q13) and this information is used as it is. For
respondents from Kuwait, however, this information is not included. According to WDI data
set 98.5% of Kuwaitis live in urban areas (World Bank 2015a). Thus I have coded all Kuwaiti
respondents as urban. In Palestine this question is slightly modified by adding “refugee camp”
as a third option. Since I have not been able to define whether the refugee camps of Palestine
should be considered urban or rural, I have excluded Palestinian respondents living in refugee
camps. This excludes about 14% of the Palestinian respondents. In the WVS6 it is not directly
asked whether a respondent is living in a rural or urban area, but there is a question about the
size of the town (v253). I have used this question and recoded this so that respondents living
in towns with a population greater than 10 000 inhabitants are urban and respondents living in
towns with a population lower than 10 000 inhabitants are rural. Another option would have
been to have 50 000 inhabitants as a limit for rural and urban residence but choosing 10 000
was justifiable because this brought country specific shares of the urban population closer to
figures in the WDI data set. In WVS6 the question about the size of the town is not asked in
Egypt and Palestine and thus respondents from these countries are excluded from all analyses
done with WVS6.
It is acceptable to use this question to control how easy it is for a respondent to reach the
location where protests often occur. However, the question could also be better, for example
asking how many hours away the respondent lives from a major city. In a perfect world we
would have geographic coordinates for the home of every respondent, and accurate and
complete georeferenced data about every protest which have occurred. Then we could
calculate how close to protests each respondent lives and evaluate how easily he or she could
have reached the place where protests took place. As this information is absent at the moment
we have to accept the use of rural and urban as a substitute. Although surely inaccurate in
some occasions, it should still capture in general what we wanted and be fairly valid.
As we saw earlier, there were substantial differences between Arab countries in how the
Arab Spring unfolded in them (Allansson et al. 2012). Different countries give citizens
different ways to express their political views and in some countries there are restrictions on
the freedom of assembly (Gelvin 2012: 5–6). These points let us assume that the country is a
factor affecting in how often respondents have taken part in protests both in connection to the
Arab Spring protests but also to protesting in general. Thus country is included in the
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regression analyses as a control variable when more than one country is included in the
sample. Although country is included in the regression analyses, its results are not reported in
the tables. There is a separate section in the results where I shortly introduce the results from
the country variable. As country is a nominal level variable it is coded as a set of binary
variables, where each country gets its own binary variable. One country is defined as a
reference category but it does not have great significance which country we choose, as we are
not interested in the effect of country per se but we just want to rule out its impact on the
variables in which we actually are interested. The country of a respondent is available for
every data set and every respondent in the data.
5.5.5. Validity
An issue with validity which I have not mentioned above but which comes in question with
almost all the variables is something which can be called the time lag. In ABIII most
respondents are interviewed in 2013, in other words two to almost three years after the start of
the Arab Spring. Some respondents are also interviewed in late 2012 and some during the first
half of 2014. This means that I mostly try to find out if the respondent’s employment status at
the time when the survey was conducted has an impact on whether he or she took part in
protests one to three years earlier. Of course time can change not only the employment status
but also the education level, place of residence, interest in politics, voting behaviour and
satisfaction with life. Although the passing of time most surely has an impact on the age of a
respondent, I am not worried about that because the age of the respondents varies from 18 to
close to 100, so one to three years is a minor change—in general young respondents remain
young and the old remain old. I argue that during one to three years, also changes in the
education level are scant. People move rather rarely and often not so far from where they first
lived, so I think that vast majority of people living in urban areas now also lived in urban
areas one to three years ago. However, it makes things complicated that it is most difficult to
estimate the impact of the time lag on employment status, interest in politics, voting
behaviour and satisfaction with life, the variables in which we are most interested. Still I
assume that, while some surely have, most respondents have not completely changed their
position in regard to these questions. However, this is hard to substantiate.
In WVS6 respondents are asked whether they protested during the last year. This
strengthens my research design because changes during one year are obviously less than
during three years. In Tunisia and Egypt the respondents of ABII were asked whether they
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took part in the Arab Spring protests which at the time of the surveys had started six to ten
months earlier. This is why these two cases in ABII are important for the thesis.
In general the difference between the time the survey was conducted and the time
respondents took part in protests is my biggest concern in relation to the validity of the survey
data. Briefly, we would like to know the situation and mindset of the respondent at the time of
the protests but to be precise none of our questions measures that. However, as we have also
WVS6 where people are asked about protesting during the last year and two countries in ABII
where people are asked about protesting less than a year ago, I think that if all these data sets
generate similar results, the results can be seen as mutually validating and results can be
considered to be reliable. When studying hypotheses 6 and 7 where the explained variable is
either satisfaction with life, interest in politics or political activity, the time lag does not cause
problems because these are asked at the same moment as other questions, for example about
employment status.
5.6. Data reliability
5.6.1. Data reliability in research question I
I assume nobody thinks that all protests which have taken place in any given African country
are included in SCAD or ACLED. The question is then, how big is the share of protests which
is missing from these data sets. Ottaway & Hamzawy refer to Egypt’s daily newspaper al-
Masry al-Youm published in Arabic, according to them it reported 222 strikes, labour sit-ins,
and demonstrations in Egypt in 2006 and 580 in 2007 (Ottaway & Hamzawy 2011: 2). I will
not analyse strikes, but they are also included in SCAD. According to SCAD there were 36
strikes, demonstrations and riots in Egypt in 2006 and 25 in 2007. According to ACLED there
were three protests and riots in 2006 in Egypt and two in 2007. In a news article of Reuters,
the leader of the Algerian opposition political party Said Saadi stated that there were more
than 9 700 riots and unrests in Algeria in 2010 alone (Reuters 2011). For Gelvin this figure
seems exaggerated, but according to him Algeria has since 2001 been “the site of almost
constant strikes, demonstrations, and riots” (Gelvin 2012: 97). According to SCAD there were
four riots and protests in Algeria in 2010 and according to ACLED fifteen. Maybe these
figures reported in a newspaper of Egypt or given by the Algerian opposition leader were too
high. Still, if the real numbers of protests are one half, or even one quarter of these, it means
that a vast majority of protests are not included in SCAD nor in ACLED. Ide & Scheffran
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have studied the coverage of ACLED and SCAD using a data set about pastoral violence
between 2006 and 2009 in East Africa which was collected through field research. They
compare this data set with figures provided by SCAD and ACLED. In short, the data set
collected through field research included 1547 incidents with 3000 deaths, the equivalent
numbers in ACLED were 258 incidents and 1025 deaths and in SCAD 17 incidents and 412
deaths (Ide & Scheffran 2014: 271–273). Again it seems that SCAD and ACLED miss a large
percentage of incidents.
When taking into account the sources used by ACLED and SCAD, it is maybe not
surprising that many incidents are missing. As mentioned earlier, SCAD is based on keyword
searches in the news of two news agencies, AP and AFP. In the article where Salehyan et al.
introduce SCAD they argue that they do not draw information from local African newspapers
since there are countries without free press and consequently news agencies in these countries
probably do not provide accurate enough information. Further, they see that using AP and
AFP ensure consistent reporting standards for all countries and thus enables cross-national
and cross-temporal comparisons (Salehyan et al. 2012: 505). As these arguments mostly seem
reasonable one could still assume that also AP and AFP often originally get their information
of incidents from local news agencies. If the coverage of local news agencies is partial in
certain countries, most probably the coverage of AP and AFP also remains partial in those
countries. The data of ACLED is based on multiple information sources, primarily on press
accounts from various regional and local news sources and humanitarian agencies (Raleigh et
al. 2010: 656). This of course might cause just those problems which SCAD tries to avoid by
using two news agencies; problems related to comparability between countries and reliability
of local news sources. Media reports are an important information source similarly for UCDP
GED, but also other sources are used, NGO reposts, case studies, databases, and historical
archives (Sundberg & Melander 2013: 527).
When it is clear that none of these data sets include all protests or incidents of organised
violence, it is essential whether the data can be seen as a representative sample. If only a
portion of all incidents is included but incidents included are randomly selected from the total
population, it should not cause considerable harm if even the majority of incidents is missing.
In other words, if for example two thirds of the protests occur in urban areas and we gather a
sample where the protests are selected randomly, also in the sample two thirds of the protests
are located in urban areas. Thus we can make valid conclusions based on data even if it does
not include the whole population.
Unfortunately, we have good reasons to believe that the data is in some respects biased
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and thus does not form fully representative sample. Firstly, if there are major battles going on,
minor events are less likely to be reported in media (Raleigh et al. 2010: 656; Sundberg &
Melander 2013: 527). This applies for conflict events but arguably also for protests. If there
are massive protests in one place within a country, smaller protests are likely to be ignored by
the media. This means that in general bigger protests and incidents which cause greater
numbers of fatalities are overrepresented in the data. Secondly, and maybe more importantly,
incidents in urban areas are likely to get more attention. In relation to the Arab Spring, Gelvin
has noted that since in Egypt most journalists were based in Cairo, protests which took place
elsewhere got in general less attention in the media or were entirely ignored (Gelvin 2012:
45). Similarly in Yemen protests in the capital city, Sana’a, got most of the attention although
there were large protests also elsewhere and in the city of Taiz the numbers of protesters even
exceeded the numbers of those marching in Sana’a (Gelvin 2012: 79). Bocquier & Maupeu
use Kenya as an example and write that in general journalists are urban and they write for
urban readers, so violent death in the capital Nairobi will be more likely reported in media
than violent death in the provinces, where a major event must take place to send journalists
there. Bocquier & Maupeu assume that the bias of reporting events in urban areas more
comprehensively applies to African daily newspapers in general (Bocquier & Maupeu 2005:
329). This so called urban bias is largely recognised (Raleigh et al. 2010: 656; Sundberg &
Melander 2013: 527). An additional bias, whose existence is hard to verify, is connected to the
globalisation of communication. It might be that the affairs of the African continent are better
covered in the media today than they were in the early 1990s. This could appear as an
increase in incidents when studying hypothesis 1.
I assume these biases affect more the protest data in SCAD and ACLED than the data
on fatalities of organised violence in UCDP GED. Firstly, I suppose that incidents of
organised violence break through in media more often than protests. Secondly, as Sundberg &
Melander argue, since UCDP GED also utilise other sources than media reports, this should to
a certain degree mitigate media bias (Sundberg & Melander 2013: 527). In addition, using
fatalities as an indicator instead of plain numbers of incidents, should compensate for some
media bias in the sense that more lethal incidents should be mentioned in the media with a
greater likelihood. Thus the figures representing total numbers of fatalities should be
approximately correct, even if incidents with low numbers of fatalities are not reported in
media. This is a similar argument as that made by Sundberg & Melander when justifying why
they use fatality estimates (Sundberg & Melander 2013: 527). Another issue is, that the
estimates of fatalities are just estimates, although UCDP has put a lot of effort to ensure data
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accuracy. On the other hand as the numbers of fatalities caused by one incident fluctuate
between 1 and 2 700 in the data I use, the minor incidents will remain as minor incidents even
if the number of fatalities would be one, two, or five. The major incidents then again will
remain as major incidents despite having in reality caused 2 000 or 3 000 deaths. In addition
to the best estimate of fatalities, which I will use here, UCDP GED also provides low and
high estimates of fatalities. The total number of fatalities between 1989 and 2014 in the
countries I will study is according to the best estimate 121 393, according to the high estimate
222 747 and according to the low estimate 119 791. Although one could see that there is a
considerable difference between low and high estimates, I would rather see that they have the
same magnitude. I would also agree with Sundberg & Melander that a bigger problem is the
lack of data than inaccuracies in it (Sundberg & Melander 2013: 527).
Lastly it is important to estimate what is the effect of these known shortages with the
reliability for my research design. To dampen the impact of inaccuracies I have used two data
sets about protesting, ACLED and SCAD. Since these largely rely on different sources I
assume that if both give similar results these results can be considered more reliable than
results based just on one data set. Although this may increase the reliability of the results, it
does by no means remove the problems caused by media biases and shortages in the data. For
the reasons mentioned above I have more confidence with UCDP GED data about fatalities of
organised violence and I have not used another data set parallelly. In addition, UCDP GED is
considered as the leading data set in its field (Eck 2012). So I do not know with which data set
I should have compared it. I separated two biases which most likely exist in the data. Firstly,
major protests and major incidents of organised violence are supposedly included in the data
more comprehensively than minor protests and minor incidents of organised violence.
Secondly, incidents occurring in urban areas are supposedly included in the data more
comprehensively than incidents in rural areas. In hypothesis 1 where we explore the
connection of unemployment, protests and organised violence yearly, urban bias is not so
crucial because we are not primarily interested in where within a country incidents occur. As
the major incidents of organised violence should be moderately well included in the data,
results should be relatively reliable also in this respect, even when minor incidents of
organised violence are missing. The results of hypothesis 2 can be seen as being more
vulnerable to these biases. Obviously, if we find out that more protests or organised violence
are concentrated in urban areas, it is hard to say whether this reflects reality or if this is the
case only because of urban bias. As with hypothesis 1, the lack of minor incidents should be
less serious when interpreting results of hypothesis 2.
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Figure 3. Unemployment rates for Mauritania and Morocco 1991–2014 according to the ILO
When presenting the study area, I noted that three countries, Mauritania, Sudan, and Libya are
not studied in hypothesis 1 because I have not considered the yearly unemployment data
provided by the ILO reliable enough. More precisely, according to the ILO changes in the
unemployment rates through the years are close to zero in these countries. To illustrate this I
have included ﬁgure 3 which presents unemployment data for Mauritania and Morocco. For
Mauritania the graph actually suggests just a straight line whereas the graph for Morocco has
increases and decreases. Unemployment is a ﬂuctuating phenomenon, so it is most likely that
this does not mean that there are no changes in the unemployment rate in Mauritania. Instead
the graph indicates that the ILO has had so little information about the yearly changes that it
has not been able to estimate whether the unemployment rate in Mauritania has declined or
increased through the years. This is not to say that the data for Mauritania is completely
useless; if the data of all Arab countries is explored, it is interesting to note that through all the
years Mauritania seems to have the highest unemployment rate, and this most likely can be
taken as an indication that Mauritania, indeed, has a very high unemployment rate compared
to other Arab countries. But to study the temporal changes in unemployment rates, which is
our purpose in hypothesis 1, I consider the data for Mauritania inappropriate. The data for
Libya and Sudan look pretty much similar to the data of Mauritania, so these countries were
also excluded from hypothesis 1. The WDI data set, from where the ILO ﬁgures are taken,
includes also the national estimates of the unemployment rates. It seems obvious that the
countries where there are almost no changes in the unemployment rates recorded in the data
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of the ILO, there are very few national estimates available. In Libya, Sudan, and Mauritania
during 24 years there are national estimates available only for one, two and three years
respectively. In countries where the unemployment rates are fluctuating more according to the
ILO data, in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen, there are also national estimates
available for a considerably greater number of years, for 18 on average. This is not surprising
since, as noted before, it is stated when describing the methodology of data collection that the
ILO estimates of the unemployment rates include “both nationally reported and imputed data”
and “are based on household labour force sample surveys” (World Bank 2015b). There are
differences between national and ILO estimates in the years when both are available. In some
cases the differences are 5 percentage points, or even more, but in general the figures are
similar.
Because it partly remains unclear to me how exactly national statistical authorities have
gathered the governorate level unemployment data, it is also hard to estimate how reliable the
data is. In the case of Libya and Egypt where the source of the figures is apparently a census,
it should be a reliable source for unemployment data. Although the reliability of the data of
the national statistical authorities can in general be questioned, the ILO obviously uses their
data as base for its own estimates, so presumably the ILO has considered this data in most
cases to be reliable enough for its purposes. Of course the ILO uses yearly national
unemployment rates but they are provided by the same statistical authorities as the
governorate level unemployment rates I will use.
For sure there are some inaccuracies in the population density data since it is partly
based on modelling and there might be inaccuracies in the census data too. When I will use it
for illustrative purposes in 0.25 degrees grid cells and compute the populations of
governorates, the inaccuracies should not cause problems at this scale. Taken into account the
reliability issues with the other data sets used I would not be worried about the population
density data.
Finally, there are diverse issues with data reliability in research question I. On the other
hand, as far as I know, these are the best data available about the national unemployment
rates, governorate level unemployment, the locations of protests and riots, and the locations of
fatalities caused by organised violence. I think it is better to take a look at them, than to make
assumptions with no data. Assumptions about the relationship between unemployment and
protesting and organised violence are anyway made. In the section where I interpret the
results I will come back to this and consider how reliable the results, are taken into account
the quality of the data.
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5.6.2. Data reliability in research questions II, III, and IV
To estimate reliability of the data I will ﬁrst compare some characteristics of the respondents
with information about residents of these countries taken from elsewhere. My emphasis will
be in ABIII since that is the main survey data of the thesis.
Figure 4. ABIII respondents by age and gender
Figure 4 presents the population pyramid of respondents of ABIII—because no respondent
under 18 years old is interviewed these age groups are missing. Compared to population
estimates of the United Nations Population Division from these countries for 2010, this
population pyramid in general looks as it should (United Nations 2015b). Age groups of
respondents between 20 and 30 years-old are bigger than age groups of older people, this is
the case in the Arab countries in general. Age groups above 30 year-olds diminish rather
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steadily until the oldest respondents who are nearly 90 years old. 50.0% of respondents are
female and 50.0% are male. An interesting detail is that among elderly respondents there are
more men than women. In this respect the population pyramid of the respondents differs from
UN figures. More precisely there are 225 male respondents 70 years old or older but only 125
female respondents same age. In the estimates of the UN there are more women than men
who are 70 years old or older in every country included in the ABIII data the exception being,
for one reason or another, Kuwait (United Nations 2015b). Clearly enumerators have taken
care that there are evenly many males and females included. One possible reason for elderly
women remaining underrepresented is, then, that they are more conservative; they have not
been willing to answer the questions because they felt it would be unacceptable for women to
take part in a political survey. Consequently younger women, and perhaps especially
politically active younger women, are overrepresented as 50.0% of the respondents are
women. This might mean that in the results women seem more active protesters than they are
in reality. Maybe also otherwise politically more active citizens have taken part in the survey
when those politically inactive have refused and this might distort results also otherwise.
However, if this is the case, it should affect evenly the answers of the unemployed and the
employed so I do not see any reason why it would bias results in this respect.
If population pyramids are made from respondents of ABII and WVS6, they also
indicate that age and gender distribution of these data sets in general correspond to the actual
populations of these countries. Again, there are more male respondents 70 years and older
than females which might again be explained following the same logic. Kuwait is not
included in ABII and WVS6 so according to UN figures there are more women than men in
this age group in all countries of these data sets.
Another feature worth noting is the share of unemployed respondents in the data set.
Table 2 shows the number of unemployed respondents in ABIII data set divided with the total
number of respondents, where students and retired respondents are excluded. This calculation
tells, as precisely as possible with this data, what the “unemployment rate” is among the
respondents of ABIII. Students and the retired are excluded because in the ILO definition the
unemployed are compared to the labour force, not the total population (World Bank 2015b).
The two figures in the table, “unemployment rates” calculated from ABIII and the
unemployment rates provided by the ILO, differ considerably in many countries. In Algeria,
Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon the difference is less than 5 percentage points which is completely
understandable but in other countries differences are bigger, in Morocco even 18.4 percentage
points. In seven out of twelve countries there are less unemployed respondents in ABIII than
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Table 2. Share of unemployed respondents in ABIII by country and actual unemployment
rates in the same countries.
what we might expect based on ﬁgures of the ILO. Robbins offers some explanations for
these differences. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, some people, especially those working in the
informal sector, might answer that they work, although they are not currently working. In the
statistics of the ILO they would be deﬁned as being unemployed. Secondly Robbins suggests
that many young adults, particularly males, are living in less traditional housing arrangements
and are thus not available when sampling frames are designed. They also are less often at
home and consequently have lower response rates (Robbins 2014). Hammer has surveyed
young unemployed in Nordic countries and he has also noted that young people without work
have showed a low interest in taking part in surveys (Hammer 2002: 133).
Following same formula as in table 2 the “unemployment rate” for all male respondents
of ABIII is 18.8% and for female respondents correspondingly 11.2%. According to the ILO
the overall unemployment rate for males in the Arab countries in 2013 was 8.6% whereas for
females it was considerably higher, 21.3%. There is again a substantial difference compared
to ABIII, where females have more seldom answered that they are unemployed compared to
men. Maybe women who are housewives have answered that they are housewives even if they
are looking for work and would have been counted as unemployed in a labour force survey.
These ﬁgures also hint that differences between the shares of the unemployed in ABIII and
the ILO unemployment rates are not caused by sampling biases. It is hard to imagine that
these biases would affect males and females this differently and in the ﬁrst place cause these
Share of unemployed
respondents in ABIII*
Unemployment rate**
Algeria 14.0 % 9.8 %
Egypt 7.2 % 13.2 %
Iraq 10.2 % 15.1 %
Jordan 10.2 % 12.4 %
Kuwait 19.3 % 3.0 %
Lebanon 4.1 % 6.2 %
Libya 9.1 % 19.2 %
Morocco 28.1 % 9.7 %
Palestine 11.9 % 23.0 %
Sudan 29.0 % 14.6 %
Tunisia 28.0 % 13.3 %
Yemen 11.0 % 17.7 %
* Number of unemployed 
respondents in ABIII compared 
to total number of respondents 
(students and retired are 
excluded)
** Unemployment rate 
(modeled ILO estimate) in the 
year of ABIII survey, if survey 
is conducted during multiple 
years, average of these years. 
Source: World Bank 2015a
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tremendous differences. In addition, these sampling biases should always lead to a reduced
share of unemployed respondents when in many countries the share of unemployed
respondents in ABIII is considerably higher than we might expect according to the ILO
unemployment rates. In other words it is likely that an important cause for the differences
between ABIII and ILO is the blurry definition of unemployed person and how respondents
have interpreted both the question about employment status and their actual working situation.
This again highlights the need for testing an alternative operationalisation for unemployment
status. As mentioned earlier I have included an operationalisation which is based on income.
A possible source of error is the dishonesty of respondents, arguably this might
especially be an issue in states which are governed autocratically, where surveillance of
citizens is extensive and people are jailed or otherwise punished based on their political
beliefs. Thus, when respondents are asked about their political beliefs and political actions in
the Arab countries they might try to avoid answering or answer in the way they think will not
cause harm for them. In the Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey enumerators have
not read aloud the possibility to answer “I don’t know”, neither is the possibility to refuse to
answer read aloud. However, if respondents have refused to answer or have not known an
answer, enumerators have used appropriate codes and counted these answers as missing. This
should, as much as possible, keep respondents from refusing to answer or answering that they
do not know, if this really is not the case.
ABIII includes a question (q513) about how satisfied a respondent is with the
government. If respondents have been afraid of consequences or have tried to please
enumerators, one could expect that in this question people would have given good grades for
their governments. However, as figure 5 presents, with the scale from 0 to 10 where zero
means absolutely unsatisfied and ten means completely satisfied, the most common answer
has been zero—a respondent is absolutely unsatisfied with his or her government—with
slightly more than one fifth of all respondents choosing this option. Slightly more than half
(52.1%) of respondents have evaluated their satisfaction to be lower than five, which is the
median and 29.1% have considered themselves more satisfied than five. In 3.6% of answers
the answer is missing, the respondent has “not been interested” or “not been concerned”, has
declined to answer or has not known the answer. The share of missing answers, 3.6%, is
relatively low and it is close to share of missing answers for example in question (q701a)
“Generally speaking, do you think that trade with other countries should increase, decrease, or
remain at its current level?” where 4.0% have refused to answer or have not known an answer.
The question about foreign trade could have had less missing answers if many respondents
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Figure 5. ABIII respondents’ answers to the question concerning satisfaction in government
had refused to answer in fear of state surveillance, but this is not the case. Based on these few
questions the unwillingness to answer truthfully in fear of consequences cannot be ruled out
as a possible source of error but I would say the results of these questions do not raise the
suspicions. Lastly and more importantly, there is no apparent reason why this potential source
of error would affect differently the unemployed and the employed. Thus it should not have a
major effect on the results.
Both the Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey are widely used by researchers,
journalists, and policy-makers, and numerous journal articles and other publications have
been written based on these data sets (Arab Barometer 2016; World Values Survey 2016).
That many people have done something does not necessarily legitimise doing the same. But in
this case I think that the fact that many competent scholars have published research based on
these data indicates that they too think that it is reliable. Lynch has written that the Arab
Barometer “uses a very careful methodology to the best practices of the ﬁeld” (Lynch 2012).
Both the Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey have ample internal practises to
assure the quality of the data. These practices are described in detail in supplementary
documentation which can be found in the web pages of these data projects.
In general I consider that these survey data sets are undoubtedly reliable enough to use
in the ways I will use them in this thesis. My greatest concerns in relation to the validity and
reliability of these data are ﬁrstly the measurement of unemployment status and secondly the
time lag, in other words, that employment status, interest in politics and other questions are
asked considerably after the actual time of protesting. Above I have discussed how I handle
these issues and I will come back to this when interpreting and evaluating the results.
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20%
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Completely
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85
6. RESULTS
6.1. Research question I
6.1.1. Hypothesis 1
Figures 6–10 represent the unemployment rates, numbers of protests and numbers of fatalities
caused by organised violence in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. Fatalities caused
by organised violence are not analysed in Tunisia as there are no fatalities coded there in
UCDP GED. This is to say that the number of fatalities has not exceeded 25 in any year in any
of the three categories of organised violence defined by UCDP. There are differences between
the diagrams in how many years they cover, this is due to the use of three separate data sets
for protests and fatalities and the different time spans each of them covers.
As noted when introducing the hypotheses, there are two ways how we might assume
the unemployment rate and political instability are connected. Firstly, that their trends move in
parallel, and secondly, that rising unemployment after a stable period will cause political
instability, or a stable—or increasing—unemployment rate after a phase of decrease will
cause political instability. When looking at the trends in the unemployment rates and in the
numbers of protests, it generally appears that there is no linkage between these two factors,
regardless of which of these two mentioned form of connection we are looking for.
Mostly the highest numbers of protests do not occur in the years of the highest
unemployment rates, nor do the lowest numbers of protests take place during the phases of
lower unemployment rates. Trends in Morocco actually show the opposite, both according to
SCAD and ACLED there are a comparatively low number of protests before the year 2003
when the unemployment rate is higher than at any year after that. And on the other hand the
country has seen peaks in numbers of protests after 2010 when the unemployment rate has
remained relatively low. ACLED obviously suggests the same negative relationship for
Algeria; as there is an overall downwards trend in the unemployment rate, there is an overall
upwards trend in the number of protests. SCAD does not indicate this upwards trend in the
number of protests in Algeria but neither does it seem that there would be any positive
relationship between unemployment and protesting. It is hard to say anything definitive based
on the figures of Tunisia but I would interpret that neither do they provide confirmation for
the hypothesis about a positive connection between the unemployment rates and the number
of protests. The only chart which does support the hypothesis is Egypt when the SCAD data is
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Figure 6. Unemployment rate, protests, and fatalities caused by organised violence in Algeria
1991–2014.
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Figure 7. Unemployment rate, protests, and fatalities caused by organised violence in Egypt
1991–2014.
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Figure 8. Unemployment rate, protests, and fatalities caused by organised violence in Morocco
1991–2014.
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Figure 10. Unemployment rate and fatalities caused by organised violence in Yemen 1991 2014–
Figure 9. Unemployment rate and protests in Tunisia 1991 2014–
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
ra
te
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
p
ro
te
s
ts
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
ra
te
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
p
ro
te
s
ts
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
ra
te
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
fa
ta
li
ti
e
s
90
utilised. There can be seen three peaks in unemployment, in 1995, in 2005 and from 2011 to
2013. During these same years there are also peaks in numbers of protests. It is worth noting,
that there are many years after 2004 which have seen more protests than 1995; however,
between 1991 and 2003, the year 1995 is the one with the highest number of protests, and thus
it is well justified to interpret it as a peak. If ACLED is used instead of SCAD to study trends
in Egypt, this relationship between unemployment and protests seems more flimsy.
SCAD also includes information about how many people have taken part in a protest.
This information is visualised too, when it has been available. If the numbers of participants
are studied too, it does not change the overall picture. Neither is there generally an indication
that a higher unemployment rate would be connected to larger protests, if measured in
numbers of protesters.
The charts also give scant support for the assumption that a stagnating unemployment
rate after a decline or a rising unemployment rate in any situation would be connected to a
high number of protests. In Tunisia, according to both SCAD and ACLED the number of
protests is relatively low from the 1990s until 2010 as the unemployment rate is fluctuating,
and the protests which did occur do not seem to correlate with declines or accretions in the
unemployment rate. From 2010 to 2011 there is a remarkable increase in the unemployment
rate and there are a lot of protests in 2011 too, in other words, during the Arab Spring. But
from 2011 to 2012 there is as remarkable decrease in the unemployment rate and there are
even more protests in 2012 than in 2011. In all I interpret that the trends of Tunisia do not
confirm the hypothesis. In Morocco the chart with ACLED shows that the major trend in
unemployment is the decrease from 1997 to 2010 and throughout this time the numbers of
protests are relatively low. In 2011 the unemployment rate turns to an increase, and from 2011
to 2014, as the unemployment rate increases, the number of protests is high. Thus the chart of
Morocco where ACLED is used can be seen to support the hypothesis. But when the trends in
Morocco are studied with SCAD data, it reveals a different picture. SCAD shows that as the
unemployment rate in Morocco rises from 1991 until 1998—a phase which cannot be studied
with ACLED as that data set starts from 1997—there are only a few protests annually, but
during the decline in the unemployment rate from 1998 until 2010 there are some years with a
considerably greater number of protests. Above SCAD showed that in Egypt the
unemployment rate and the numbers of protests are at their heights in same years. Also now it
seems apparent that from 2010 onwards as the number of protests is highest in Egypt the
unemployment rate is growing, both according to ACLED and SCAD. Still, there is no
indication that before 2010 there would be more protests during the periods of an increasing
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unemployment rate, which took place from 1992 to 1995 and from 1999 to 2005. Thus I
consider that neither does Egypt provide support for the hypothesis. Evidence from SCAD in
Algeria actually runs counter to the hypothesis: there are relatively few protests during the
rapid rise in the unemployment rate from 1991 to 1996, in addition, the highest peaks in
numbers of protests occurred in 2001 and 2002, during a rapid decline in the unemployment
rate. ACLED does not confirm this opposing image provided by SCAD but neither does it
support our original assumption. Again, if the extent of the protests, measured as the number
of participants, is taken into account, there is not considerably more confirmation for the
hypothesis.
When we turn to look at the fatalities caused by organised violence, their linkage to the
unemployment rates seem to be much stronger. Indeed, both in Algeria and in Egypt it seems
apparent that the trends of the two variables under study are similar, during the years of higher
unemployment rates there are more fatalities caused by organised violence and during lower
unemployment rates fewer. In Algeria the peaks for unemployment and fatalities are not
exactly at the same years, but the trends are clearly alike. There is a sharp increase in both
from 1991 to 1995. Fatalities decrease, again sharply, from 1998 to 2004 or so, and after that
stay at a low level. A decrease in the unemployment rate takes place slightly later, from 2000
to 2009 and then remains low. In Egypt the peaks in 1995, 2005, and 2014 are identical for
both variables, and the trends follow each other also otherwise. The chart for Yemen also
possibly provides some support for the hypothesis, but not as clearly as those of Algeria and
Egypt. There is a notable number of fatalities in 1994, and there can be seen a peak in the
unemployment rate during that year, but there are similar peaks in the unemployment rate also
in 1998, 2000, and 2005 with no fatalities. From 2011 to 2014 the unemployment rate is at a
higher level than in any earlier year during the time span under observation, and there are
considerable numbers of fatalities, too, during these four years. In Morocco there are two
years when there are fatalities caused by organised violence and it would be absurd to state
that they are somehow correlated with the unemployment rate as they are not.
The charts clearly give more support for the assumption that the trends of the death toll
and unemployment move in parallel, than that an increase in the unemployment rate would be
connected to a higher number of fatalities and a decline would result in a lower number of
fatalities. Actually, I would say, that there is hardly any support for the latter interpretation. In
Algeria, as the unemployment rate is rising from 1991 to 1996, there are first relatively low
numbers of fatalities caused by organised violence, but towards the end of the phase of
increase the death toll is massive. Following this logic, during the rapid decline from 2000 to
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2009 or so, there should be hardly any casualties—in reality there are—and the stagnation in
the unemployment rate after 2009 should again be combined with higher death tolls—again,
in reality the numbers of fatalities remain low compared to earlier years. The relationship
between fatalities and unemployment in Egypt is not as contrary to this way of thinking as the
figures of Algeria are. But especially the Egyptian decline in the unemployment rate from
1995 to 1999 should be accompanied by low death tolls, as is not the case. In total the trends
in Egypt can be better explained by assuming that the trends move in parallel. Similarly
Yemen fits better for the assumption of like changes, the four successive years of high
violence, 2011–2014, occur in the time of a stable unemployment rate, whereas many years of
increasing unemployment have not provoked any fatalities. The chart for Morocco shows no
connection no matter which logic is used in its analysis.
These analyses are carried out using the total unemployment rates. Caruso & Gavrilova
found that the growth rate of male youth unemployment predicts Palestinian terrorism and
politically motivated violence better than the growth rate of the total youth unemployment
rate. And further, that the growth rate of the total youth unemployment rate is still a better
predictor than the growth rate of the total unemployment rate (Caruso & Gavrilova 2012).
WDI provides the unemployment rates also for males and the youth. In the five countries
under study, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen, the trends in the youth
unemployment rate and the male unemployment rate are similar. They are not identical, for
example the youth unemployment rate is constantly higher than the total unemployment rate,
but when there is a rise in the total unemployment rate, also the youth unemployment rate is
on the rise, and as the total unemployment rate declines, so does the youth unemployment
rate. Thus, the results are similar, if the youth unemployment rate or the male unemployment
rate is used instead of the total unemployment rate.
When I introduced unemployment and the labour markets of the Arab world we saw that
in 2010, just before the spark of the Arab Spring, the combined unemployment rate of the
Arab world was at the lowest level since 1991. Korotayev & Zinkina noted that the
unemployment rate in Egypt had peaked earlier and in 2010 it was relatively low compared to
many other regions and countries of the world (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011: 143–145).
Although not my principal goal, it is also interesting to observe how the unemployment rates
in individual countries developed during the years before the Arab Spring. It seems that,
indeed, the unemployment rate in Egypt had had its heights before 2010 and in that year it
was actually at a lower level than during most years from 1991 to 2010. The same can be said
about Tunisia, from 1998 to 2010 there had been a relatively constant decline in the
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unemployment rate and compared to the whole period of 1991 to 2010, unemployment was at
a low level in Tunisia in 2010. Interestingly the situation was similar in Algeria and Morocco,
although these countries are not as important for this thesis, because they did not experience
the Arab Spring turmoil with the same intensity as Egypt and Tunisia did. In Algeria and
Morocco the unemployment rate in 2010 was at its lowest point since 1991. Yemen, however,
does not fit into the same category in this respect. Generally in Yemen there has been an
unsteady but upwards trend in the unemployment rate through the whole period under study,
from 1991 to 2014. And in 2010, the unemployment rate in Yemen was at its highest point
since 1991.
If we compare ACLED and SCAD as to how they illustrate the fluctuations in the
numbers of protests throughout the years there are notable differences. What is common for
ACLED and SCAD, is that they both show that the numbers of protests have been
unprecedentedly high after the beginning of the Arab Spring, in 2011 and 2012, in all
countries but Algeria. And precisely Algeria is the country where the data sets differ most.
According to SCAD, 2001 and 2002 are the years with the highest numbers of protests, while
according to ACLED there were hardly any protests during these years. Also the conceptions
about 2011 and 2012 are very different, according to ACLED there were almost as many
protests in 2012 as in 2011, but according to SCAD the figure for 2011 was about eight times
higher than that for 2012. Before 2010 there are so few protests recorded in Tunisia in both
data sets that it is hard to say anything about their correspondence, in Morocco data sets
provide quite a differing picture, and in Egypt there are some common features, most notably
the peaks in 2005 and 2008, but also many differences. One could hope for greater
correspondence between these data sets, as they both represent the same phenomenon,
protests, although with different definitions, inclusion criteria, and data sources.
6.1.2. Hypothesis 2
In hypothesis 2 we assume that the protests and organised violence are concentrated to the
same areas as the highest unemployment rates. This is first observed descriptively with maps
and then by calculating some correlations. Map 4 illustrates population density in North
Africa in 2010, just before the Arab Spring and map 5 represents unemployment by rural and
urban areas and by governorate in 2010 or in the latest year before that when data is available.
Governorates are divided in four categories or quarters with an even number of governorates
in each of them as described earlier. Map 6 shows all protests by governorate both according
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Map 4. Population density in North African Arab countries in 2010
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Map 5. Unemployment at governorate level and urban and rural unemployment rates in North African Arab countries before the Arab Spring uprisings. 
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to ACLED and SCAD from 2006 to 2011, in other words, in the year of the Arab Spring and
during the five preceding years. Map 7 presents deaths caused by organised violence in each
governorate for the same period of time.
Maps show that according to both ACLED and SCAD, governorates which have seen
most protests are densely populated, they are in the area surrounding the river Nile and its
delta in Egypt and Sudan, and on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean
in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. Further, both data sets show that the
highest number of protests in each country has occurred in the governorates of the capital
cities. This is the case in all countries included and happens despite the unemployment
situation in the capital—whether the unemployment rate in the capital is in the highest quarter
within the country, as in Libya, or in the lower side of the median, as in Tunisia and
Mauritania. Also more generally, the maps provide scant evidence to support the assumption
that more protests would have occurred in the governorates of higher unemployment. The
only country which possibly supports our hypothesis is Libya, where most protests are located
in the four densely populated governorates, which also have high unemployment rates.
It seems that deaths caused by organised violence are not as clearly located in populous
areas as protests, especially not in Sudan but neither in Libya. However, in Egypt the capital
is also the governorate where by far the most fatalities of organised violence have been
concentrated. As with protests, neither would I say here that more organised violence would
have taken place in the governorates of high unemployment.
The most obvious explanation for why there are more protests in governorates with high
population is simply that when there are more people, there are also more people who
potentially might protest. That is also why it is potentially hard to detect the impact of
unemployment. If there is a populous governorate with a low unemployment rate there is
likely to be a lot of protests, but in a governorate of high unemployment and a minor
population there are probably not many protests, if any. Therefore we will analyse whether in
the governorates of high unemployment there have been more protests and organised violence
in proportion to the population.
To study this, I have divided the numbers of protests and deaths caused by organised
violence in each governorate by the population of the governorate. It is debatable whether the
data for protests and organised violence actually is accurate enough for this analysis. For
example, as one protest is the basic unit of our analysis, it might be that in governorates with
a high population the protests are bigger than in governorates inhabited by a smaller number
of people. This is problematic as in the calculations one (large) protest divided by a greater
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number of people will result in a lower outcome than one (minor) protest divided by a smaller
number of people. However, if protests are not proportioned to the population it is at least
complicated to approximate if a higher number of protests in a certain governorate is due to a
higher population or to high unemployment. Table 3 presents results from this exercise done
to study the interplay between unemployment, protests, organised violence and the
population.
The correlations in the table mainly confirm what might have been seen from the maps.
When the absolute number of protests are observed, the higher number of protests correlates
statistically significantly with the population. This means just that in a governorate populated
by 1 000 000 people there are more protests than in a governorate with 1 000 inhabitants. This
as such is not surprising. If we look at the fatalities caused by organised violence their
occurrence does not correlate statistically significantly with the number of residents in the
governorate, also the correlation coefficient is remarkably lower. In other words, in
governorates with a higher population organised violence does not increase as clearly.
More informative than observing the absolute numbers, is to take a look at the numbers
of protests and fatalities which are divided by the population of the governorate. Similarly
here, the number of protests in proportion to the population correlates positively and
statistically significantly with population density—by population density I mean the
population of the governorate divided by the surface area of the governorate. Protesting
correlates with population density, no matter whether we are using SCAD or ACLED. This
means that it is not just the high number of residents in the governorate which is connected to
the high number of protests. There are also more protests in proportion to the population in
those governorates where the population density is higher. This is also not surprising; it can
be that people gather in populous governorates to protest for example because population
centres and especially capitals are easier to access. Again, when we take a look at fatalities
caused by organised violence proportioned to the population, this variable does not correlate
statistically significantly with population density, unlike protesting. So in this data organised
violence is not concentrated in densely populated areas. Actually, although the correlation is
statistically insignificant, the coefficient is negative. This was possible to see from the maps
as well.
SCAD and ACLED report protests to be concentrated in the same areas also when
proportioned to population. This is to be expected as such, so should it be with two data sets
reporting roughly speaking the same phenomena. However, this is encouraging as temporally
1
0
0
Riots and demonstrations (SCAD) 0.086
Riots and protests (ACLED) 0.078 0.903 ***
Fatalities of organised violence (UCDP GED) 0.088 0.040 0.001
Population 0.007 0.503 *** 0.413 *** 0.056
Population density 0.041 0.823 *** 0.859 *** –0.053 0.517 ***
Riots and demonstrations (SCAD) / Population 0.005 0.456 *** 0.413 *** –0.017 0.017 0.210 **
Riots and protests (ACLED) / Population 0.022 0.335 *** 0.562 *** –0.049 –0.079 0.235 *** 0.544 ***
Fatalities of org. violence (UCDP GED) / Population 0.052 –0.047 –0.054 0.536 *** –0.121 –0.070 0.051 –0.003
N for correlations including unemployment quarters is 101. N for other correlations is 167.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005.
 Table 3. Correlation matrix for governorate level variables of unemployment, protests, fatalities of organised violence, and population, Pearson’s r
Riots and
protests
(ACLED) /
Population
Riots and
demonstrations
(SCAD) /
Population
Unemployment
quarter
Riots and
demonstrations
(SCAD)
Riots and
protests
(ACLED)
Fatalities of
organised
violence
(UCDP GED)
Population
Population
density
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these two data sets indicated to some extent different trends. This might also raise the
confidence as to the accuracy of these data sets.
Our main factor of interest, however, is unemployment measured here using quarters, as
in the map. And for unemployment there are no statistically significant correlations. In
addition to the nonexistence of statistically significant correlations, the coefficients for
correlations between protesting and the fatalities of organised violence are rather low. This
means that protests as well as fatalities caused by organised violence do not seem to be
concentrated in the governorates of the highest unemployment. In short, this data does not
support our hypothesis. In addition to the correlations reported here, I have calculated
correlations using the actual unemployment rates instead of unemployment quarters and using
the number of events of organised violence reported by UCDP GED instead of using the
number of fatalities they have caused. I have also tried to use the number of days the protests
have lasted, as this is reported in SCAD, to measure protesting instead of using the pure
number of protests. These additions did not bring any differing results about the relationship
between unemployment and protesting or organised violence. The correlations remained
statistically insignificant and the coefficients remained low.
In all correlations Giza, one governorate of Egypt, is excluded because it seemed to be
an outlier. In the administrative division used in the data, Giza is the second smallest
governorate and the second most densely populated governorate in the data set. Still, there are
no protests recorded there in the SCAD data and according to ACLED, the number of protests
is little compared to other governorates with as high population density. Supposedly the
reason for this is that, where Cairo lies along the river Nile, there is a very dense population in
both sides of the river, on the west bank of the river is the Cairo governorate and on the
opposite side of the river is the Giza governorate. I assume that either protesters go from Giza
to Cairo to protest or protests that occurred in Giza are reported in the media as occurring in
Cairo and either or both of these reasons explain the scarcity of the protests in Giza. When
Giza is excluded from the data set, the p-value for the correlation between the population
density and protests in proportion to the population according to SCAD diminishes from
0.051 to 0.006. Similarly the p-value for the correlation between population density and
protests in proportion to the population according to ACLED diminishes from 0.018 to 0.002.
The coefficients for these correlations increase slightly. These are the most notable changes.
There are five countries where the data about the governorate level unemployment rates
are available, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco and Mauritania. If the same correlations are
calculated for these countries individually, there is practically no evidence to support
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hypothesis 2. When studying countries one by one, the number of observations (N) becomes
quite low so I have here set the limit for statistical significance at 0.10. When individual
countries are observed it is reasonable to use the actual unemployment rates instead of
unemployment quarters, one important reason for using quarters when studying multiply
countries was to leave aside the differences between countries and concentrate in the
differences within the countries. As argued earlier, it is best to compare unemployment rates
to the number of protests proportioned to population and not to the absolute number of
protests. With these specifications the only country where a statistically significant
relationship between protesting and unemployment can be found is Egypt and this correlation
is negative; the higher the unemployment rate the less there are protests in the governorate
according to SCAD. This relationship does not appear with ACLED data.
When studied temporally, in hypothesis 1 the unemployment rates seemed to be linked
with organised violence in some countries, in other words a greater number of deaths caused
by organised violence emerged in the years of higher unemployment. There are three
countries where both the governorate level unemployment rates are available and there are
some fatalities caused by organised violence recorded in the UCDP data set. These countries
are Egypt, Libya and Mauritania. Similarly to the results from studying all countries together,
when observing these countries one by one, there are no cases where the correlation between
the unemployment rates—or unemployment quarters—and the fatalities caused by organised
violence would be statistically significant. The same applies if organised violence is measured
with the number of incidents instead of using the number of fatalities.
In Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya protests in proportion to the
population correlate with the population density. This happens both when using ACLED and
SCAD. More precisely, in these countries in the governorates with a higher population density
there are more protests in proportion to population, consistently with results from studying all
countries together. In Morocco and Egypt, instead, these correlations are statistically
insignificant for both data sets, SCAD and ACLED. As map 5 showed, we have data about
the unemployment rates in urban and rural areas for five countries, Algeria, Egypt,
Mauritania, Morocco, and Sudan. In Algeria there are data for the four years between 2006
and 2011 and during all those years the urban unemployment rates are slightly higher than the
rural, the difference is from 1.1 to 1.9 percentage points (National Office of Statistics of
Algeria 2014). In Egypt there are data for 2006 and 2012, in both years the urban
unemployment rate is higher than the rural, in 2006 the difference is 3.0 percentage points and
in 2012 respectively 6.4 percentage points (Assaad 2009: 21; Egypt State Information Service
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2014). In Morocco data for all the years from 2006 to 2011 is available and through these
years the urban unemployment rate is substantially higher than the rural, the difference varies
from 9.5 to 11.8 percentage points (High Commission for Planning of Morocco 2015). In
Sudan the difference is even more substantial in 2008, the only year available, the urban
unemployment rate is 21.9 percentage points higher than the rural (Nour 2011: 16). From
Tunisia no actual unemployment rates are available, but the African Development Bank states
that the unemployment rate is higher in the rural areas of Tunisia, particularly in the North-
West region of the country (African Development Bank 2007: 11). The same could be
concluded from maps 4 and 5 presenting the unemployment rates by governorate and
population density. In Mauritania there is one year when the data is available, 2008, and
practically there is no difference between the rural and the urban unemployment rates, the
difference is 0.2 percentage points (National Office of Statistics of Mauritania 2009: 158).
So in most countries there are more protests proportioned to population in densely
populated governorates and in most countries the urban unemployment rate is higher than the
rural. This could be considered supportive for our hypothesis; protests are concentrated in the
densely populated areas where the unemployment rates are higher. Still, when individual
countries are observed, the relationship between unemployment and protests is not this
obvious. This causes scepticism towards this tentative support for the hypothesis. In Algeria
and Sudan, where the urban unemployment rates are higher than the rural, there are also
statistically significantly more protests concentrated in the densely populated governorates.
But in Tunisia and Mauritania, where the urban unemployment rates are as high or even lower
than in the rural areas, there are also statistically significantly more protests in proportion to
the population in governorates with higher population density. In Morocco and Egypt instead,
where the urban unemployment rates are higher than the rural, and where the difference is
even bigger than in Algeria, there is no such statistically significant correlation. Thus the
protests are not more clearly concentrated into densely populated areas in the countries where
urban unemployment is higher than rural. In addition, we have to bear in mind, that even
though densely populated governorates, such as Cairo, Luxor, Tunis, or Tripoli are often
urban areas, urban areas do not fully equal densely populated governorates. In many sparsely
populated governorates there are also some urban districts.
So I did not find any clear relationship between the numbers of protests and the
unemployment rates when studying spatially. Another way to study whether there is a
relationship between the unemployment rates and protesting is to look whether the Arab
Spring protests within individual countries started from the regions of higher unemployment
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rates. There are some notions in the previous literature telling where the protests started in
each country, these will be utilised here because of the known uncertainties in the data of
ACLED and SCAD. In Tunisia the protests started from the provincial town of Sidi Bouzid
and from rural areas (Anderson 2011: 2; Kuhn 2012: 642, 674). As said, in Tunisia the
information available suggests that the unemployment rates were higher in rural areas than in
urban areas (African Development Bank 2007: 2011). Similarly table 3 hints that the
unemployment rates are higher in sparsely populated governorates, although this relationship
is not statistically significant. Still, as the maps 4 and 5 show the sparsely populated
governorates are not homogeneous in this respect but there are considerable differences, and
actually the governorate of Sidi Bouzid, where the protests started, is in the quarter of the
lowest unemployment rates. In Egypt the revolution was organised by urban youth and is
labelled as “truly urban” (Anderson 2011: 2; Kuhn 2012: 674). In Egypt, unlike in Tunisia,
the unemployment rates are higher for urban areas (Assaad 2009: 21). And as the map shows,
also the capital Cairo suffers from a higher unemployment rate than many sparsely populated
governorates. In Libya the uprisings started again from peripheral areas and especially from
the eastern provinces. The eastern provinces are also said to have suffered from higher
unemployment rates compared to the west of Libya (Gelvin 2012: 81; Kuhn 2012: 674). Map
5 also indicates that governorates in eastern Libya had slightly higher unemployment rates
than those in the west of the country, but the most obvious observation is that in Libya the
unemployment rates are highest in the urban governorates. Taken together, this provides
partial but not convincing evidence that in these three countries protests would have started in
areas where the unemployment rates were higher.
6.2. Research question II
The main method which is used to study research questions II, III, and IV, is binary logistic
regression, in some hypotheses I have also utilised linear regression. In addition, I have used
chi-square tests and charts to illustrate the patterns in the data. First I will make a couple of
remarks related to the regression analyses of the thesis and on how I will report their results
here. The results presented here from hypothesis 7 in research question III and hypothesis 9 in
research question IV are based on WVS6. The results of the other hypotheses, including all
hypotheses of the research question III, are based on ABIII data. The results of other data sets
can be found as appendixes.
R2, the coefficient of determination, tells how much of the variation in the explained
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variable can be explained by the explanatory variables of the model. The higher the r2, the
better the values of the explained variable can be predicted by the explanatory variables. SPSS
provides two values of r2 for binary logistic regression, Cox & Snell r2 and Nagelkerke r2.
Due to the formula which is used to calculate Cox & Snell r2 its upper bound is less than 1.0,
which is problematic. To “correct” this, Cox & Snell r2 can be divided by its upper bound and
the result of this operation is Nagelkerke r2.  Allison argues that this “correction”—
however—is not well justified theoretically and further, the Nagelkerke r2 likely produces
values misleadingly high (Allison 2013). Thus, in my thesis I report the Cox & Snell r2.
Coefficients of linear regression indicate how a one unit change in the explanatory
variable effects the value of the explained variable if all other explanatory variables are
constant. Thus for example in table 10 in the sample of all countries the coefficient of age tells
that being one year older increases the individual’s interest in politics with 0.009 on a scale
from 1 (not interested) to 4 (very interested) assuming that all other factors stay unchanged.
However, it is obvious that this way of interpretation is not suitable for binary logistic
regression. For example in table 4 we see that in Libya the coefficient for being male is 1.640,
and it is impossible to have a 1.640 change in the explained variable, as it can only get values
0 (did not protest) and 1 (did protest). In binary logistic regression the interpretation of
coefficients is indeed more complicated than in linear regression. As the relationship between
the explanatory and explained variables is in binary logistic regression assumed to be logistic,
the magnitude of the change in the explained variable is also reliant on the values of the
explanatory variable. Instead of analysing the coefficients, odds ratios are often interpreted
when using binary logistic regression analysis. To simplify, in my case the odds ratio tells
how much higher the likelihood for an individual is in the observed category to take part in a
protest compared to an individual in the previous category. For example in the above
mentioned case of Libya the odds ratio (i.e. exp β) for the male variable is 5.154 which would
mean that men are about five times more likely to take part in protests compared to the
reference category, females. Still, odds ratios also reflect unobserved heterogeneity of the
model and thus we cannot compare odds ratios between models. Comparison is possible only
if unobserved heterogeneity is equal between models, that rarely happens and neither is that
the case with my models (Gelman & Hill 2007: 81–83; Mattila 2009; Mood 2010). For these
reasons I will leave the interpretation of coefficients to a lesser attention in the thesis. I will
mostly concentrate on statistical significance and—of course—I will also observe the
direction of the relationship, in other words, whether the factor under study impacts explained
variable decreasingly or increasingly.
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For illustrative purposes and to check correlations between variables, correlation
matrixes and some descriptive statistics can be found in appendix A. Mainly there seem to be
statistically signiﬁcant correlations between any given pair of two variables which are used in
the thesis. As the data sets are this large (N ranging from some 3 000 to almost 14 000) this is
maybe not surprising. The correlation coefﬁcients are generally low, so there should be no
concerns about multicollinearity. This is good news for the credibility of the results of both
binary logistic regression and linear regression. It is perhaps noteworthy, that protesting and
the variable where the unemployed are pitted against the employed do not correlate with each
other, and this is the linkage we are most interested in. Analyses to be presented soon will take
a closer look at their relationship, when possible intermingling factors are taken into account.
6.2.1. Hypothesis 3
Figure 11. Protest participation and employment (measured with the question of employment
status)
As mentioned earlier, I will use three ways to operationalise unemployment when studying
hypothesis 3. The ﬁrst is based on actual questions about employment status, but due to
supposed problems with this indicator, the two other ways used are based on income. Firstly,
ﬁgure 11 presents Arab Spring protest attendance using the actual question about employment
Data set: ABIII
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status and based on ABIII data. All countries of the data are included here as in every similar
chart I will introduce. Maybe not surprisingly, students are the most active protesters, whereas
the retired and housewives are the most passive. The protest attendance of the unemployed,
the part time employed and the full time employed is between these extremities and these
groups are relatively close to each other. In the regression analyses, only the full time
employed will be counted as employed for the reasons explained earlier. As could be
supposed based on the chart, employment status has a statistically significant impact on
protest participation if all employment statuses are analysed, χ2(6, N = 14 358) = 339.70, p <
0.005. Still, there is no statistically significant difference between the unemployed and the
employed, χ2(1, N = 6 129) = 1.15, p > 0.05.
Table 4 shows that when the four countries most affected by the Arab Spring, Egypt,
Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, are studied together the employed are, contrary to our hypothesis,
statistically significantly more active to protest than the unemployed. Results to the
hypothesis can be read from the line of the “Employed” variable. The signs of the coefficients
indicate higher protest attendance for the employed also when these four countries are studied
separately, although only in Libya the relationship is statistically significant. On the other
hand, in the subsample of “other countries” the employed protest statistically significantly less
probably than the unemployed, which is supportive for the hypothesis. If the countries of the
“other countries” were studied one by one, it would turn out that in two out of eight of them
the relationship suggests that the employed really are statistically significantly more likely to
protest than the unemployed. Including the four countries substantially impacted by the
uprisings, the coefficients of five countries are supportive for the hypothesis, two of these
countries suggesting a statistically significant relationship, and seven countries contradict our
assumption, one of these seven, Libya, being statistically significant. Thus to sum, no
unambiguous relationship seems to appear here. It is maybe not surprising then that when all
countries are studied together, there is also no statistically significant linkage between
protesting and being unemployed compared to being employed. The model presented in table
4 can be considered as the base model of research question II, which is then modified when
studying hypotheses 4 and 5.
1
0
8
Urban residence 0.753 *** 0.412 * 0.441 * 0.289 * 0.455 *** –0.081 0.231 ***
(0.187) (0.195) (0.184) (0.135) (0.084) (0.095) (0.063)
Male 1.214 *** 1.640 *** 1.556 *** 0.300 * 1.090 *** 0.626 *** 0.883 ***
(0.228) (0.147) (0.196) (0.141) (0.081) (0.086) (0.059)
Age –0.013 –0.006 –0.034 *** –0.009 –0.016 *** –0.012 *** –0.015 ***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.637 *** 0.229 *** 0.513 *** 0.314 *** 0.349 *** 0.288 *** 0.315 ***
(0.106) (0.080) (0.097) (0.063) (0.039) (0.047) (0.029)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.336 0.898 *** 0.008 0.056 0.259 * –0.331 ** –0.062
(0.356) (0.291) (0.229) (0.242) (0.129) (0.127) (0.089)
Others 0.085 0.579 * 0.024 –0.429 –0.025 –0.488 *** –0.283 ***
(0.373) (0.272) (0.221) (0.220) (0.122) (0.116) (0.084)
Constant –4.747 *** –3.147 *** –2.738 *** –0.658 * –1.315 *** –2.025 *** –0.830 ***
(0.587) (0.508) (0.425) (0.335) (0.193) (0.191) (0.139)
N
R
2 0.153
1 195
0.154
1 160
0.122
1 186 14 173
0.166 0.040
4 657
0.084
1 116 9 516
0.136
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed (measured with the question of employment status)
Arab Barometer III
Egypt Libya Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Other countries All countries
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Figures 12 and 13 show an alternative measurement for employment that I will use, the
income. Absolute income measures real income as money and relative income measures how
well the income covers the needs of a respondent. These ways to operationalise employment
Data set: ABIII
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Figure 12. Protest participation and employment (measured with the question of absolute 
income)
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Figure 13. Protest participation and employment (measured with the question of relative 
income)
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indicate similarly with previous results that being unemployed, in other words receiving less
money, does not in a straight forward way increase the protest attendance. Actually, here the
charts suggest that on the contrary, the higher the income the higher the likelihood of an
individual to take part in the Arab Spring protests. The groups with the highest earnings are
the most active protesters. The people with the lowest relative income are also the most
passive protesters. With absolute income the situation is not quite that clear but when a trend
line representing the three deciles average is added (black line), it suggests that change in
protest attendance is rather constant. For chi-square tests I divided respondents into two
groups based on their income instead of having ten groups in absolute income and four groups
for relative income. Both ways to measure income show a similar relationship here, and in
both cases the differences are statistically significant, for absolute income χ2(1, N = 9 752) =
43.21, p < 0.005 and for relative income χ2(1, N = 14 071) = 25.47, p < 0.005. I have also
added a logistic curve to figure 12. I did this to demonstrate the assumed logistic relationship
between explanatory and explained variables, which is inherent in logistic regression. The
logistic curve—or S-curve—does not differ greatly from the linear line and practically the
assumed logistic relationship fits the data as well as an assumption about linearity would.
Tables 5 and 6 confirm the idea given by the graphs; when all countries are studied
together, the higher the income the more likely the individual protested during the Arab
Spring protests. The result is same no matter which way to measure income is used. When
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen are studied as one group and “other countries” as another
group, there are no statistically significant results, although the results of “other countries”
come close to statistical significance in both tables. The relationship they suggest is positive,
in other words, also here opposite to our expectation of negative relationship. From the four
countries, which are studied separately, the results are diverse, but both statistically significant
results indicate again positive linkage, that a higher income is connected to higher protest
attendance.
Although the results in hypothesis 3 differed to some extent depending on which of the
three measurements of unemployment was used, the central finding was obvious. None of
these analyses provided appreciable support for the hypothesis that the unemployed would be
more active protesters than the employed. From now on I will leave the two income based
operationalisations and use only employment status question to measure unemployment.
1
1
1
Urban residence 0.674 *** 0.641 0.390 * 0.091 0.371 *** –0.104 0.166 *
(0.211) (0.362) (0.188) (0.159) (0.100) (0.112) (0.075)
Male 1.263 *** 1.663 *** 1.555 *** 0.322 * 1.012 *** 0.669 *** 0.857 ***
(0.290) (0.269) (0.201) (0.157) (0.101) (0.106) (0.073)
Age –0.012 –0.009 –0.032 *** –0.018 * –0.022 *** –0.011 ** –0.018 ***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Education 0.575 *** 0.288 0.551 *** 0.320 *** 0.380 *** 0.307 *** 0.362 ***
(0.120) (0.147) (0.102) (0.069) (0.047) (0.055) (0.035)
Income (absolute) 0.087 * –0.032 –0.017 0.056 * 0.022 0.029 0.024 *
(0.041) (0.045) (0.027) (0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011)
Constant –4.872 *** –2.470 *** –2.767 *** –0.777 ** –1.083 *** –2.744 *** –1.052 ***
(0.623) (0.847) (0.435) (0.306) (0.199) (0.228) (0.153)
N
R
2 0.142
9 582
0.041
6 500
0.174
3 082
Table 5. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed (measured with the question of absolute income)
0.080
828
0.155
1 127
0.147
338
0.113
789
Arab Barometer III
Egypt Libya Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Other countries All countries
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
1
1
2
Urban residence 0.766 *** 0.363 0.471 * 0.306 * 0.467 *** –0.058 0.239 ***
(0.189) (0.193) (0.185) (0.135) (0.085) (0.095) (0.063)
Male 1.280 *** 1.747 *** 1.546 *** 0.456 *** 1.177 *** 0.678 *** 0.955 ***
(0.215) (0.146) (0.184) (0.133) (0.078) (0.084) (0.057)
Age –0.011 –0.001 –0.034 *** –0.009 –0.015 *** –0.015 *** –0.016 ***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.705 *** 0.298 *** 0.484 *** 0.317 *** 0.364 *** 0.235 *** 0.312 ***
(0.110) (0.080) (0.102) (0.063) (0.040) (0.045) (0.029)
Income (relative) –0.141 0.052 0.070 0.104 0.040 0.082 0.061 *
(0.108) (0.074) (0.086) (0.073) (0.040) (0.046) (0.030)
Constant –4.604 *** –3.124 *** –2.790 *** –1.260 *** –1.486 *** –2.286 *** –1.185 ***
(0.539) (0.493) (0.422) (0.303) (0.183) (0.201) (0.139)
N
R
2 0.124
1 154 1 104 4 599
0.136
13 882
0.040
9 283
0.166
Table 6. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed (measured with the question of relative income)
0.0760.154
1 187
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
1 154
0.157
Other countries All countriesEgypt Libya Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Arab Barometer III
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6.2.2. Hypothesis 4
If the young unemployed and the young employed are compared using the chi-square test,
there are no statistically significant differences in how often they participated in the Arab
Spring protests, χ2(1, N = 3 312) = 2.59, p > 0.05. However, when studying protest
participation among the Arab youth more closely, there are slightly more results supporting
hypothesis 4 than there was evidence to support hypothesis 3 for the all age population. These
results are presented in table 7. Most notably, in Tunisia the young unemployed have
participated in protests statistically significantly more often than the young employed. Also in
the sample of all countries the result with the positive coefficient, in other words supportive
for the hypothesis, comes close to statistical significance, its p-value is 0.077. Maybe partly
because of this change in Tunisia, when in hypothesis 3 the sample of the four countries
denoted that the unemployed were statistically significantly less active protesters than the
employed, this result loses its statistical significance here when only young respondents are
studied. However, the coefficient for this sample of the four countries most affected by the
upheavals remains negative. Again in Libya it is statistically significantly less likely for a
young unemployed person to take part in protest compared to a young employed person.
Even if this hypothesis provided slightly more evidence for the assumed relationship
between unemployment and protesting than hypothesis 3 where adults were included, one
should not make too bold claims. Education was a factor statistically significantly increasing
the likelihood of protest attendance in all samples in hypothesis 4 when studying only the
youth—as education similarly increased protest attendance statistically significantly in every
sample of hypothesis 3. Compared to that, being unemployed was a statistically significant
factor only in three out of seven of these samples, and, in addition, in one of these three cases
where being unemployed was a statistically significant factor, in the case of Libya, against
what we expected, it reduced the likelihood of protesting. Thus, taken together, support for
this hypothesis also remain scant.
1
1
4
Urban residence 0.795 *** 0.440 0.505 0.416 * 0.524 *** –0.234 * 0.182 *
(0.251) (0.293) (0.280) (0.173) (0.115) (0.118) (0.082)
Male 1.067 *** 1.907 *** 1.874 *** 0.305 1.127 *** 0.722 *** 0.927 ***
(0.296) (0.230) (0.291) (0.181) (0.110) (0.111) (0.078)
Age –0.008 –0.054 ** –0.070 ** 0.027 –0.022 * –0.004 –0.016 *
(0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Education 0.378 * 0.418 *** 0.717 *** 0.312 *** 0.339 *** 0.342 *** 0.325 ***
(0.153) (0.147) (0.159) (0.082) (0.057) (0.064) (0.042)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.274 1.146 *** –0.934 * –0.253 0.089 –0.509 *** –0.198
(0.384) (0.354) (0.369) (0.297) (0.161) (0.162) (0.112)
Others 0.073 0.552 0.002 –0.394 –0.003 –0.528 *** –0.270 **
(0.402) (0.312) (0.291) (0.257) (0.144) (0.137) (0.098)
Constant –3.892 *** –2.841 *** –2.585 *** –1.603 *** –1.192 *** –2.253 *** –0.844 ***
(0.912) (0.852) (0.876) (0.559) (0.342) (0.340) (0.243)
N
R
2 0.088
544
0.069
645
0.208
413
0.195
551
0.150
7 072
0.046
4 919
Table 7. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed among the youth
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
0.157
2 153
Other countries All countriesEgypt Libya Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Arab Barometer III
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6.2.3. Hypothesis 5
In hypothesis 5 we turn to compare protest participation between the educated unemployed
and the educated employed. To do this, I have only included respondents in the highest
educational category, in other words those, who have an education higher than secondary
education. As respondents with a lower education are excluded, education understandably is
not a control variable here. At first sight it seems that when all countries are studied the
educated unemployed actually are more eager to protest than the educated employed, χ2(1, N
= 3 312) = 4.33, p < 0.05. But the results of regression analysis in table 8 show that there is a
positive, although statistically highly insignificant, coefficient for the Employed-variable, this
meaning that the educated unemployed are not more likely to protest than the educated
employed. There can be various reasons for this difference between chi-square test and
regression analysis. For example it might be that there are more educated unemployed
respondents in countries were generally less people took part in the protests and this distorts
the analysis with the chi-square test. However, with regression analysis there is no statistically
significant result for the Employed-variable for this hypothesis. This might partly be due to a
lower number of observations. As only highly educated respondents are included, there are
also less statistically significant coefficients for control variables. Still, the lack of results
supporting the hypothesis cannot be explained only by the lack of observations. Just by
looking at the signs of coefficients it is clear that mostly they are positive for the Employed-
variable when we expected them to be negative. In addition, there are surely enough
observations at least in three samples which combine several countries, and being male is a
statistically significant factor in almost every subsample. Thus, the right conclusion here is
that there is no substantial difference in protest attendance between the educated unemployed
and the educated employed.
In research question II the unemployed and the employed are compared in five different
models, three models to analyse hypothesis 3 and the unemployed in general, one for the
young unemployed and one for the educated unemployed. For all four separately studied
countries there are one or two models indicating statistically a significant relationship, in the
case of Tunisia this statistically significant result is supportive for our hypothesis and in other
cases statistically significant results contradict our hypothesis. In other words, none of the
four countries produced supportive result in one model and the opposite in another model.
This is encouraging.
1
1
6
Urban residence 0.683 *** 0.476 * 0.114 0.098 0.425 *** –0.36 * 0.139
(0.226) (0.239) (0.367) (0.297) (0.133) (0.172) (0.106)
Male 0.874 *** 1.834 *** 1.897 *** 0.547 1.430 *** 0.873 *** 1.207 ***
(0.271) (0.191) (0.386) (0.351) (0.131) (0.157) (0.101)
Age 0.004 –0.005 –0.030 * 0.000 –0.007 –0.014 * –0.010 *
(0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.020) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.513 0.613 –0.440 0.052 0.233 –0.336 0.052
(0.435) (0.351) (0.475) (0.431) (0.199) (0.271) (0.163)
Others 0.128 0.341 –0.149 –0.096 0.060 –0.39 –0.061
(0.466) (0.330) (0.447) (0.448) (0.197) (0.279) (0.163)
Constant –2.732 *** –2.247 *** –0.458 0.161 –0.604 * –0.778 * –0.051
(0.534) (0.473) (0.597) (0.764) (0.284) (0.387) (0.243)
N
R
2 0.149
189
0.166
664
0.055
511
0.052
2 412
0.014 0.160
208 1 572
Table 8. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed among the educated
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
0.176
3 984
Other countries All countriesEgypt Libya Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Arab Barometer III
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6.2.4. Results from other data sets and additional operationalisations
Appendixes C and D presents the models of hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 run with ABII and WVS6
data. The central information provided by these two other data sets, ABII and WVS6, is
consistent with the results from ABIII. Generally being unemployed does not have a
statistically significant impact on the likelihood of an individual to take part in protests. When
there are statistically significant results they primarily indicate that the unemployed are less
active protesters compared to the employed. In addition, based on ABII and WVS6 there are
no statistically significant results indicating that the unemployed would protest more probably
in the four countries most affected by the Arab Spring, namely Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and
Yemen. When relative and absolute income are used to measure employment and all countries
are studied together, both ABII and WVS6 show a statistically significant relationship, again
consistently with ABIII; the more people earn the more likely they are to protest.
Interestingly it seems that according to each data set, out of four separately studied
countries, Tunisia is the country where the unemployed are most active protesters compared
to the employed. This notion can be made based on the use of the employment status question
in hypothesis 3. As the results are statistically insignificant this is not a robust finding. Still, in
ABIII the Tunisian unemployed are practically as likely to protest as the employed, the
coefficient is positive but very low and its p-value is 0.92, in ABIII also the coefficients for
the other three separately studied countries are positive, but the coefficients are higher and
their p-values are respectively lower, reaching statistical significance in Libya. In ABII only
Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen are included, but the situation is same, for Tunisia the coefficient
of this variable is positive and low with a p-value of 0.98, whereas for other two countries the
coefficients are greater and their p-values lower. In WVS6 again three countries are included,
this time Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen and there Tunisia’s coefficient is negative but
statistically insignificant, in Libya and Yemen the coefficients are according to WVS6
positive.
It is also interesting, that as with ABIII, also WVS6 indicates that in the sample of
“other countries” the unemployed are statistically significantly more active protesters than the
employed when measured by the employment status question. In contrary, when income
questions are used, WVS6 indicates that the unemployed are statistically significantly less
active protesters compared to the employed. And the third data set, ABII, does not indicate
that the unemployed of the “other countries” would be more active compared to the
employed. Thus I would not say that these results from the sample of the “other countries”
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provide any strong evidence to support our hypothesis, but I think it indicates that there are
some differences between countries in how active the unemployed are. Partly the countries
included in the sample of the “other countries” in ABIII and WVS6 are the same. Thus,
possibly a more detailed analysis would show that statistically significant supportive results of
“other countries” appear because there are same countries in the samples of “other countries”.
I have also tested how some changes or alternative operationalisations in the models of
research question II affect the results. These variations are tested with the seven samples of
the ABIII data set. I have not included their results as tables in the thesis nor in the
appendixes. First I tried to add marital status as control variable, because it could be assumed,
for example, that bachelors protest more often. I tried two ways to have this as a binary
variable, first coding bachelors as their own group and having others as the reference group,
and secondly coding the married as their own category and having others as the reference
group. In chi-square both these operationalisations indicated a statistically significant
relationship. However, when this was added as a control variable in the base model of
hypothesis 3, it lost its statistical significance whichever operationalisation was used. It might
be that the higher protest participation among bachelors which was evident in the chi-square
tests, is partly explained by their age; young respondents protest more often and are more
often bachelors. Adding marital status as a control variable neither appreciably increased the
coefficient of determination nor affected the coefficients or the statistical significance of other
variables. Thus I have left marital status out from my analyses.
In hypothesis 5 I divided the data to study the educated unemployed. Another way to
study the interaction effect of two variables would be to include an interaction term in the
regression model. In practice the interaction term for two variables means that these variables
are multiplied with each other. In this case, it is not reasonable to add an interaction term to
the current base model for the two variables measuring employment status, namely Employed
and Other. Doing so would actually test the interaction between education and being
employed or belonging to the group of “others”, and based on this it would be challenging to
interpret whether there is an interaction between being unemployed and educated. An
alternative is to exclude everybody but the employed and the unemployed from the analysis,
and code the binary variable as 0 for the employed and 1 for the unemployed, and this is what
I tested with ABIII. As a result I expected a positive coefficient for the interaction term, but in
four samples out of seven the coefficient was negative, and more importantly, it was not
statistically significant in any sample. However, this analysis observes whether there is an
interaction between unemployment and education, it does not compare the educated
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unemployed to the educated employed, which is what we actually wanted to do. The results
still support each other; the educated unemployed do not appear to be active protesters no
matter whether they are compared to the educated employed or whether this is studied by
means of an interaction term.
I also tried using an interaction term for age and unemployment status in hypothesis 4.
There we expect the coefficient of the interaction term to be negative. Adding this interaction
term brought hardly anything new, but confirmed what was seen when comparing results
from hypotheses 3 and 4. There were two samples where the interaction term was statistically
significant, these were the samples of all countries and the sample of Tunisia. In both these
cases the coefficient was negative. And, not surprisingly, these were the two samples where
the unemployed were not statistically significantly more active in protesting than the
employed in hypothesis 3 but the unemployed youth was more active in protesting than the
employed youth in hypothesis 4.
I made an additional model where I had 25 years as a limit for youth in hypothesis 4
instead of 35 years. This did not change much. In general all the results were statistically less
significant compared to having 35 years as a limit. This can be explained with the sample
sizes, which were naturally reduced considerably when studying only respondents 25 years
old and younger. Other than that the results were concordant with those presented in table 7.
6.3. Research question III
In research question III we proceed to explore, whether the unemployed are politically aware
and less satisfied with life compared to the employed. I will mainly use linear regression in
this research question, and in models utilising linear regression I have included only three
samples, firstly the sample with all countries and respondents of the data set, secondly the
sample where the countries in which we are most interested are studied together, and thirdly
the sample where the respondents from all other countries are studied together. The samples
of individual countries are left out primarily because the explained variables in these analyses
are not fully normally distributed. As discussed earlier, this should not be a problem in linear
regression as long as the sample sizes are relatively large. After I have excluded the analyses
of individual countries, the smallest sample size is above 4 000 and this should indeed be
large enough. The residuals of these larger samples are also better normally distributed, the
normal distribution of residuals is often considered as one, even though not the most
important, assumption for the use of linear regression.
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6.3.1. Hypothesis 6
Data set: WVS6
Figure 14. Satisfaction with life among the unemployed and the employed
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Figure 14 provides support for our assumption in hypothesis 6 that the unemployed are less
satisﬁed with their lives than the employed. It shows that among both unemployed and
employed respondents, the most common answer has been about half way on the scale; not so
dissatisﬁed, but neither so satisﬁed. However, about 10% of the unemployed have answered
that they are completely dissatisﬁed with their life where the corresponding share for the
employed is some 4%. Respectively, employed respondents are more often completely
satisﬁed with their lives than those who are unemployed.
Results from regression analyses presented in table 9 validate this ﬁnding. The
coefﬁcients of determination in table 9 and in table 10 are adjusted. The coefﬁcients
reported in both tables are unstandardised. As mentioned earlier, in hypotheses 6 and 8 which
concern the satisfaction in life, I have reported results based on the WVS6 data set in the
thesis, and results got from ABIII can be found in appendix B. In all other hypotheses the
results here are based on ABIII and the results with WVS6 are in appendix C. I have
considered the WVS6 to be better as there the question asked is “how satisﬁed are you with
your life as a whole these days”. The item in the ABIII data set which could be used in this
hypothesis instead asks “[g]enerally speaking, how would you compare your living conditions
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with the rest of your fellow citizens”, and the options available vary from “much worse” to
“much better”. To be precise, this question in ABIII actually does not ask about satisfaction.
On the other hand, this hypothesis is based on relative deprivation theory, which assumes that
people who feel deprived after comparing themselves to some other people are dissatisﬁed
and start rebelling. Thus both these questions measure whether the respondent is relatively
deprived according to the theory, and, interestingly, they offer two different ways to
operationalise this. The results in the table show that, in all three samples, the employed are
statistically signiﬁcantly more satisﬁed with their lives than the unemployed. Results from
Urban residence –0.096 0.067 0.002
(0.091) (0.065) (0.054)
Male –0.624 *** –0.011 –0.273 ***
(0.083) (0.062) (0.050)
Age 0.000 –0.003 –0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Education (those without formal education as reference cagegory)
Lower than secondary 0.549 *** 0.082 0.241 ***
(0.133) (0.107) (0.084)
Secondary 0.533 *** 0.434 *** 0.431 ***
(0.138) (0.106) (0.084)
Higher than secondary 0.669 *** 0.725 *** 0.640 ***
(0.150) (0.120) (0.094)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.646 *** 0.897 *** 0.784 ***
(0.154) (0.133) (0.100)
Others 0.888 *** 0.911 *** 0.890 ***
(0.136) (0.122) (0.091)
Constant 4.801 *** 5.459 *** 4.748 ***
(0.226) (0.198) (0.149)
N
R
2
World Values Survey 6
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9. Linear regression, satisfaction with life of the unemployed
All countries
0.070
9931
0.037
5 674
0.110
4 257
Libya, Tunisia,
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ABIII which are presented as an appendix show similarly statistically signiﬁcant support for
the hypothesis in each sample—to be precise, results show that the unemployed consider their
living conditions statistically signiﬁcantly worse that the employed. From a statistical point of
view, the residuals of ABIII are not fully normally distributed in these models.
6.3.2. Hypothesis 7
Figure 15. Interest in politics among the unemployed and the employed
In hypothesis 7 we expect that the unemployed are politically less active. I use two indicators
to measure whether a respondent is politically active, ﬁrst measuring the respondent’s interest
in politics and second whether he or she voted in elections. Descriptively, ﬁgure 15 shows
that the unemployed are about twice more often not interested in politics than the employed.
The employed then again are almost twice as often very interested in politics compared to the
unemployed. Also when we take a look at voting, employed respondents have voted
considerably more probably than the unemployed, χ
2
(1, N = 6 234) = 208.829, p < 0.005.
Tables 10 and 11 tell results of regression analyses and they both provide considerable
support for the hypothesis. In other words, unemployed people are less active voters and less
interested in politics compared to employed people. The coefﬁcient takes this direction in
each model, in the sample of all countries and in the sample where four countries are studied
together. This difference is statistically signiﬁcant whichever indicator is used. Also some
other samples indicate a statistically signiﬁcant difference.
Data set: ABIII
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In the models presented in tables 9 and 10 residuals and the normality of their distribution are
observed although not reported here. There are no appreciable concerns in this respect.
6.3.3. Results from other data sets
There is no question in the ABII data set which could be used to study hypothesis 6, the
results from both ABIII and WVS6 were introduced already above. I run the model of
Urban residence –0.041 0.039 0.013
(0.029) (0.020) (0.016)
Male 0.122 *** 0.215 *** 0.186 ***
(0.028) (0.018) (0.015)
Age 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (those without formal education as reference cagegory)
Lower than secondary 0.225 *** 0.186 *** 0.203 ***
(0.040) (0.030) (0.024)
Secondary 0.464 *** 0.395 *** 0.416 ***
(0.046) (0.035) (0.027)
Higher than secondary 0.619 *** 0.539 *** 0.563 ***
(0.042) (0.034) (0.026)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.171 *** 0.016 0.060 *
(0.048) (0.030) (0.026)
Others –0.003 –0.146 *** –0.104 ***
(0.045) (0.028) (0.024)
Constant 1.902 *** 1.591 *** 1.922 ***
(0.073) (0.051) (0.045)
N
R
2
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Arab Barometer III
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Egypt, Libya,
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Other countries All countries
Table 10. Linear regression, the inﬂuence of unemployment on being politically active  
(measured by interest in politics)
1
2
4
Urban residence –0.545 *** 0.266 0.020 0.509 *** –0.001 –0.063 –0.035
(0.143) (0.165) (0.131) (0.148) (0.070) (0.052) (0.042)
Male 0.609 *** 0.555 *** 0.039 0.049 0.284 *** –0.027 0.086 *
(0.160) (0.127) (0.136) (0.158) (0.068) (0.047) (0.038)
Age 0.028 *** 0.026 *** 0.029 *** 0.102 *** 0.039 *** 0.052 *** 0.047 ***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.382 *** 0.363 *** 0.279 *** –0.034 0.217 *** 0.062 * 0.133 ***
(0.064) (0.068) (0.075) (0.068) (0.033) (0.025) (0.020)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.426 0.184 0.058 1.150 *** 0.418 *** 0.411 *** 0.384 ***
(0.284) (0.257) (0.190) (0.266) (0.115) (0.078) (0.064)
Others 0.417 0.159 0.045 0.303 0.168 0.038 0.059
(0.279) (0.233) (0.170) (0.244) (0.105) (0.072) (0.059)
Constant –1.417 *** –2.528 *** –1.597 *** –3.930 *** –2.025 *** –1.797 *** –1.944 ***
(0.391) (0.442) (0.316) (0.390) (0.169) (0.118) (0.105)
N
R
2 0.041
1 192
0.053
1 178
0.072
1 188 9 683
0.092
4 744
0.276
1 186
Table 11. Binary logistic regression, the inﬂuence of unemployment on being politically active  (measured by voting)
0.104
14 427
0.114
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Arab Barometer III
Egypt Libya Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Other countries All countries
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hypothesis 6 also for the four separately studied countries, although these results are not
reported here due to lower sample sizes and non-normally distributed residuals. However, if
these results were interpreted, coefﬁcients take the expected direction in each case and in
about half of them the relationship is statistically signiﬁcant. This further supports the results
of the unemployed being less satisﬁed with their lives.
In hypothesis 7 the results from ABII and WVS6 are generally parallel with results of
ABIII which were introduced above. The only exception to this is WVS6 when the political
activity of the unemployed is studied; according to WVS6 there are no statistically signiﬁcant
differences in the voting activity of the unemployed and the employed. Other than this, the
coefﬁcients suggest everywhere that the unemployed are politically less active, also when the
WVS6 data is analysed using the question of political interest. In about half of these models
this positive relationship is statistically signiﬁcant.
6.4. Research question IV
6.4.1. Hypothesis 8
Figure 16. Protest participation and satisfaction with life
According to ﬁgure 16 there is no clear relationship between the satisfaction in life and
protesting. Neither being dissatisﬁed nor being satisﬁed seems to increase the likelihood for
protesting. This is discouraging in relation to hypothesis 8, as we presumed that those who are
less satisﬁed with their lives would protest more likely.
Data set: WVS6
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Urban residence 0.506 *** 0.168 –0.803 0.367 *** 0.092 0.241 ***
(0.114) (0.199) (0.648) (0.096) (0.102) (0.070)
Male 1.256 *** 0.855 *** 1.359 *** 1.228 *** 0.517 *** 0.916 ***
(0.109) (0.212) (0.264) (0.091) (0.095) (0.065)
Age –0.012 ** –0.013 –0.004 –0.010 *** –0.009 * –0.009 ***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Education 0.250 *** 0.506 *** 0.707 *** 0.428 *** 0.253 *** 0.362 ***
(0.067) (0.126) (0.102) (0.050) (0.055) (0.037)
Satisfaction with 0.014 0.014 –0.040 0.006 0.004 –0.001
life (0.021) (0.038) (0.042) (0.017) (0.021) (0.013)
Constant –2.419 *** –3.644 *** –3.847 *** –3.103 *** –2.822 *** –2.676 ***
(0.353) (0.579) (0.512) (0.245) (0.263) (0.189)
N
R
2
Table 12. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the dissatisﬁed
0.156
863
0.050
1 114
0.100
2 042
0.097
9 273
0.042
5 254
0.126
4 019
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
All countriesLibya Tunisia Yemen
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries
World Values Survey 6
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Table 12 conﬁrms what the ﬁgure alluded to. Satisfaction with life does not have a
statistically signiﬁcant relationship with the likelihood of protest participation in any samples.
In addition, the coefﬁcients are both negative and positive and none of them is even close to
statistical signiﬁcance. This means that these models provide actually no suggestion about the
relationship we expected.
6.4.2. Hypothesis 9
Figure 17. Protest participation and interest in politics
Hypothesis 9 proposed that those who are politically active are more likely to protest. This
assumption in turn gets substantial support. Based on ﬁgure 17 it appears that those who are
most interested in politics are more than three times as likely to protest than those who are
least interested in politics, between these extremities protest attendance increases rather
steadily. Similarly, when studied descriptively, those who voted in the last parliament
elections protest more often than those who did not vote χ
2
(1, N = 14 330) = 7.01, p < 0.01.
Tables 13 and 14 show results from regression analyses. They corroborate that being
politically active is indeed a strong predictor of protest participation. Actually, the interest in
politics turns out to be the most signiﬁcant factor inﬂuencing protest participation. Being
interested in politics increases the likelihood for protesting in every sample statistically
signiﬁcantly at the level of p < 0.005. Gender comes close to this, as males are statistically
signiﬁcantly more likely to protest at the p < 0.005 level in all but one model of the table.
Being politically active also is generally a robust predictor of protest participation but not
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Urban residence 0.719 *** 0.494 * 0.480 * 0.402 *** 0.522 *** –0.091 0.254 ***
(0.189) (0.195) (0.188) (0.140) (0.086) (0.096) (0.064)
Male 1.233 *** 1.768 *** 1.467 *** 0.323 * 1.139 *** 0.563 *** 0.882 ***
(0.214) (0.147) (0.187) (0.137) (0.079) (0.085) (0.058)
Age –0.018 * –0.013 * –0.040 *** –0.011 –0.021 *** –0.020 *** –0.021 ***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.546 *** 0.150 0.396 *** 0.267 *** 0.267 *** 0.168 *** 0.232 ***
(0.108) (0.081) (0.100) (0.065) (0.040) (0.045) (0.029)
Interest in politics 0.597 *** 0.555 *** 0.625 *** 0.526 *** 0.547 *** 0.495 *** 0.510 ***
(0.125) (0.078) (0.101) (0.073) (0.043) (0.049) (0.032)
Constant –5.731 *** –3.630 *** –3.890 *** –2.041 *** –2.222 *** –3.000 *** –1.828 ***
(0.574) (0.468) (0.471) (0.306) (0.182) (0.206) (0.137)
N
R
2 0.152
14 116
0.049
9 460
0.195
4 656
0.121
1 099
0.180
1 185
0.186
1 189
0.138
1 183
Table 13. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of those politically active (measured by interest in politics)
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Arab Barometer III
Egypt Libya Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Other countries All countries
1
2
9
Urban residence 0.721 *** 0.359 0.441 * 0.274 * 0.451 *** –0.062 0.233 ***
(0.187) (0.193) (0.185) (0.135) (0.084) (0.095) (0.063)
Male 1.314 *** 1.621 *** 1.573 *** 0.433 *** 1.138 *** 0.681 *** 0.939 ***
(0.213) (0.143) (0.186) (0.133) (0.077) (0.840) (0.057)
Age –0.012 –0.007 –0.038 *** –0.018 *** –0.019 *** –0.014 *** –0.018 ***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.647 *** 0.221 ** 0.497 *** 0.341 *** 0.357 *** 0.255 *** 0.317 ***
(0.107) (0.079) (0.097) (0.062) (0.039) (0.044) (0.029)
Voting –0.216 0.681 *** 0.507 *** 0.436 *** 0.447 *** –0.017 0.238 ***
(0.227) (0.143) (0.177) (0.152) (0.081) (0.086) (0.058)
Constant –4.600 *** –2.846 *** –2.841 *** –0.988 *** –1.420 *** –2.232 *** –1.083 ***
(0.513) (0.443) (0.424) (0.271) (0.166) (0.187) (0.127)
N
R
2 0.164
1 197
0.121
1 178 4 675
0.081
1 111
0.158
1 189
Table 14. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of those politically active (measured by voting)
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
0.137
14 141
0.038
9 466
0.170
Other countries All countriesEgypt Libya Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Arab Barometer III
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6.4.3. Results from other data sets
Generally results from alternative data sets give similar results. Interest in politics increases
the likelihood for protest participation statistically signiﬁcantly in every sample. Those who
are politically more active are also more likely to protest, and often this relationship too is
statistically signiﬁcant. Notably, neither in any of these models are there any statistically
signiﬁcant result in the analyses of hypothesis 8; this conﬁrms that those dissatisﬁed with life
do not seem to protest more often. The complete lack of statistically signiﬁcant results also
means that satisfaction with life proves to be the weakest performing explanatory variable of
the thesis. There is no other explanatory variable—neither as a control variable, nor as a
variable of our primary interest—in any hypothesis which would be statistically insigniﬁcant
in every sample of every data set. Thus it is justiﬁed to conclude that based on these results
the satisfaction with life seems to have no impact on protest participation.
6.5. Control variables in research questions II, III, and IV
Figure 18.  Protest participation and country
Although not reported in the tables, the country has been included as a control variable in all
Data set: ABIII
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quite as often as the interest in politics. Those who have voted in the last elections are
statistically signiﬁcantly more active protesters in all samples except in Egypt and in the
sample of “other countries”.
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models where more than one country is analysed, and in every single one of these models
there have been statistically signiﬁcant differences between countries. Figure 18 represents
Arab Spring protest participation by country based on ABIII data, and the differences between
countries are indeed remarkable χ
2
(11, N = 14 427) = 1618.07, p < 0.005. Not surprisingly,
generally the share of respondents who have taken part in Arab Spring protests is greater in
countries hard hit by the uprisings, these countries are on the left of the dash line.
Figure 19.  Protest participation and age
The results of regression analyses have shown that, as we assumed, the older a respondent is
the less likely it is that he or she protests. This relationship is statistically signiﬁcant in about
two thirds of the models. Only in Yemen does ABII suggest that the older respondents protest
statistically signiﬁcantly more often. Otherwise all statistically signiﬁcant results across data
sets and samples prove that the young are more likely to protest.
 Figure 19 illustrates this trend clearly. Respondents in the age cohorts 18–20 and 21–25
are the most active protesters, and after that protest participation decreases along with age.
There are no clear falls, instead, the decrease happens rather steadily. This supports the
solution to include age in the models as such instead of using its square root or coding it into
binary variable. In the ﬁgure above, respondents are grouped into ﬁve years age cohorts, in
the regression models the actual age of a respondent are used.
Education is a statistically signiﬁcant factor in practically every model. And in every
model where protest participation is studied and education is a statistically signiﬁcant factor,
it denotes that the more educated a respondent is the more likely he or she is to participate in a
Data set: ABIII
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protest. Figure 20 shows similarly that those who have higher than secondary education
clearly protest most often. Those who have a secondary education follow behind and those
who have a lower than secondary education or no formal education are still less active
protesters.
Figure 20.  Protest participation and education level.
Gender is approximately as often a statistically signiﬁcant factor as education, in other
words almost in every model. In the models predicting protest participation it, as expected,
indicates everywhere that males are more active protesters than females. The impact of urban
residence seems minor compared to gender or education, but urban residence is still a
statistically signiﬁcant factor in slightly more than one half of the models. Generally
throughout the data sets and samples statistically signiﬁcant results indicate that those living
in urban areas are more likely to protest, as we expected. As with age, here again for some
reason ABII suggests that Yemenis are an exception; in Yemen the rural population protests
statistically signiﬁcantly more often than city dwellers, but this is only according to ABII.
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7. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
7.1. Central results and possible explanations for them
7.1.1. Research question I
In hypothesis 1 the support for the assumed connection between the unemployment rate and
the number of protests remained scant and ambiguous. As only one out of eight charts
indicates that the trends of these two factors move in parallel, this can actually happen by
coincidence. The one supportive case was Egypt when studied using SCAD. Still, the high
number of protests in Egypt from 2011 onwards was probably not caused by the
unemployment rate per se, instead both the rise in protests as well as the rise in the
unemployment rate are said to be caused by the Arab Spring (Daily News Egypt 2013). Thus
it would be erroneous to conclude that a rise in the unemployment rate caused protests. If
something, it was the other way around, protests caused a rise in the unemployment rate.
When looking for linkages between declines, stagnations or accretions in the unemployment
rate and numbers of protests, there is again maybe one out of eight charts suggesting a
relationship, which again does not prove much.
The results seemed quite different when we turned from protests to look at the
relationships between fatalities caused by organised violence and the unemployment rates. At
least in Algeria and Egypt the trends in the unemployment rates and the numbers of fatalities
were consistent. Also Yemen provided partial support for the hypothesis, but not as clearly as
Algeria and Egypt. Figures from Morocco showed no connection between these two variables
under scrutiny. As two or three out of four cases supported our hypothesis this is hard to
ignore as coincidence. However, as only four countries were under study, neither should one
make any generalised conclusions based on this. In addition, again, the correlation does not
necessarily mean that unemployment is a causal factor behind organised violence. As in the
case of Egypt and protests, it can be that organised violence causes unemployment. Berman et
al. have suggested that this can happen for example through violence discouraging
investments, consumption, and production (Berman et al. 2011: 505, 508). Cramer, however,
has noted, that to assume that violent conflicts would generally create unemployment is also
simplistic and not backed with adequate evidence. Although this can happen, violent conflicts
often have various and contradictory impacts on labour markets (Cramer 2010: 18).
Algeria was perhaps the country most clearly illustrating the joint trends in
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unemployment and casualties of organised violence, so I will take a closer look at it. From
1991 to 1995 it faced a rapid and simultaneous rise in unemployment and in organised
violence. Algeria was faced by economic complications after the price of hydrocarbons
collapsed in 1986. The country wanted to get relief from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and adopted neoliberal economic policies, which really came into force in 1991 and
resulted in a rise in unemployment. The origin of the Algerian civil conflict, instead, is traced
back to the victory of the Islamists in the elections of 1989 and the military coup which
followed (Gelvin 2012: 94–95; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016a). It is important to
acknowledge that these descriptions indicate that behind both the rise of unemployment and
the rise of organised violence there were external factors. But even if the original triggers
came from the outside, I think it is possible that these trends were, at least partly, dependent
on each other. However, the question is then, which one causes the other. The numbers of
fatalities in Algeria started to decline before the decline in the unemployment rate which
might indicate that the former caused the latter rather than the other way around. Still, we
cannot make conclusions about the direction of the causal relationship based on only this one
result from Algeria, where the death toll declined before the unemployment rate. Based on my
charts, in other situations than that, it was impossible to differentiate which one came first. In
short, if the trends of unemployment and fatalities move in parallel, it can be considered as the
chicken and egg situation, and it is not too easy to prove which way the causation runs—if
there even exists causation. It can also be that there are other factors, which have an impact on
both variables.
An issue which complicates comparing the trends in organised violence and
unemployment is that there is often poorly unemployment data available from conflict
affected areas (Cramer 2010: 13–16). This is the case also in Sudan and Yemen. Sudan would
have been an interesting country to analyse in more detail because of the major conflict in
Darfur. But as there were no governorate level unemployment data or data about temporal
changes in unemployment available, this was impossible. From Yemen I was able to find
neither the governorate level nor the rural and the urban unemployment rates.
In Yemen the unemployment rate was on the rise during the years preceding the Arab
Spring. But noteworthily, there was no significant rise at that time in Tunisia and Egypt, the
first countries affected by the uprisings. Especially Tunisia had seen a long-lasting and
relatively constant decline in the unemployment rate starting in 1998. Similarly in Morocco
and Algeria the unemployment rate in 2010 was at the lowest level for a decade. This is an
interesting notion. It provokes us to ask that if unemployment was a major cause behind the
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uprisings, why they started at that particular moment and not in times when the
unemployment rate had been considerably higher.
In hypothesis 2 we asked whether there were more protests and organised violence in
the areas of higher unemployment. When all countries were studied together, the
unemployment rate of a governorate did not correlate statistically significantly with protests
or with fatalities caused by organised violence. When studying countries individually, there
were no indications that a higher unemployment rate would have been connected to a higher
number of protests proportioned to population, and in one case there was a statistically
significant negative correlation, more unemployment in a governorate was linked to a lower
numbers of protests. When countries were studied separately, correlations between
unemployment and organised violence remained statistically insignificant no matter which
operationalisations were used. Thus, in total, evidence from these analyses did not offer
noteworthy support for the hypothesised connection.
In general, in the countries under observation in hypothesis 2 unemployment rates are
higher in urban areas than in rural areas, in some countries differences are bigger than in
others. Also in general there have been more protests in proportion to population in densely
populated governorates. However, it might be too straightforward to conclude that there are
more protests in urban areas because the unemployment rates are higher there. There are also
other reasons why protests can concentrate in urban areas; it is easier for people to travel to
cities, cities often have more educated population, and, in the case of capitals, the
governmental buildings there might attract protesters. Thus, it is hard to estimate what is the
role of unemployment, as protests might concentrate in urban areas also because of these
other reasons. When individual countries were studied, it was not the case that in the countries
where the unemployment rates are more substantially higher compared to the rural
unemployment rates, the protests would have been more clearly concentrated to the densely
populated governorates. Actually, inspection goes at least partly against this, for example in
Tunisia protests are more profoundly concentrated to densely populated governorates than in
some other countries regardless of the fact that the unemployment rate in Tunisia is higher in
rural areas. This weakens the assumption that protests would locate in urban areas because of
unemployment. In addition, the comparison is not fully coherent since a densely populated
governorate is not fully equal to an urban area.
I also took a look at where the Arab Spring protests started in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya
and what the situation was concerning unemployment in these areas. Results were mixed, but
neither can this be considered as strong evidence to support the assumption of unemployment
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as a driving factor behind protests. Here information on where uprisings started is based on
some qualitative descriptions by scholars.
7.1.2. Research question II
The analysis of research question II was primarily done with ABIII data. Firstly, a descriptive
analysis showed that the employment status as such has an impact on Arab Spring protest
participation. Students were notably active protesters whereas the retired and housewives took
seldom part in protesting. However, there were no considerable differences between the
unemployed and the employed. Hypothesis 3 similarly received scant support from regression
analyses. Measured by the question about employment status, most of the countries indicated
that there were no statistically significant relationships between being unemployed and
protesting, this was the case also when all countries were studied together. In Libya, one of
the four countries we were more interested in, the unemployed were statistically significantly
less likely to protest than the employed. The relationship took the same direction in Egypt,
Tunisia, and Yemen but was statistically insignificant.
I assumed that there might be some problems as to the validity of the question about
employment status. As part of the people in the Arab economies work sporadically or work in
the informal sector or might work for very low payment, the dichotomy of being unemployed
or employed did not necessarily have the same relevance as in Western countries. Thus I also
used income to measure employment.
Results from analyses of relative and absolute income are very close to each other.
These models demonstrated that there either is no relationship between income and protesting,
or if there is, the more people earned the more likely they took part in the Arab Spring
protests. Some differences appear when unemployment is operationalised with income
compared to the operationalisation based on the question of employment status. Notably,
according to all three data sets the sample of all countries shows that higher income predicts
higher likelihood for protest participation. This relationship is statistically significant and
holds both for relative and absolute income. But when the question about employment status
is used, there are no statistically significant relationships in the samples of all countries.
Further, in the sample of “other countries” of WVS6, the employment status question predicts
that the unemployed are protesting statistically significantly more often than the employed but
also there both income questions show that the higher the income the higher the protest
attendance. There seem to be no apparent explanations for these differences. One easy
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explanation could be that when questions about income are used, all respondents are included
in the analyses and it is likely that housewives and the retired have a small income. But on the
other hand, as there is a control variable for age, it should to great extent control for the lower
protest participation of the retired, and as there is a control variable for gender, that should
mostly take care of housewives. In addition, students are active protesters with a low income.
Thus, to explain the results of income variables by the low protest participation of housewives
and the retired does not sound conclusive to me. Another explanation could be that income
questions simply serve as better indicators for working in the diverse labour markets of the
Arab countries; this is the very reason why we tested these operationalisations too.
However, in the end, differences between the results of different operationalisations in
hypothesis 3 are minor. As said, the core message of those all of them is that unemployment
does not have an explicit impact on protest participation, but if there is a linkage it generally
seems to be, that the unemployed protest more seldom than the employed.
Compared to hypothesis 3, in hypothesis 4 there was slightly more evidence to support
the assumption that the young unemployed protest more often than the young employed. Still,
in Libya the unemployed protested statistically significantly less actively than the employed,
and in most samples there was no statistically significant relationship. Compared to the
impact of education for example, unemployment was also here clearly a less important factor.
In hypothesis 5 there were no significant differences between the educated unemployed and
the educated employed in protest attendance.
As I run these models also with ABII and WVS6 data, these data sets generally
confirmed results summed up above. Some modifications of the models I tested with ABIII
data also supported the conceptions already presented.
In short, all these different data sets and different approaches or measurements provided
scant support for the main assumption of research question III. It seems that compared to the
employed, the unemployed did not generally protest more often in the Arab Spring protests
nor in other occasions. Mostly there are no clear differences between them and, rather, the
evidence suggests that the unemployed are less active protesters than the employed and not
vice versa.
This notion of the remote influence of unemployment becomes evident, if it is compared
to other socio-demographic factors, which served as control variables. Taken together, I have
presented in the results and in the appendixes 95 regression models for research question II.
More precisely, I have five models, three for hypothesis 3 and one for both hypotheses 4 and
5, these I have run in 19 samples and subsamples of three different data sets. All models have
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had urban residence, gender, age, and education as control variables, except that education
was not a control variable in hypothesis 5 when only the highly educated were included.
Being unemployed has been as an explanatory variable measured in one way or another in all
these models. Education has been a statistically significant factor influencing the likelihood
for protest participation in 73 models out of those 76 models where it has been included and
in all these 73 cases it has increased the likelihood for protest attendance as we expected. Age
has been a statistically significant predictor of protest participation in more than half of the
models where it has been included, and in all these cases except for two the relationship has
taken the assumed direction, the younger the respondent, the more likely he or she has taken
part in protests. Thus we can say that these analyses provide strong support for the proposition
that youth and the high education of the population were significant factors leading to the
spark of the Arab Spring.
When we then turn to the variable of our main interest, unemployment, the tone indeed
changes considerably. Unemployment has been a statistically significant factor in less than
one quarter of the models, but more importantly, only in five out of 95 models has
unemployment been a factor statistically significantly increasing the likelihood for protesting.
In other words, far more often, models have indicated results contradictory to our hypotheses;
that the unemployed are statistically significantly less likely to protest than the employed.
These figures are not necessarily fully comparable, as a model including all countries
should maybe get more weight in comparison than a model run for only one single countries.
Still, I think this comparison validates well the argument that whereas young age and high
education have proved to be factors considerably increasing protest participation, the impact
of unemployment is much lesser and much more controversial. This comparison also shows
that being male has statistically significantly increased protest attendance in practically all
models, and those living in urban areas have been statistically significantly more active
protesters in almost half of the models.
One could suggest that if it was not the unemployed and the poor who were in the
forefront of these uprisings, maybe it then was the middle class. Although only a graph, the
figures calculated from ABIII data suggested that those in the highest income decile took part
in the Arab Spring protests most actively. It is of course debatable in which income deciles
the middle class in the Arab societies is situated. Maybe most people in the richest decile still
belong to the middle class if the upper class is considered to be very thin.
At some points the results of the first research question also allow us to discuss them
compared to the results of other research questions. Firstly both ACLED and SCAD data and
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the survey data support the idea that more protests occur in urban or densely populated areas.
This is not surprising, but still an agreeable result. As said, in Tunisia, unlike in some other
countries, the unemployed were not more passive protesters compared to the employed.
Tunisia also appeared to be the only country where the information available suggested that
the unemployment rates are lower in urban than in rural areas. This again seems confusing at
first sight. It could be assumed that in a country where the unemployment rates are lower in
urban areas, the urban unemployed would be less dissatisfied with their situation. As most of
the protests take place in urban areas, the unemployed could then be expected to protest more
seldom. I think it is also interesting to note that this data at hand suggests that in absolute
numbers the main part of the protesters were not unemployed. Even in the Arab countries
with the highest unemployment rates only a minority of the total labour force are unemployed
according to ILO figures. As it seems that the unemployed are not more active protesters than
the population on the average, this then leads us to assume that the majority of the protesters
during the Arab Spring were something else than unemployed.
As noted, out of the four separately studied countries, in Tunisia the unemployed are
more active compared to the employed than elsewhere. Mainly this means that in Tunisia the
unemployed are as active as the employed, while in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen they seemed
rather more passive than the employed. All three data sets support this interpretation, although
the differences are not substantial and relationships are often statistically insignificant.
However, also inspection of the sample of “other countries” indicates that there are
differences between countries in how active the unemployed are. This provokes us to ask why
there are these disparities between countries.
When I discussed the theoretical background of the thesis, an issue which was raised
was the important role labour unions often play in the mobilisation of the unemployed and the
differences between countries in how labour unions take the jobless into consideration
(Chabanet & Faniel 2011: 401–402; Klandermans 2011: 45). This might offer one explanation
why it has appeared that the unemployed have been more passive in some Arab countries than
in others. Langhor has found that countries differed considerably as to which role the labour
unions took in the Arab Spring uprisings. In Tunisia labour unions had a “key role” in the
Arab Spring, in Egypt the labour mobilised forcefully towards the end of the revolt, in Yemen
the role of labour unions was limited or non-existent, and in Libya Qaddafi had banned labour
unions so they could not play a role there (Gelvin 2012: 71; Langhor 2014). Gelvin notes that
in Tunisia labour union activists encouraged unemployed and underemployed youth to take
part in the uprisings (Gelvin 2012: 56). This could indeed explain why the unemployed did
140
not remain passive during the Arab Spring in Tunisia and, further, why there are also other
differences between countries.
7.1.3. Research question III
Results of research question III provided robust support for the hypotheses. First, the results
showed that unemployed people are considerably less satisfied with their lives, which was
expected following the relative deprivation theory. Secondly, the analyses proved that the
unemployed are politically less active compared to the employed. This outcome was assumed
based on writings of Jahoda et al. who suggested that being unemployed reduces the political
interest and political activity of an individual (Jahoda et al. 1933/2002: 39–41). The results
were parallel based on all data sets utilised.
7.1.4. Research question IV
In research question IV we first found that those who are less satisfied with life do not protest
more actively. Actually, the results indicated that there are no differences between protest
participation of unemployed and employed respondents. This contradicts the relative
deprivation theory as it suggests that it is more likely for those who feel themselves deprived
to protest. There is hardly any theoretical argument stating in itself that dissatisfaction in life
should not have an impact on protest participation. Instead, many have theorised that there are
various other factors which have an impact on protest participation in addition to
dissatisfaction. It appears to be the most logical explanation that these other factors have an
impact stronger than dissatisfaction. These other proposed factors and their relevance in this
case will be discussed in the next section 7.1.5.
We also found that political activity generally is a strong predictor of protest
participation. Those who are more interested in politics and those politically more active took
also more often part in the Arab Spring protests. This outcome was assumed following
Schlozman & Verba, who have theorised that the political skills are critical in the process of
political mobilisation (Schlozman & Verba 1979: 19–20). More precisely, it turned out that an
interest in politics is the factor most often statistically significantly linked to protesting. In
practice high education and being male increase protest attendance as often as the interest in
politics. Also in research question IV results from alternative data sets were supportive for the
results got with primary data.
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7.1.5. Explaining results of all research questions together
As results both from research questions I and II generally suggest that unemployment is not
connected to a higher likelihood of political instability or especially protesting, it is worth
considering which theoretical approaches can be used to explain this outcome.
Klandermans highlighted that just dissatisfaction with the current situation do not
necessarily turn to mobilisation. Further he argued, that in the case of the unemployed, they
are likely to be unhappy with their situation so the lack of the protests of the unemployed has
to be explained with some other factors (Klandermans 2011). My results seem to support this
idea; the unemployed are less satisﬁed with their lives, but still, they are not more likely to
protest. Theory provides numerous possibilities to explain why the unemployed do not
mobilise. This can happen because unemployment leads to passivity and resignation, the
unemployed lack collective identity, they do not have resources such as political or
organisational skills, or the unemployed do not ﬁnd protesting rational, as it will not bring
jobs. Of these proposed factors, this thesis took a closer look to what role being politically
active plays in protest participation. The results of research questions II, III and IV can be
illustrated in the ﬁgure below.
Figure 21. Findings of research questions II, III, and IV
The arrows in the ﬁgure indicate assumed relationships and the colours of the arrows tell
whether the results suggested a positive relationship (green) or not (blank). Firstly, in research
question II we assumed that those who are unemployed have a higher likelihood to protest
compared to those, who are employed. The results did not conﬁrm this hypothesis, generally
Being politically active
Feeling of dissatisfaction
Unemployment Protest participation
Unemployment Protest participation
Research 
question II
Research 
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results found 
positive relationship
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the unemployed were not more active protesters. Then, in research questions III and IV we
separated two mechanisms which are proposed to link unemployment to protesting. We found
that unemployment and political activity are negatively connected. Those who are
unemployed are politically less active, the blank arrow tells that there is no positive
relationship between these two factors. In turn, those politically active are more likely to
protest. It also turned out that, on one hand, there is a positive relationship between being
unemployed and being dissatisfied with life, but on the other hand being dissatisfied with life
does not increase likelihood of protesting.
In short, this seems to suggest that the unemployed do not protest, because
dissatisfaction with life does not increase likelihood for protesting. Higher political activity
then again increases the likelihood for protesting, but the unemployed are politically less
active. After all, it possibly seems understandable, that the unemployed were less eager to
take part in the Arab Spring protests. Maybe people who have problems in feeding themselves
are not so interested if the country is governed democratically. However, this thesis does not
bring any final truths about why unemployment does not appear to be connected to political
instability. The theoretical considerations concerning the relationships between
unemployment and political instability can be seen as a supermarket of explanations, from a
diverse discussion everyone can pick points to explain any result. In reality the relationships
between unemployment and protesting are surely more complex than the figure above
presents. Social networks, identity, marginalisation, and many other possible intervening
mechanisms are not tested here partly because they are more difficult to model.
Until now we have traced the relationship between unemployment and political
instability by observing, whether higher unemployment rates have been connected to a higher
level of political violence or higher numbers of protests. We have also studied, whether the
unemployed have been active protesters. When using these methods, unemployment is
generally not linked to political instability. But does this mean that unemployment had no role
in the spark of the Arab Spring? Compared to the world, the average unemployment rate was
high when the Arab Spring started, but based on this it would be simplistic to conclude that
unemployment was a factor behind the Arab Spring. But based on my results it would also be
simplistic to conclude that unemployment had no role.
Perry & Reiss have argued that historians have often not detected the particular
contribution of the unemployed in revolutions (Perry & Reiss 2011: 35). Presumably this is
the case also with the Arab Spring uprisings. Despite my results, many unemployed have
protested and surely many have protested because of unemployment. But it is hard to
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distinguish empirically the role which the unemployed or unemployment in the end have
played.
Even if the unemployed themselves were not active protesters that does not necessarily
mean that people who participated did not think about unemployment. It is possible that
students for example were protesting because they were frustrated with poor employment
opportunities or the employed were protesting because they were afraid of losing their jobs.
Or all people generally were furious about high unemployment, including the unemployed
themselves, but the unemployed just did not take to the streets so often for various reasons
suggested above. This is a point Schlozman & Verba have raised, they noted that also people
who are not unemployed themselves can take political action on unemployment. They further
argued that unemployment is an issue which has a greater role in politics than the unemployed
alone as a group (Schlozman & Verba 1979: 20).
Indeed, here is some indication that many considered unemployment as a problem in the
times of the Arab Spring at least in Egypt and Tunisia, even though the unemployed
themselves were not marching in the forefront. When discussing earlier research I mentioned
that soon after the Arab Spring had toppled Tunisia’s former ruler Ben Ali, a survey
conducted found that 60% regarded unemployment as the first or the second biggest problem
facing the country (International Republican Institute 2011a). It would also be daring to argue
that Tunisian protesters did not think about unemployment, as their most chanted slogan is
said to have been “Employment, freedom, and dignity” (Ben Mhenni 2014). Similarly in
Egypt a survey done in the spring of 2011 found that two thirds considered the low living
standard or the lack of jobs as the factor which most influenced their support of or
participation in the Arab Spring protests (International Republican Institute 2011b).
But if people protest because of unemployment, why this did not appear in the results of
research question I? If unemployment leads to protests, there should be more protests in years
and areas of higher unemployment—no matter who actually does the protesting.
This frustration with high unemployment evident in the surveys was articulated in
Tunisia and Egypt, even though the unemployment rate was rather steadily decreasing during
the years before the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt. And by no means was it high in 2010
in a historical perspective (World Bank 2015a). Thus it seems that people are not necessarily
satisfied with employment opportunities even though the unemployment rates decline. This
notion receives also broader support. Arampatzi et al. have demonstrated that as a whole there
were substantial improvements in economic and social indicators throughout the Arab world
between the beginning of the 2000s and the eruption of the Arab Spring. Poverty declined in
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all countries except Yemen, the region experienced considerable progress in relation to the
Millennium Development Goals and inequality remained low in international comparisons
and did not worsen in most of the economies of the region. But simultaneously, in the years
before the Arab Spring people had become increasingly less satisfied with their lives. Authors
identify this as the “unhappy development” paradox (Arampatzi et al. 2015).
If dissatisfaction with unemployment is not connected to fluctuations or spatial
distributions of unemployment, and this dissatisfaction neither manifests itself as unemployed
people protesting, then my research design is just simply not able to capture the role of
unemployment. But interestingly, hypothesis 8 actually indicated that even dissatisfaction
with life in general does not drive people to protest. At least those who are less satisfied do
not protest more often. This then anyway leads us to ask whether the dissatisfaction with
unemployment in the end was a major motivation for people to protest. Maybe the Arab
Spring started mainly for some other reasons, but when it started, some people also wanted to
express their frustration with poor unemployment opportunities. This, however, will remain
unanswered question in this thesis.
Where has this discussion brought us? We know now, that the unemployed were not
more likely to protest and we know that neither does the unemployment rate seem to be
connected to protests. It also seems that people can be dissatisfied with the employment
situation even if the unemployment rate has decreased. And people who are not unemployed
themselves might protest because of unemployment. I think the results from this thesis have
still shed more light on the role of unemployment in the Arab Spring uprisings. The results
should not be interpreted as an indication that unemployment was irrelevant for the Arab
Spring. Still, the results are thought provoking and give us reason to think, whether
unemployment in reality was as important factor in this chain of events as some have
suggested.
7.2. Reliability and validity of the results
7.2.1. Research question I
As pointed out in the section presenting the data reliability, taken into account, how ACLED
and SCAD data are collected, there are some issues with the reliability of the data.
Presumably the urban bias influences both data sets, meaning that urban incidents of
protesting and organised violence are overrepresented in the data. In addition, larger protests
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and incidents of organised violence with higher numbers of casualties are more likely to be
included in the data than minor events. These two systemic biases should have greater impact
on the spatial examination in hypothesis 2 than on the temporal observation of hypothesis 1.
For yearly figures it is not so crucial if large and urban protests get more weight; as this
happens throughout the years, it affects every year evenly. But as the unit of analysis in
hypothesis 2 is a governorate, these biases have a different impact in different governorates.
In a rural governorate with a small population more protests probably remain ignored, as the
governorate is both rural and the small population is likely to organise small protests in
absolute terms. These protests would still be notable when proportioned to population.
Comparison in hypothesis 1 showed that there are occasionally considerable differences
depending on whether the yearly numbers of protests are studied with ACLED or with SCAD.
Partly these differences can be explained by different sources which are used as basis of the
data sets and partly with different definitions of an “event” they have used—maybe most
notably ACLED considers that one event only lasts one day whereas in SCAD also protests
continuing for several days are combined into one event. Taken sources and definitions into
account, there are still some surprisingly substantial differences when studied yearly. This is
worrying and means that no strong conclusions should be made based on the results of these
analyses.
In hypothesis 2 both data sets, however, located the protests mainly into the same
governorates, also after protests were proportioned to the population. This can be interpreted
as a consolidation of the results, as two data sets give similar results. On the other hand, this
does not exclude the possibility of media bias, as it might be that SCAD and ACLED report
similar patterns of protesting because the media, the source of information, itself is biased.
Urban bias can partly explain why we in hypothesis 2 found that there are more protests
in urban areas, also when proportioned to the population. Combined to earlier proposed
explanations, such as accessibility, the education level of the population, and governmental
buildings, this further challenges the idea that the higher unemployment rates in urban areas
would be a causal factor for the abundance of protests there.
When the exact locations of the incidents have been unknown for the coders of the
UCDP GED, ACLED, and SCAD data sets, they have located the incidents into nearby
towns, provincial capitals or centroid points of the areas. I will not any more discuss the
grounds or rationality of these coding procedures as such. Still, it is good to note here that as I
have done my analyses at the governorate level, this coding procedure should not reduce the
validity of my results. In each data set and each incident there is information included telling
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how precisely the incident has been located. When incidents have not been located precisely
enough, I have excluded them totally from the analysis of hypothesis 2.
Taken into account the sources of the data, results concerning organised violence should
be more reliable than those concerning protests. This is firstly because presumably organised
violence which leads to casualties is more inclusively reported in media than minor or
medium protests. In addition, UCDP GED which is used here collects information not only
from media reports, but also from other sources, such as NGO reports and historical archives
(Sundberg & Melander 2013: 527).
When the data is principally biased in the way that urban incidents are overrepresented
and the results generally suggest that organised violence is not concentrated into densely
populated areas, this result should hold even if in reality there is more organised violence in
rural areas than these figures let assume. Supportive for this, Kalyvas argues that most civil
conflicts are fought primarily in rural areas (Kalyvas 2006: 38–48). As unemployment in the
countries which I study is generally higher in urban areas, this again does not support the idea
that organised violence takes place where the unemployment rates are higher.
If the unemployment rate would be a strong causal factor behind protesting, one would
assume that the relationship between these two factors would have been revealed by these
data, too. Maybe unemployment is a minor factor acting together with a set of other variables,
and this might rather explain why it was not possible to perceive its impact here. As there are
known shortages in the data because of which more sophisticated statistical analyses are not
reasonable, it is neither possible to study here this kind of joint effects of diverse factors. Of
course it cannot be ruled out that with a more accurate data set the results could indicate a
connection between unemployment and protesting. Still, there is no obvious reason to assume
that the data used would be systemically biased to undercount protests in governorates and
years of higher unemployment. I think that there are no evident grounds to assume that with
better data a relationship would be found.
I also assumed that the globalisation of communication could cause less incidents to be
recorded during the earlier years of the time period than towards its end. This might influence
the results of hypothesis 1. Charts maybe partly verify this emerging trend, but this is not a
major concern. I have kept this in mind, and peaks or falls in the numbers of protests are
mainly compared to previous and subsequent years. The trends of the whole period are not
studied.
As pointed out earlier, being unemployed or employed does not have the same meaning
in the Arab countries as that we think of in the Western world. This might lead us to doubt the
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validity of unemployment as an indicator. Being employed in an Arab country might not
provide sufficient income to achieve decent standards of living. In addition, underemployment
or having meaningless or exploitative work in the informal sector or elsewhere can be a
problem for an individual practically to the same extent as being unemployed. But to be
precise, this is not a problem of validity. Our indicator measures exactly what we intended it
to measure when setting research questions and hypotheses, namely unemployment. Another
question is whether being unemployed in developing economies has such significance, that it
is even reasonable to assume that unemployment leads to rebellions. This again can be seen as
one potential explanation for the results we have at hand; maybe unemployment does not
cause political instability, because being unemployed or employed does not carry the same
relevance in the context of the Arab world as elsewhere.
The yearly unemployment rates in hypothesis 1 are taken from the ILO; I have
described their origins when presenting the data and I have considered this data reliable
enough for my purposes, apart from Sudan and Libya. In Egypt and Libya the data on urban
and rural as well as governorate level unemployment is apparently based on census, but in
other countries the collection method of the subnational data used in hypothesis 2 remains
partly unclear. The reliability of this data as a whole is discussed earlier and I have also shown
that based on the data of Morocco, the unemployment patterns within the country do not
change considerably during six years, the time period of hypothesis 2. Governorates of high
unemployment remain governorates of high unemployment. I think that in terms of data
reliability greater concern might still be the data of ACLED and SCAD and at some extent
also UCDP GED.
Another important question is, whether this data on unemployment, protests, and
organised violence is detailed enough in terms of validity, set aside its reliability. And this
question concerns both the data itself but maybe even more the adjustment of our hypotheses.
As we saw, there are substantial differences between sparsely populated governorates in their
unemployment rates, and the same applies for densely populated governorates, so one single
rate for urban and one for rural unemployment might generalise too much. On the other hand,
also the governorate level unemployment rate can cover a lot of disparity. Morocco is the only
country under study where also the urban and rural unemployment rates are available at the
governorate level. From 1999 to 2013 there is one governorate in Morocco where the urban
unemployment rate has through all the years been approximately the same as the rural and
never more than twice as high as the rural. In another governorate the urban unemployment
rate has during these years always been five to seventeen times higher than the rural (High
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Commission for Planning of Morocco 2015). Thus the aggregate unemployment rates used
here, although separated at the governorate level or by the urban and rural at the national
level, might be too non-specific. Maybe people in certain towns feel relatively deprived and
protest because the unemployment rate in their town remains unchanged and they see that in
other nearby towns it is declining. If in this case the aggregate unemployment rates would be
studied, it would seem as if protests emerge in spite of the declining unemployment rate in the
area. It is also unfortunate that the governorate level unemployment rates as well as the rural
and the urban unemployment rates are generally available only for some years. However, I
have not seen that spatially this detailed unemployment data would have been used to study
the protests of the Arab Spring. So although there might be a need for even more detailed
data, my analyses here have also revealed to us some new patterns to support and to question
the role of unemployment in the Arab Spring revolutions.
7.2.2. Research questions II, III, and IV
7.2.2.1. Time lag
Earlier I have noted that the survey data which I have used here should generally be of good
quality and reliable and valid enough for my purposes. I also concluded that my greatest
concerns in relation to the accuracy of the data are firstly difficulties in measuring
unemployment and secondly time lag. By time lag I meant that in some cases respondents
have answered whether they took part in protests years before the time of the survey was done
and questions on employment status, interest in politics, and respondents’ other features were
asked.
We do not have to ponder about time lag in research question III, as there we try to
predict the respondents’ current dissatisfaction and their current interest in politics using their
current socio-demographic characteristics. As noted earlier, the time lag also affects some
features less than others. It is likely that changes in age, education level, and gender during a
couple of years have little impact on the respondents in the data. Income, employment status,
or political interest on the other hand might change rapidly.
Three different data sets I have used suggest the same results to a great extent. As in
ABIII respondents are in practice asked whether they protested up to three and a half years
ago, the time lag should have greater impact here. This could be seen as a lower share of
statistically significant results; the more time has passed, the more people have changed their
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employment status. Theoretically a greater time lag should drive results towards entropy.
However, in WVS6 respondents are asked whether they protested during the preceding year
and in ABII respondents in Tunisia and Egypt were asked whether they took part in the Arab
Spring protests which at the times of the survey had begun six to ten months ago. During six
months or one year the employed are mostly likely to remain employed, those who are
interested in politics to remain interested in politics and it is likely that the income of the
people also stays relatively constant. Still, there is no more support for our hypotheses from
data where the time between protests and the moment of the survey is shorter. All three data
sets suggest that when all countries are studied together the higher the income of a
respondent, the more likely she or he has participated in protests. I believe that this and
consistent results more generally—especially country specific consistent results—are not due
to accident but rather reflect reality and validate each other. I consider that time lag does not
have a great influence on the validity of the results.
Consistent results are interesting also in that sense that based on them, same factors
seem to drive people both to Arab Spring protests and to protests in general. In ABIII people
were asked particularly about taking part in the Arab Spring “demonstrations and rallies”. In
WVS6 the question was asked about taking part in peaceful demonstrations and in countries
other than Morocco the WVS6 field work was conducted at such a time that the question did
not cover Arab Spring protests. In ABII respondents in Tunisia and Egypt were asked about
participation in the Arab Spring protests, and in the other countries whether they had
participated in a protest, march, or sit-in in general. Thus, the data sets suggest that age,
education, gender, and employment status affected similarly participation in peaceful
demonstrations, sit-ins or Arab Spring protests. Similar results again of course increase the
credibility that this data as a whole allows us to draw conclusions about the factors which
drive people to protest, but also that these results could be applied to protesting more
generally in these countries. Further it indicates that it is justified to use one data set as a
primary source in one hypothesis and another in another hypothesis as I have done.
7.2.2.2. Validity of unemployment
As in the case of the time lag, also here it should increase our confidence as to the
results, that separate data sets and separate operationalisations support each other.
I think that we can separate three different stages or sets of explanations to rationalise
why the unemployed do not protest more often than the employed. Firstly, we can say that
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unemployment is difficult to define and thus difficult to measure. If somebody is working
occasionally once or twice a week or is working for some hours or some days every now and
then, is he unemployed or employed? This is a problem of validity, and this is one concern
with the question of employment status in the survey data. Probably people who have
answered the question do not have the same understanding as we do or the same
understanding with each other about what being unemployed actually means. Secondly, we
can agree that there is a certain definition for being unemployed. But we can then suggest,
that being unemployed does not have same meaning in the Arab countries as it has in Finland,
for example; being employed does not mean a good standard of living but might be as
frustrating as being unemployed. This is something I mentioned already in relation to the first
research question and I see it rather as a possible explanation for results than as a problem of
validity. Or then thirdly, we can agree that being unemployed means a lack of work and lack
of livelihood. If so, then it “really” is the case that what we understand as unemployment does
not increase the likelihood for protesting; deprivation does not lead to rebellion and then
several possible explanations emerge. It might be, for example, that being unemployed is
depressing, it feels impossible to change by protesting, people do not want to protest because
of unemployment because they do not want to identify themselves as unemployed or they lack
social relations.
As said, when employment was measured with income, it appeared, too, that those who
earn little are not more active in protesting, if something, they are less active. Consistent
results from these two operationalisations using income as a proxy for employment provide
support for the idea that the use of actual questions about employment status produce valid
results. The results also suggested that dissatisfaction does not increase the likelihood of an
individual to protest. Thus I would turn to the third set of explanations to reason why the
unemployed are no more likely protest to protest. In other words I would not blame poor
validity for the lack of support for the hypotheses and I would conclude that deprivation in
this case does not seem to lead to rebellion.
Other questions and indicators used in the thesis can be considered as valid
measurements for the subjects we wanted to measure. In hypotheses 6 and 8 satisfaction with
life was measured by two quite different questions. However, as argued earlier, both these
questions are valid in the light of relative deprivation theory. And as they both resulted in the
same outcome, the weak validity of the question cannot be blamed for unexpected results.
Throughout all my models in research questions II, III, and IV the coefficients of
determination remain low. This as such is not surprising, as it is apparent that protesting is a
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phenomenon including lot of contingency. There is an endless number of factors which
influence an individual’s final decision to take part in protest and many of them are possibly
connected to personal relations, feelings, or experiences and can never fully be included in the
models. Satisfaction with life or interest in politics are also complex phenomena so it was
similarly expected that coefficients of determination would be low. What is more important is
how similar results different data sets and different samples produce. In other words, despite
low r2, it can be considered a robust result that some factors—as education or age—have an
impact on protest participation and some—as satisfaction with life—do not.
When presenting the data I came to the conclusion that possibly politically more active
people are overrepresented in the data. I also noted that respondents, especially in an
authoritarian country, can avoid answers which they think interviewers or rulers might dislike.
But based on the swift analysis of a question about satisfaction with government it seemed
that it was not the aim of the respondents to please with their answers. More importantly,
however, I do not see how these potential biases could affect the unemployed and the
employed differently. Thus, neither do I consider them to be notable concerns.
Also the wide usage of the data and all the endeavours these data projects have taken
themselves to ensure the quality of the data increase my confidence in the results.
7.2.3. Use of linear regression in research question III
One might question the validity of results from linear regression analyses in research
question III. In the chapter introducing methods I discussed whether my data meets the
requirements of linear regression. Everybody does not agree that a Likert scale variable can be
considered as an interval scale variable, but I followed Vehkalahti and Newsom, who argued
that there is no considerable problem in doing so (Vehkalahti 2008: 37; Newsom 2013: 2).
Some statistics text books state that normal distribution of the explained variable is a
presumption for the use of linear regression, but Lumley et al. have demonstrated that with
sample sizes larger than 100 or 500 the linear regression model is valid also with explained
variable, which is not normally distributed (Lumely et al. 2002). Even if we assume that using
Likert scale variable and not meeting the requirement of normal distribution reduces accuracy
of the analyses, I think the central findings hold. Even if we would use 0.005 as the level for
statistical significance, all three results presented in table 9 still suggest that the unemployed
are less satisfied with their lives. With the 0.005 level of statistical significance one out of
three models in table 10 indicates that the unemployed are less interested in politics, but when
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voting is used as an indicator of being politically active, the hypothesis receives widely
support. It is also noteworthy that several data sets and several independent samples
consistently give results supporting the hypotheses. Taken into consideration all this, I think
that these potential shortages in fully meeting the requirements of linear regression do not
invalidate results this robust, even if they cause some inaccuracies. Consequently I consider
both findings about the lower satisfaction of the unemployed and about their lower political
interest to be trustworthy in this respect.
7.3. Comparisons with earlier research
Earlier research has given diverse results when studying in different locations and at different
times the connection between the unemployment rate and protests or organised violence.
Some studies have indicated that there is a positive correlation between these two factors, but
most studies have suggested either no or even a negative relationship. Generally my results
from the first research question give scantly support for the hypothesised positive relationship
between unemployment and political instability, and taken into account the earlier research,
this is maybe not surprising. However, my results provided partial evidence that the higher
unemployment rate is connected to the higher level of organised violence in temporal
inspection. These results are in line with some studies from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
When studying the relationship between unemployment and political violence in Israel–
Palestine, Sayre and Caruso & Gavrilova found evidence that the higher unemployment rate is
connected to a higher level of terrorism (Sayre 2009; Caruso & Gavrilova 2012). However,
Hassan, Berrebi and Krueger & Malečková have found that Palestinian suicide bombers have
not been unemployed or poor (Hassan 2001: 37–38; Krueger & Malečková 2003; Berrebi
2007). This also partially echoes my results from Egypt. The results in hypothesis 1 suggested
that during the years, the higher unemployment rate has been connected to the higher level of
organised violence, and according to SCAD, the higher unemployment rate is also connected
to the higher number of protests. Still, at the individual level the unemployed in Egypt were
not more active protesters. White and Thompson did not find a positive relationship between
the unemployment rate and political violence, in some cases they found negative relationship
(Thompson 1989; White 1989; 1993). But Honaker instead found that if separate
unemployment rates for Catholics and Protestants were used, political violence correlated
positively with the unemployment rates (Honaker 2010). This is something that my analyses
do not reveal. If some ethnic minorities have been active protesters because of their higher
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unemployment rate, this will remain unnoticeable as I did not include a variable for ethnicity
in my models.
Some earlier studies have shown at the country level that those Arab countries which
experienced higher unemployment rates were not more prone to the revolutions and turmoil of
the Arab Spring (Korotayev et al. 2014; Byun & Hollander 2015). My results mainly confirm
that the same applies at the subnational level, protests and organised violence have not
concentrated in those governorates with high unemployment.
In relation to the trends of unemployment and protests in the context of the Arab Spring,
Ottaway & Hamzawy argue, that over the decade preceding the Arab Spring there was an
increase in protests, strikes, and other forms of social protests in the Arab world (Ottaway &
Hamzawy 2011: 2). This rise is actually impossible to observe, when looking at my charts of
protests in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. This might raise further doubts towards the
data of ACLED and SCAD or then this rise was more apparent in some other countries. It is
also possible that Ottaway & Hamzawy have not based their argument on quantitative
measurements or they have not meant it to be taken this literally. Goldstone noted that
governments in Egypt and Tunisia had long created jobs but these subsidies had been cut out
in the 2000s (Goldstone 2011: 12). According to Mirkin during the decades preceding the
uprisings the numbers of Arabs working as migrant workers in oil exporting Arab countries
had decreased and this had blocked an employment opportunity which many had utilised
(Mirkin 2013: 8, 17). These developments raised by Goldstone and Mirkin do not seem to
appear as increases in the unemployment rates in the ILO data I use. It is likely that these
developments mentioned by Goldstone and Mirkin were real but had a minor effect on the
unemployment rates at national or regional level.
My results indicating that the unemployed are not active protesters are in line with many
earlier studies. Oyefusi and Scacco have found that in Nigeria being unemployed actually
often statistically significantly reduces an individual’s willingness to take part in protest
(Scacco 2007; Oyefusi 2010). In some cases my results suggest similarly that the unemployed
have participated in the protests more seldom than the employed, but mostly I have found no
significant differences between the unemployed and the employed. I naturally have a slightly
different approach than Oyefusi and Scacco, who study whether the unemployed are willing
to protest. If we assume that the unemployed have less political, organisational and other
resources than the employed, we would rather expect that the unemployed are more willing to
protest compared to how often they finally do protest. Here, instead, the unemployed in
Nigeria were mostly statistically significantly less willing to protest, but my results indicated
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that there generally were no considerable differences in actual protesting. Taken into account
the seemingly notable differences between the countries in the protest attendance of the
unemployed, these differences between my results and results from Nigeria are then rather
likely to be explained by country specific differences. I did also introduce several studies
which did not approach this topic quantitatively but still concluded that the protests of the
unemployed have remained rare and small scale incidents.
In relation to the Arab Spring, some studies based on survey data sets have similarly to
my results indicated that the unemployed have not been more active, or have even been
comparatively passive protesters in the Arab countries (Beissinger et al. 2012: 13; Hoffman &
Jamal 2012; 2013: 28–30; Doherty & Schraeder 2015; Shafiq & Vignoles 2015). These
studies have, however, had their focus elsewhere than in the role of unemployment. In
addition they have studied just single countries, used data sets which do not actually include
information about Arab Spring protest participation or their inspection of the protest
participation of the unemployed has been descriptive. In the case of the 2012 article of
Hoffman & Jamal, I also argued that their measurement of unemployment is imprecise.
Beissinger et al. have demonstrated, that between Tunisia and Egypt there were
differences in how different societal groups took part in the uprisings. They suggest that also
more generally the characteristics of those who participated the protests varied from country
to country (Beissinger et al. 2012). This gets some support from my results in relation to
unemployment. It indeed seems that there are differences between countries as to how the
unemployed mobilised. Interestingly, also earlier studies done in countries around the world
have often indicated similar results from the same countries. Studying partly different periods
of time, Sayre and Caruso & Gavrilova found some indication that in the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict the unemployment rate is linked to politically motivated violence (Sayre 2009;
Caruso & Gavrilova 2012). In Northern Ireland, instead, several studies exploring different
areas and times have found that the unemployment rate is generally not linked to the level of
political violence, and if it is, the relationship is negative: higher unemployment predicts less
violence (Thompson 1989; White 1989: 1288–1289; 1993: 580–582). In Nigeria, Oyefusi and
Scacco have found, using different survey data sets that the unemployed are statistically
significantly less likely to participate in a violent protest (Scacco 2007; Oyefusi 2010). This
might suggest that more generally, there are differences between countries in how
unemployment is connected to protesting or organised violence. If this is the case, it could at
least partly account for diverse empirical results around the world.
Schlozman & Verba found that in the United States the unemployed were considerably
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less happy with their achievements in life than the employed, but this dissatisfaction did not
lead to political participation (Schlozman & Verba 1979: 346–349). Bagguley interviewed
unemployed people in Britain in 1980s. Some of them were involved in the Brighton centre, a
centre attempting to organise the unemployed for involvement in collective action, whereas
some interviewed did not take part in the activities of this centre. The interviews of the
politically passive unemployed highlighted their beliefs that collective action would not
improve their matters. Bagguley regarded this fatalism to be the major reason why the
unemployed did not protest in the 1980s (Bagguley 1991). My results reflect these findings.
The unemployed are dissatisfied but this does not turn to political activity nor protesting, as
protesting actually also is a form of political activity. With my analyses I am not able to
identify, whether the unemployed in these Arab countries remained comparatively passive,
because they thought that with political activities they would not achieve anything. However,
it surely seems one potential explanation.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
8.1. What and how well did the thesis answer the question about the role of
unemployment in the Arab Spring?
Unemployment is often considered to be a forceful driver behind various forms of political
instability, ranging from protests and riots to terrorism and armed struggles. Also in the case
of the Arab Spring, unemployment is one of the most often mentioned factors which are seen
to have stoked the uprisings. Still, the empirical research studying the relationship of
unemployment and political instability is scattered and its results provide scantl support for
the assumed linkage.
It is important to study the significance of unemployment to political instability. Firstly,
this is important per se to get better understanding of mechanisms behind rebellions.
Secondly, this is important to provide guidance for policies which aim at preventing political
instability or fostering peace.
My thesis has focused on studying the role of unemployment in the Arab Spring
uprisings. Even though unemployment is repeatedly labelled as an important factor behind the
Arab Spring, there are—as far as I know—no prior studies which would have this clearly
focused on the significance of unemployment in the context of the Arab Spring.
If unemployment would be a forceful causal factor behind political instability, it could
be assumed that a higher unemployment rate would lead to higher numbers of protests and a
higher level of organised violence. More precisely this could signify that in areas where the
unemployment rate is higher there is more political instability, that the Arab Spring uprisings
were preceded by a rise in the unemployment rate, or that there are more protests and
organised violence in times of high unemployment rates and less political instability in times
of lower unemployment rates. I was looking for these and some other possible indications in
several North African Arab countries. In general the evidence to support the assumed
relationship between the unemployment rate and political instability remained weak. There
are some concerns about data reliability, whose impacts on results are hard to estimate.
However, if the relationship between unemployment and political instability would be robust,
I would assume that it would have appeared more clearly also in these analyses. It is possible
that political instability is mainly determined by other factors and unemployment only has a
minor influence. If this is the case, it is obvious why the effect of unemployment has not
appeared in my analyses; my hypotheses were based on the assumption that unemployment
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has a strong impact on political instability.
After comparing the unemployment rates and level of political instability I used survey
data to test if the unemployed of the Arab countries are more active protesters than the
employed. I am much more confident with this survey data than with the data which I used to
study the relationships between the unemployment rates and the appearance of protests and
organised violence. The survey data is more extensive and its reliability and validity are
superior. From now on I used regression models which included a set of control variables, for
education, for gender, and for some other factors which previous studies have shown to have
an impact. Thus I was here able to detect also if being unemployed had a lesser influence in
protesting.
In short, I found very little support that unemployed people were more active protesters
compared to the employed in relation to the Arab Spring protests or in relation to protesting in
general. Generally, in those occasional models, where the results indicated significant
differences in protest attendance between the unemployed and the employed, the unemployed
turned to be less likely to protest than the employed. This was the case especially in Egypt,
Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, countries hard hit by the Arab Spring, which we studied more
closely. The finding that the unemployed are not more active protesters compared to the
employed seems robust and can be considered as the key result of the thesis. Different
operationalisations, different model specifications, and three different data sets suggest
similar results. The results showed clearly and consistently, that on the other hand, being
younger and being more educated are factors which throughout the models increase the
likelihood of an individual to protest. Further, it appears, that the same socio-demographic
groups have been active in the Arab Spring protests and in demonstrations more generally.
The results also hinted that there are differences between the Arab countries in how actively
the unemployed have mobilised.
If only the examination of unemployment rates and political instability would have
indicated a weak or no relationship, issues with data could have been blamed. But as the
survey data indicate alike, that at the individual level the unemployed are not more active
protesters, this cannot be explained with data quality. The results of survey data support the
results from earlier analyses of the thesis.
Further analyses which were based on the same survey data sets revealed that the
unemployed are significantly less satisfied with their lives and also somewhat less active in
politics. It also appeared that being dissatisfied in life does not increase the likelihood of an
individual to take part in protests, but being politically more active is clearly linked to higher
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protest attendance at the individual level. Finding that it is not more likely for the less
satisfied to protest contradicts explicitly with relative deprivation theory. This, however,
provides one possible explanation for why the unemployed are not more active protesters in
the first place and why the unemployment rate did not generally seem to be connected to
political instability. The results suggest, that the unemployed are less satisfied, but this will
not erupt as protesting due to their low interest in politics. This is apparently still a partial
picture. Theoretical considerations provide also several other mechanisms to explain
relationships between unemployment and political instability which are not tested here.
Possibly the unemployed do not mobilise because they do not have social networks, they do
not want to identify themselves as unemployed, they are marginalised, they lack political
skills and other resources, and they believe that protesting is unlikely to bring them jobs.
Taken together, although my results do not provide a complete picture, all the results of my
thesis form a logical whole, where one part supports another.
The coefficients of determination in the regression models were overall low, which was
not surprising taken into account how complex phenomena protest participation, satisfaction
in life or political activity are to model. The explanatory power of the regression analyses
does not lie in any single model or its coefficient of determination but instead in the
abundance of survey data, in the number of the models and the hugely similar results they
indicate.
Unemployment might have some role in the spark of the Arab Spring and in the protests
and insurgencies of the Arab world more largely, but based on these results the role does not
appear to be substantial. The question then emerges whether some other operationalisations or
some other approaches would have led to different outcome. Maybe the results would reveal
that the unemployed are still eager to take to the streets, if we would have observed how
recently employment status of an individual has changed, if an individual has many
acquaintances who are unemployed, or if we would have studied the unemployment rate at the
city or at the neighbourhood level. Perhaps the unemployed were protesting first and big
masses followed? Or possibly we would have found a correlation with political instability by
using the disaggregated unemployment rates for different ethnic groups. This is naturally
possible, but also fully speculative.
Notably, the control variables all operated as we expected throughout the analyses.
Education and age were clear drivers of protest no matter if this was observed with regression
analyses, chi-square tests or by charts. Even if an additional analysis would find that with
some specific operationalisation unemployment predicts more protests or more political
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instability, I would still think that its impact remains minor compared to age and education for
example. In addition, results refuted the hypothesis of the dissatisfied being more eager to
protest. Although this was not a premise for all theoretical approaches suggesting higher
protest participation among the unemployed, this still partly shakes the basis to even expect a
relationship between unemployment and protesting.
What can we finally say based on these results about the role of unemployment in the
Arab Spring uprisings? We have studied whether the unemployed are active protesters and
whether the levels of organised violence and protesting correlate with the unemployment rate
spatially and temporally. But these analyses do not explicitly tell, whether unemployment was
an influential factor. As discussed earlier, it might be that people are frustrated even if things
have become better, and it is also possible that people who are not unemployed protest
because of unemployment. Still, the results presented above are noteworthy. I guess many
would agree that if unemployment did play a major role, it should have been better observable
in these analyses. Thus, based on my thesis it seems that unemployment was not a major
driving force behind the Arab Spring.
8.2. What new knowledge has this thesis brought?
Earlier research done in the context of other countries indicates that generally a higher
unemployment rate has not been linked to a higher level of political instability. Evidence
available also shows that often the unemployed have not been active protesters, terrorists, or
insurgents. Generally research in this field, though scanty, has provided diverse and
conflicting results. However, I would argue that the central finding of the thesis is in line with
earlier research; the unemployment does not seem to be a strong causal factor predicting
political instability, and based on my results, this is the case also in relation to Arab Spring
uprisings.
I have primarily presented this thesis as one case study exploring the importance of
unemployment for political instability. At the same time it aims to increase our understanding
about the Arab Spring and the net of drivers behind it.
Evidently this thesis has provided some new information. As far as I know, there are no
prior studies which would have focused this clearly on the role of unemployment in the
context of the Arab Spring. ABIII, the main survey data set has also been published in late
2014, so many studies done soon after the uprisings have not been able to utilise this data. In
earlier studies exploring the Arab Spring, unemployment has been one variable among others
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in regression analyses or it has otherwise received less attention. My analyses of the role of
unemployment have mainly confirmed notions of earlier research. However, I consider my
results to be more convincing as I have tried several approaches and operationalisations to test
its impact. I have also included a relatively large number of countries in my analyses, and I
have used data where the respondents are asked specifically about the participation in the
Arab Spring protests. Many other studies have used data including information about
protesting in general. Finally I have discussed theoretical considerations and earlier empirical
research about the relationship between unemployment and political instability in other case
studies, and I have reflected the results of the Arab Spring against that general background.
As said, if unemployment has been analysed in relation to the Arab Spring, it has only been
one factor among others. These studies have not spent much time in pondering why
unemployment has not appeared to be a significant driver, this is maybe noted with surprise
and then left aside.
So firstly, I have done a more thorough analysis about the role of unemployment in the
context of the Arab Spring. But in addition, neither has the significance of unemployment for
protest movements or organised violence in general been studied too much. My study is one
new case study to advance our knowledge in this field. This thesis has used two approaches to
study the role of unemployment, first by examining the unemployment rates and their impact
on political instability, and secondly analysing the unemployed as individuals and their protest
participation. In earlier research I have not seen these two ways combined in one study. Based
on survey data I further explored the interplay of unemployment, dissatisfaction, political
activity, and protesting. Neither have I seen this kind of analysis in previous studies. This
provided us with some possible explanations for why the unemployed are not more active
protesters.
On could say that my results were expected given the results of the earlier case studies
from different corners of the world which have explored the relationships between
unemployment on one hand and protesting and organised violence on the other. But taken into
account the numerous assumptions which have been made concerning the linkage of the Arab
Spring and unemployment, these findings are surprising, and taken into account their
concordance, hard to dismiss.
Can we then generalise the results of this thesis to other countries and other uprisings or
protest movements? Based on my results I would not make country or case specific
assumptions about the passivity or activity of the unemployed outside the context of the Arab
Spring. Actually one suggestive result of this thesis is that there are considerable differences
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between countries in how unemployment influences. This could also be one explanation for
why earlier studies have produced so differing results; in one country studies have found a
positive correlation between the unemployment rate and political violence, but then studies
from other countries have found that higher unemployment predicts less political violence. I
think that something from all this can still be generalised. Namely, based on both my results
and earlier studies, the significance of unemployment as a driver of political instability
generally appears to be weaker and more complex than often assumed.
8.3. Directions for future research
Although this thesis has presented some fresh outcomes, it has mainly raised more questions
which have remained unanswered.
Firstly, do the results found here also hold in other countries, in other world regions or
globally? Each of the analyses of this thesis could be extended to a wider scope. Survey data
is well available to enable individual level analyses at the global scale or in some special
world region. Data also allows us to study the linkage of the unemployment rate and political
instability more widely. SCAD, ACLED, and UCDP GED have all expanded the coverage of
their data outside Africa in 2015. The ILO provides the unemployment rates for almost every
country of the world, although data about unemployment at sub-national level is probably
harder to find. If this kind of an analysis is done and it results in finding a positive correlation
between the unemployment rate and protests or organised violence, it is important to
remember that correlation alone does not mean that unemployment would be a causal factor
behind protesting. As we saw in the case of Egypt both the unemployment rate and the
numbers of protests increased considerably from 2010 to 2012, but the increase in
unemployment was not driving people to protest, instead, a rise in both variables was
probably caused by revolution and the political turmoil sparked by the Arab Spring itself.
My thesis and earlier studies hint that there are differences between countries in how
unemployment impacts political instability. This offers another interesting direction for future
research to explore whether there really are differences between countries in this relation. And
if there are, where do these differences come from? Labour unions would be one plausible
candidate to explain the differences between countries, and it would be interesting to
investigate their importance more thoroughly. Based on some survey data set a small number
of countries could first be chosen so that the countries differ in how active protesters the
unemployed are. Then it could be studied either quantitatively or qualitatively which factors
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might cause these differences.
A further question for future studies could be what the role of location in protest
participation is. It seems impossible to predict precisely where protesting takes place. There
are various components hard to model, which might be labelled a human factor. However,
arguably those who live close to a location where a protest takes place, are more likely to
attend it. Thus, to analyse the significance of unemployment in protest participation more
closely, it would be interesting to study people living in the same region or people living
equally far away from a location where protests take place. Then the people under survey
would factually have equal opportunities to protest. This issue is unlikely to change the basic
conception, supposedly the role of unemployment remains minor, but this way of analysis
might still give us a more detailed picture.
Finally, a way to gather information about why some people participated in the protests
and some did not is to interview people from both groups. It is likely to be too late to
interview people about participation in Arab Spring protests, as time has passed and it has
possibly changed the thoughts of the people too. Interviewees would be likely to give at least
partly different reasons for their participation today than they actually had in mind more than
five years ago. However, interviews in relation to some resent protests would give us new
insights about which role location and accessibility, social networks, marginalisation,
dissatisfaction, lack of resources, and other proposed factors play in the mobilisation of the
unemployed.
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N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Employment status (Unemployed = 1;
Employed = 0)
6 286 0 1 0.28 0.449
Employment status (Employed = 1;
Unemployed & Other = 0)
14 729 0 1 0.31 0.461
Employment status (Other = 1; Employed
& Unemployed = 0)
14 729 0 1 0.57 0.495
Income (absolute) 9 974 1 10 5.01 3.083
Income (relative) 14 417 1 4 2.27 0.948
Urban residence 14 648 0 1 0.67 0.470
Male 14 809 0 1 0.50 0.500
Age 14 799 18 89 37.80 13.886
Education 14 775 1 4 2.63 1.042
Protest participation 14 427 0 1 0.14 0.345
Satisﬁed with life 14 649 1 5 2.96 0.805
Voting 14 688 0 1 0.58 0.493
Interest in politics 14 662 1.0 4.0 2.42 0.921
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of ABIII
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–0.386 *** 0.366 *** –0.270 ***
–0.232 *** 0.133 *** –0.047 *** 0.273 ***
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0.014 0.043 *** –0.063 *** 0.073 *** 0.062 *** –0.017 * 0.150 *** –0.087 *** 0.119 ***
–0.140 *** 0.079 *** –0.027 *** 0.136 *** 0.272 *** 0.070 *** –0.007 –0.042 *** 0.144 *** 0.016
–0.183 *** 0.099 *** –0.031 *** 0.137 *** 0.038 *** 0.008 0.052 *** 0.272 *** 0.022 ** 0.022 ** 0.035 ***
–0.155 *** 0.172 *** –0.140 *** 0.164 *** 0.106 *** 0.073 *** 0.158 *** 0.096 *** 0.241 *** 0.161 *** 0.081 *** 0.194 ***
14 2859 88714 58814 5886 236
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14 56414 50514 30514 63314 65414 66214 501
14 53314 33014 65914 68014 68814 52714 3129 880
14 570 14 27414 61514 64914 48814 2719 881
14 2569 81814 57114 571
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14 63914 570
Table A2. Correlation matrix for ABIII variables. Pearson’s r
14 3496 132
14 64814 4179 97414 72914 7296 286
9 9309 9304 718
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9 82914 349
Voting
Urban
residence
Male Age Education
Protest
participation
Satisﬁed
with life
6 129
14 76914 61414 3919 96214 705
14 79914 64014 4119 96914 72314 7236 282
14 7056 275
14 40214 421
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Male
Age
Employment
status
(Unemployed
= 1; Employed
= 0)
Employment
status
(Employed = 1;
Unemployed &
Other = 0)
Employment
status
(Other = 1;
Employed &
Unemployed
= 0)
Income
(absolute)
Income
(relative)
Notes: Upper lines: Pearson's r; lower lines: N.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005.
Voting
Interest in
politics
Income
(relative)
Education
Protest
participation
Satisﬁed
with life
Income
(absolute)
6 223
14 42714 26714 0719 75214 358
14 775
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N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Employment status (Unemployed = 1;
Employed = 0)
3 172 0 1 0.28 0.447
Employment status (Employed = 1;
Unemployed & Other = 0)
10 307 0 1 0.22 0.416
Employment status (Other = 1; Employed
& Unemployed = 0)
10 307 0 1 0.69 0.462
Income (absolute) 10 021 1 10 4.89 2.150
Income (relative) 10 236 1 4 3.52 0.826
Urban residence 10 101 0 1 0.57 0.496
Male 10 336 0 1 0.51 0.500
Age 10 336 18 90 37.93 14.439
Education 10 296 1 4 2.62 1.033
Protest participation 9 595 0 1 0.15 0.359
Satisﬁed with life 10 218 1 10 6.35 2.481
Voting 9 816 0 1 0.64 0.479
Interest in politics 9 796 1.0 4.0 2.31 0.948
Table A3. Descriptive statistics of WVS6
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–0.230 *** 0.072 *** 0.002
–0.102 *** 0.055 *** –0.027 ** 0.216 ***
–0.128 *** 0.056 *** –0.018 0.076 *** 0.005
–0.049 ** 0.206 *** –0.237 *** –0.031 *** 0.035 *** –0.009
–0.211 *** –0.036 *** 0.112 *** –0.075 *** –0.040 *** 0.019 –0.007
–0.165 *** 0.211 *** –0.201 *** 0.321 *** 0.127 *** 0.065 *** 0.111 *** –0.339 ***
0.003 0.079 *** –0.099 *** 0.052 *** 0.056 *** 0.034 *** 0.156 *** –0.075 *** 0.154 ***
–0.177 *** 0.014 0.055 *** 0.297 *** 0.187 *** 0.037 *** –0.059 *** –0.023 * 0.133 *** 0.028 **
–0.037 * 0.013 –0.001 0.046 *** –0.045 *** –0.014 0.076 *** 0.130 *** 0.060 *** 0.093 *** 0.051 ***
–0.067 *** 0.061 *** –0.047 *** 0.116 *** 0.020 * –0.034 *** 0.083 *** 0.060 *** 0.200 *** 0.166 *** 0.085 *** 0.196 ***
Table A4. Correlation matrix for WVS6 variables. Pearson’s r
Employment
status
(Unemployed
= 1; Employed
= 0)
Employment
status
(Employed = 1;
Unemployed &
Other = 0)
Employment
status
(Other = 1;
Employed &
Unemployed
= 0)
Income
(absolute)
Income
(relative)
Urban
residence
Male Age Education
Protest
participation
Satisﬁed
with life
Voting
Income
(absolute) 3 100 9 999 9 999
Income
(relative) 3 139 10 212 10 212 9 937
Urban
residence 3 096 10 072 10 072 9 789 10 001
Male
3 172 10 307 10 307 10 021 10 236 10 101
Age
3 172 10 307 10 307 10 021 10 236 10 101 10 336
Education
3 164 10 275 10 275 9 989 10 202 10 068 10 296 10 296
9 567
Satisﬁed
with life 3 134 10 190 10 190 9 927 10 132 9 984 10 218 10 218 10 179
Protest
participation 2 990 9 567 9 567 9 322 9 525 9 376 9 595 9 595
9 515
Voting
3 010 9 795 9 795 9 532 9 744 9 595 9 816 9 816 9 787 9 197 9 720
Interest in
politics 3 037 9 769 9 769 9 542 9 720 9 571 9 796 9 796 9 765 9 213 9 710 9 375
Notes: Upper lines: Pearson's r; lower lines: N.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005.
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N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Employment status (Unemployed = 1;
Employed = 0)
5 003 0 1 0.18 0.382
Employment status (Employed = 1;
Unemployed & Other = 0)
11 064 0 1 0.37 0.483
Employment status (Other = 1; Employed
& Unemployed = 0)
11 064 0 1 0.55 0.498
Income (absolute) 7 464 1 10 5.02 3.086
Income (relative) 10 989 1 4 2.21 0.941
Urban residence 11 084 0 1 0.72 0.451
Male 11 244 0 1 0.51 0.500
Age 11 206 18 89 37.51 13.686
Education 11 201 1 4 2.80 1.045
Protest participation 10 983 0 1 0.17 0.377
Voting 11 110 0 1 0.51 0.500
Interest in politics 11 064 1.0 4.0 2.41 0.920
Table A5. Descriptive statistics of ABII
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–0.391 *** 0.411 *** –0.326 ***
–0.200 *** 0.107 *** –0.042 *** 0.255 ***
–0.141 *** 0.088 *** –0.046 *** 0.099 *** 0.170 ***
–0.095 *** 0.371 *** –0.402 *** 0.333 *** 0.017 –0.001
–0.199 *** 0.014 0.054 *** 0.150 *** –0.016 0.098 *** 0.050 ***
–0.078 *** 0.214 *** –0.221 *** 0.208 *** 0.190 *** 0.101 *** 0.075 *** –0.356 ***
–0.004 0.071 *** –0.082 *** 0.076 *** 0.004 –0.025 ** 0.133 *** –0.090 *** 0.109 ***
–0.102 *** 0.083 *** –0.055 *** 0.093 *** –0.037 *** –0.019 * 0.101 *** 0.145 *** 0.015 0.089 ***
–0.115 *** 0.111 *** –0.082 *** 0.155 *** 0.046 *** –0.027 *** 0.176 *** 0.075 *** 0.164 *** 0.206 *** 0.197 ***
Table A6. Correlation matrix for ABII variables. Pearson’s r
Employment
status
(Unemployed
= 1; Employed
= 0)
Employment
status
(Employed = 1;
Unemployed &
Other = 0)
Employment
status
(Other = 1;
Employed &
Unemployed
= 0)
Income
(absolute)
Income
(relative)
Urban
residence
Male Age Education
Protest
participation
Voting
Income
(absolute) 3 892 7 360 7 360
Income
(relative) 4 907 10 827 10 827 7 393
Urban
residence 4 942 10 908 10 908 7 308 10 829
Male
5 003 11 064 11 064 7 464 10 989 11 084
Age
4 993 11 035 11 035 7 437 10 955 11 049 11 206
Education
4 980 11 028 11 028 7 438 10 951 11 042 11 201 11 168
10 942
Voting
4 959 10 933 10 933 7 417 10 869 10 950 11 110 11 074 11 069
Protest
participation 4 906 10 809 10 809 7 320 10 752 10 825 10 983 10 947
10 946
Notes: Upper lines: Pearson's r; lower lines: N.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005.
10 868
Interest in
politics 4 942 10 890 10 890 7 381 10 826 10 905 11 064 11 027 11 022 10 834
188
APPENDIX B
Results from ABIII data set for hypotheses 6 and 8, which were presented with WVS6
data set in the thesis.
Tables in this appendix present the results for hypotheses 6 and 8. As results for these
hypotheses were presented with WVS6 data in the thesis, the results here are based on ABIII
data set. For hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 the results presented in the thesis were from ABIII.
For ABIII the question used to study satisfaction with life is (q102a) “Generally
speaking, how would you compare your living conditions with the rest of your fellow
citizens?”. Five alternatives are given: “much worse”, “worse”, “similar”, “better” or “much
better”. Coding is from 1 to 5, “much worse” being 1 and “much better” 5. Other
operationalisations used with ABIII can be found in chapter 5.5., Variables in research
questions II, III, and IV and their validity.
Appendix B
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8
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p
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ix
 B
Urban residence 0.077 *** 0.055 *** 0.066 ***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.015)
Male –0.095 *** –0.024 –0.045 ***
(0.026) (0.017) (0.014)
Age 0.000 –0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (those without formal education as reference cagegory)
Lower than secondary 0.122 *** 0.019 0.063 ***
(0.037) (0.028) (0.022)
Secondary 0.243 *** 0.104 *** 0.158 ***
(0.043) (0.032) (0.025)
Higher than secondary 0.346 *** 0.240 *** 0.284 ***
(0.039) (0.032) (0.024)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.299 *** 0.195 *** 0.222 ***
(0.045) (0.028) (0.024)
Others 0.189 *** 0.128 *** 0.144 ***
(0.042) (0.026) (0.022)
Constant 2.483 *** 2.673 *** 2.594 ***
(0.069) (0.047) (0.042)
N
R
2
4 732
0.049
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
9 652 14 384
0.034 0.041
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Other countries All countries
Arab Barometer III
Table B1. Linear regression, satisfaction with life of the unemployed
1
9
0
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p
p
e
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ix
 B
Urban residence 0.751 *** 0.425 * 0.423 * 0.291 * 0.458 *** –0.072 0.233 ***
(0.186) (0.192) (0.184) (0.135) (0.084) (0.096) (0.063)
Male 1.317 *** 1.703 *** 1.572 *** 0.450 *** 1.176 *** 0.695 *** 0.964 ***
(0.211) (0.144) (0.185) (0.133) (0.077) (0.840) (0.057)
Age –0.012 –0.002 –0.033 *** –0.009 –0.015 *** –0.015 *** –0.015 ***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.662 *** 0.282 *** 0.495 *** 0.323 *** 0.362 *** 0.264 *** 0.325 ***
(0.106) (0.079) (0.098) (0.063) (0.039) (0.045) (0.029)
Satisfaction with –0.034 0.094 0.058 0.111 0.063 –0.077 0.006
life (0.125) (0.090) (0.105) (0.063) (0.044) (0.052) (0.033)
Constant –4.611 *** –3.204 *** –2.854 *** –1.364 *** –1.556 *** –2.048 *** –1.097 ***
(0.606) (0.517) (0.483) (0.316) (0.201) (0.235) (0.154)
N
R
2 0.122
1 176
0.076
1 106
0.153
1 187
0.150
1 189
Table B2. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the dissatisﬁed
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
0.137
14 085
0.038
9 427
0.165
4 658
Arab Barometer III
Egypt Libya Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen
Other countries All countries
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APPENDIX C
Results from WVS6 data set for hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9, which were presented with
ABIII data set in the thesis.
This appendix presents results for hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 with WVS6 data. Results for
hypotheses 6 and 8 were introduced with the WVS6 data set in the thesis (tables 9 and 12).
For WVS6 data, the operationalisations of those variables, which are presented also in
the tables of the thesis (i.e. tables 9 and 12) can be found in chapter 5.5. Operationalisations of
those variables which only occur in these appendixes can be found below.
In WVS6 the absolute incomes are asked straight (v239), a card indicating deciles and
income groups in the respondents’ country is shown to respondents and they are asked to
specify to which group they belong, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes
that come in. The question is about household income, the respondent’s personal income is
not asked. In WVS6 there is no direct question to be used as an indicator of relative income.
To measure relative income I use question (v188) which asks how often in the last twelve
months the respondent or his or her family has gone without enough food to eat. Options
available are “never”, “rarely”, “sometimes”, and “often”. Answers are again coded from 1,
“often”, to 4, “never”. I think this question should capture quite well the sufﬁciency of
income, since food can be seen as basic goods people try to purchase with their income.
For the variable of interest in politics there are two questions in WVS6 both asking
about the respondent’s interest in politics. The ﬁrst of these questions (v7) asks the
respondents to indicate how important politics is in their life. Later in the survey respondents
are asked (v84) “how interested would you say you are in politics”. Respondents can choose
from four options, which are “not at all important”, “not very important”, “rather important”
or “very important” for the ﬁrst question and “not at all interested”, “not very interested”,
“somewhat interested”, or “very interested” for the latter question. I have coded both these
questions in a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 indicates the lowest interest in politics and 4 the
highest interest in politics. After this I have combined these two items calculating the average
of two answers. Only respondents who have answered both questions are included.
In addition to measuring interest in politics, also when analysing WVS6 data, voting is
used to measure whether the respondent is politically active. Here the question is (v227)
“when elections take place, do you vote always, usually or never?”. Respondents are grouped
so that those who vote “always” or “usually” are coded as 1 and those who “never” vote are
coded as 0.
Appendix C
1
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2
A
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ix
 C
Urban residence 0.522 *** 0.162 –0.84 0.381 *** 0.072 0.237 ***
(0.114) (0.199) (0.648) (0.096) (0.101) (0.070)
Male 1.234 *** 0.827 *** 1.358 *** 1.195 *** 0.441 *** 0.872 ***
(0.111) (0.214) (0.265) (0.092) (0.097) (0.066)
Age –0.013 *** –0.012 –0.008 –0.011 *** –0.005 –0.008 ***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Education 0.240 *** 0.519 *** 0.625 *** 0.417 *** 0.218 *** 0.337 ***
(0.068) (0.125) (0.111) (0.051) (0.056) (0.037)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.040 –0.184 0.211 –0.008 –0.417 * –0.179
(0.237) (0.295) (0.321) (0.155) (0.164) (0.112)
Others –0.010 –0.297 –0.178 –0.150 –0.730 *** –0.389 ***
(0.221) (0.262) (0.286) (0.142) (0.150) (0.103)
Constant –2.238 *** –3.396 –3.671 *** –2.880 *** –2.214 *** –2.332 ***
(0.369) (0.569) (0.543) (0.253) (0.260) (0.191)
N
R
2 0.099
9 331
0.128 0.048
4 021
0.160
1 116 871
0.102 0.051
2 034 5 310
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
All countriesLibya Tunisia Yemen
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries
Table C1. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed (measured with the question of employment status)
World Values Survey 6
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Urban residence 0.467 *** 0.147 –0.873 0.338 *** 0.079 0.213 ***
(0.114) (0.202) (0.648) (0.097) (0.101) (0.070)
Male 1.269 *** 0.866 *** 1.425 *** 1.250 *** 0.525 *** 0.934 ***
(0.110) (0.216) (0.261) (0.092) (0.095) (0.066)
Age –0.012 *** –0.013 –0.005 –0.010 *** –0.007 * –0.009 ***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Education 0.225 *** 0.487 *** 0.712 *** 0.417 *** 0.186 *** 0.327 ***
(0.069) (0.129) (0.105) (0.051) (0.056) (0.038)
Income (absolute) 0.031 0.070 –0.033 0.024 0.067 ** 0.036 *
(0.025) (0.052) (0.052) (0.020) (0.025) (0.016)
Constant –2.368 *** –3.844 *** –3.966 *** –3.111 *** –2.908 *** –2.737 ***
(0.334) (0.601) (0.489) (0.236) (0.249) (0.181)
N
R
2
Table C2. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed (measured with the question of absolute income)
0.052
1 077
0.100
2 001 5 165
0.128
3 922
0.161
844
0.097
9 087
0.044
All countries
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
World Values Survey 6
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countriesLibya Tunisia Yemen
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Urban residence 0.519 *** 0.140 –0.877 0.377 *** 0.081 0.239 ***
(0.114) (0.200) (0.647) (0.096) (0.101) (0.070)
Male 1.237 *** 0.864 *** 1.434 *** 1.219 *** 0.539 *** 0.923 ***
(0.109) (0.213) (0.255) (0.090) (0.095) (0.065)
Age –0.012 *** –0.013 –0.006 –0.010 *** –0.007 * –0.009 ***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Education 0.244 *** 0.492 *** 0.703 *** 0.422 *** 0.222 *** 0.342 ***
(0.067) (0.126) (0.104) (0.051) (0.055) (0.037)
Income (relative) 0.061 0.234 –0.055 0.073 0.162 * 0.114 **
(0.068) (0.188) (0.144) (0.058) (0.065) (0.043)
Constant –2.194 *** –3.231 *** –4.140 *** –3.284 *** –3.375 *** –3.044 ***
(0.337) (0.612) (0.537) (0.295) (0.325) (0.226)
N
R
2
Table C3. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed (measured with the question of relative income)
0.098
9 286
0.045
5 260
0.127
4 026
0.158
868
0.052
1 116
0.101
2 042
World Values Survey 6
All countriesTunisia Yemen
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Libya
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Urban residence 0.624 *** 0.039 –0.174 0.409 *** 0.133 0.282 ***
(0.163) (0.250) (0.692) (0.131) (0.135) (0.094)
Male 1.293 *** 1.030 *** 1.170 *** 1.288 *** 0.406 *** 0.900 ***
(0.163) (0.276) (0.298) (0.125) (0.128) (0.088)
Age –0.054 *** –0.030 –0.009 –0.039 *** 0.009 –0.017 *
(0.016) (0.027) (0.024) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009)
Education 0.314 ** 0.337 0.729 *** 0.474 *** 0.196 ** 0.330 ***
(0.115) (0.175) (0.143) (0.076) (0.075) (0.053)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.249 –0.233 0.009 0.043 –0.598 *** –0.233
(0.321) (0.362) (0.387) (0.198) (0.200) (0.140)
Others 0.105 –0.198 –0.225 –0.112 –0.867 *** –0.436 ***
(0.285) (0.317) (0.328) (0.172) (0.173) (0.121)
Constant –1.654 ** –2.587 *** –3.749 *** –2.389 *** –2.382 *** –2.045 ***
(0.612) (0.905) (0.784) (0.414) (0.449) (0.313)
N
R
2
Table C4. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed among the youth
0.036
583
0.117
922 2 675 4 707
0.137
2 032
0.151
527
All countries
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
0.1010.045
Tunisia Yemen
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countriesLibya
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1
9
6
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 C
Urban residence 0.409 * 0.281 –1.124 0.332 * 0.068 0.245
0.186 (0.409) (1.145) (0.165) (0.202) (0.127)
Male 1.179 *** 0.850 0.597 1.074 *** 0.496 * 0.864 ***
0.176 (0.438) (0.488) (0.154) (0.196) (0.121)
Age –0.018 * 0.007 –0.016 –0.014 * 0.002 –0.008
0.008 (0.018) (0.024) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.002 0.164 –0.081 –0.030 –0.378 –0.182
0.388 (0.620) (0.527) (0.272) (0.313) (0.207)
Others 0.095 0.050 –0.462 –0.034 –0.873 *** –0.349
0.366 (0.580) (0.553) (0.261) (0.300) (0.197)
Constant –1.046 * –2.336 ** 0.044 –0.600 –1.045 * –0.452
0.438 (0.832) (0.895) (0.361) (0.526) (0.295)
N
R
2
Table C5. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed among the educated
0.033
143
0.032
161
0.076
706
0.1220.056
1 113
0.079
1 010 2 123
World Values Survey 6
All countriesTunisia Yemen
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Libya
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Urban residence –0.078 * –0.024 –0.046 *
(0.033) (0.025) (0.020)
Male –0.093 *** 0.254 *** 0.115 ***
(0.030) (0.024) (0.019)
Age 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (those without formal education as reference cagegory)
Lower than secondary 0.360 *** 0.233 *** 0.272 ***
(0.049) (0.042) (0.032)
Secondary 0.537 *** 0.321 *** 0.392 ***
(0.050) (0.041) (0.032)
Higher than secondary 0.621 *** 0.381 *** 0.463 ***
(0.055) (0.047) (0.035)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.151 ** 0.064 0.096 *
(0.056) (0.052) (0.038)
Others 0.049 0.046 0.046
(0.050) (0.048) (0.034)
Constant 1.553 *** 1.416 *** 1.567 ***
(0.082) (0.077) (0.056)
N
R
2
World Values Survey 6
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
0.124
9 525
0.131
5 432
0.084
4 093
All countriesOther countries
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Table C6. Linear regression, the inﬂuence of unemployment on being politically active
(measured by interest in politics)
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Urban residence 0.216 * 0.143 0.451 0.218 *** –0.137 * 0.011
(0.105) (0.124) (0.355) (0.077) (0.064) (0.049)
Male 0.738 *** 0.243 * 0.149 0.459 *** 0.236 *** 0.338 ***
(0.106) (0.124) (0.185) (0.072) (0.061) (0.046)
Age 0.010 * 0.026 *** 0.023 *** 0.014 *** 0.030 *** 0.023 ***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.231 *** 0.238 *** –0.196 * 0.082 * 0.062 0.087 ***
(0.063) (0.077) (0.088) (0.041) (0.037) (0.027)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.070 0.210 –0.425 0.068 0.183 0.117
(0.224) (0.204) (0.308) (0.133) (0.127) (0.091)
Others 0.150 –0.113 –0.391 0.054 0.164 0.115
(0.200) (0.179) (0.270) (0.116) (0.115) (0.082)
Constant –0.790 * –1.599 *** 0.793 –0.015 –1.919 *** –0.332 *
(0.345) (0.350) (0.422) (0.196) (0.181) (0.141)
N
R
2
Table C7. Binary logistic regression, the inﬂuence of unemployment on being politically active  (measured by voting)
0.033
883
0.037
1 177
0.039 0.081
9 554
0.050 0.110
2 028 4 088 5 466
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
World Values Survey 6
All countries
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countriesLibya Tunisia Yemen
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Urban residence 0.499 *** 0.176 –0.607 0.378 *** 0.047 0.223 ***
(0.116) (0.203) (0.662) (0.098) (0.103) (0.071)
Male 1.333 *** 0.698 *** 1.580 *** 1.316 *** 0.395 *** 0.934 ***
(0.113) (0.219) (0.265) (0.094) (0.098) (0.067)
Age –0.015 *** –0.019 * –0.014 –0.014 *** –0.013 *** –0.013 ***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Education 0.219 *** 0.353 *** 0.530 *** 0.363 *** 0.188 *** 0.301 ***
(0.070) (0.130) (0.106) (0.052) (0.055) (0.038)
Interest in politics 0.208 *** 0.624 *** 0.636 *** 0.348 *** 0.518 *** 0.391 ***
(0.059) (0.118) (0.127) (0.048) (0.054) (0.035)
Constant –2.697 *** –4.379 *** –5.066 *** –3.669 *** –3.349 *** –3.370 ***
(0.350) (0.590) (0.521) (0.250) (0.251) (0.191)
N
R
2
Table C8. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of those politically active (measured by interest in politics)
0.1820.074
1 093
0.107
1 945 852
0.110
8 979
0.061
5 089
0.139
3 890
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Other countries All countriesLibya Tunisia Yemen
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
World Values Survey 6
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Urban residence 0.504 *** 0.086 –1.147 0.354 *** 0.072 0.223 ***
(0.115) (0.204) (0.767) (0.097) (0.101) (0.070)
Male 1.179 *** 0.822 *** 1.462 *** 1.168 *** 0.493 *** 0.868 ***
(0.110) (0.217) (0.285) (0.092) (0.095) (0.066)
Age –0.013 *** –0.023 ** 0.002 –0.011 *** –0.009 * –0.010 ***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Education 0.237 *** 0.477 *** 0.682 *** 0.420 *** 0.253 *** 0.355 ***
(0.068) (0.127) (0.107) (0.051) (0.055) (0.037)
Voting 0.522 *** 1.365 *** 0.020 0.589 *** 0.417 *** 0.528 ***
(0.126) (0.236) (0.235) (0.099) (0.107) (0.072)
Constant –2.568 *** –3.960 *** –4.349 *** –3.412 *** –2.825 *** –3.003 ***
(0.327) (0.570) (0.547) (0.245) (0.237) (0.188)
N
R
2
Table C9. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of those politically active (measured with voting)
0.155
7671 095
0.109 0.085
2 003
0.103
8 974
0.046
5 109
0.135
3 865
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Yemen
Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries All countriesLibya Tunisia
World Values Survey 6
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APPENDIX D
Results from ABII data for hypotheses 3–9.
ABII data was not used in any table of the thesis. Results for all hypotheses with ABII can be
found here.
For ABII the questions used and their operationalisations and codings are equivalent to
those of ABIII presented in chapter 5.5. The exception is protesting, the explained variable for
research questions II and IV. Its operationalisation differs from the operationalisation of
ABIII but it can be found in the same chapter 5.5.
For measuring satisfaction with life there is no operable question in ABII and thus
hypotheses 6 and 8 are not run with ABII data. When employment status was asked in ABII
there were no respondents falling in the category of unemployed in the data in Sudan. This
cannot reﬂect reality but has to be caused by some difference in the coding procedure, and
thus Sudan is excluded when ABII is studied. Three respondents in ABII who answered
simultaneously being retired and working (full time or part time) are excluded.
Unlike in other countries, in Saudi Arabia the question about voting (q301) in the last
elections is asked in relation to municipal elections and not to parliamentary elections.
Appendix D
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Urban residence 0.865 *** 0.401 * –0.498 *** 0.066 0.006 0.052
(0.220) (0.191) (0.147) (0.099) (0.093) (0.067)
Male 1.031 *** 1.691 *** 1.082 *** 1.318 *** 0.456 *** 0.757 ***
(0.264) (0.191) (0.151) (0.107) (0.075) (0.061)
Age –0.015 –0.037 *** 0.018 * –0.016 *** –0.010 *** –0.011 ***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.373 *** 0.263 * 0.426 *** 0.373 *** 0.231 *** 0.292 ***
(0.103) (0.089) (0.079) (0.050) (0.039) (0.030)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.481 0.006 0.243 0.300 * 0.010 0.115
(0.443) (0.226) (0.235) (0.148) (0.142) (0.101)
Others –0.090 –0.018 0.141 0.095 –0.006 0.039
(0.468) (0.230) (0.231) (0.150) (0.141) (0.101)
Constant –4.115 *** –2.066 *** –3.240 *** –2.332 *** –4.475 *** –1.779 ***
(0.645) (0.413) (0.436) (0.267) (0.301) (0.173)
N
R
2 0.113
1 087
0.135
1 168
0.076
1 212
0.094
10 596
0.073
7 129
0.143
3 467
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries All countries
Table D1. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed (measured with the question of employment status)
Arab Barometer II
Egypt
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Urban residence 0.748 *** 0.421 * –0.750 *** 0.058 –0.040 0.012
(0.255) (0.195) (0.196) (0.117) (0.115) (0.081)
Male 0.893 ** 1.746 *** 1.051 *** 1.396 *** 0.493 *** 0.816 ***
(0.332) (0.200) (0.212) (0.132) (0.094) (0.076)
Age –0.020 * –0.041 *** 0.004 –0.026 *** –0.014 *** –0.017 ***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.376 *** 0.234 * 0.336 *** 0.328 *** 0.229 *** 0.275 ***
(0.125) (0.092) (0.112) (0.060) (0.049) (0.038)
Income (absolute) 0.047 0.018 –0.004 0.025 0.044 *** 0.030 **
(0.049) (0.027) (0.034) (0.019) (0.015) (0.012)
Constant –3.733 *** –2.039 *** –2.017 *** –1.655 *** –4.992 *** –1.383 ***
(0.623) (0.406) (0.617) (0.311) (0.391) (0.200)
N
R
2 0.063
726
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
0.102
7 118
Arab Barometer II
Egypt Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries All countries
0.079
4 760
0.147
2 358
0.091
519
0.141
1 113
Table D2. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed (measured with the question of absolute income)
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Urban residence 0.874 *** 0.367 –0.480 *** 0.069 –0.022 0.039
(0.224) (0.190) (0.150) (0.100) (0.093) (0.067)
Male 1.271 *** 1.677 *** 1.109 *** 1.380 *** 0.433 *** 0.756 ***
(0.239) (0.184) (0.147) (0.102) (0.070) (0.057)
Age –0.015 –0.038 *** 0.019 * –0.015 *** –0.011 ** –0.011 ***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.384 *** 0.225 *** 0.415 *** 0.346 *** 0.218 *** 0.277 ***
(0.104) (0.092) (0.079) (0.051) (0.039) (0.031)
Income (relative) 0.166 0.118 0.139 0.169 *** 0.074 0.102 ***
(0.116) (0.089) (0.083) (0.053) (0.040) (0.032)
Constant –4.439 *** –2.134 *** –3.358 *** –2.423 *** –4.718 *** –1.832 ***
(0.514) (0.402) (0.420) (0.246) (0.298) (0.156)
N
R
2
Table D3. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed (measured with the question of relative income)
0.095
10 529
0.074
7 104
0.144
3 425
0.114
1 060
0.137
1 164
0.073
1 201
Arab Barometer II
Egypt Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries All countries
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Urban residence 0.551 0.402 –0.540 *** –0.073 –0.117 –0.075
(0.300) (0.260) (0.179) (0.128) (0.118) (0.086)
Male 1.265 *** 1.861 *** 1.075 *** 1.412 *** 0.418 *** 0.809 ***
(0.361) (0.247) (0.174) (0.129) (0.100) (0.078)
Age 0.004 –0.081 *** 0.036 –0.008 –0.003 –0.001
(0.034) (0.024) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008)
Education 0.519 *** 0.200 0.488 *** 0.415 *** 0.212 *** 0.294 ***
(0.169) (0.125) (0.112) (0.072) (0.055) (0.043)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.316 –0.093 0.181 0.253 –0.109 0.039
(0.486) (0.296) (0.261) (0.177) (0.171) (0.122)
Others –0.060 0.182 0.164 0.249 –0.101 0.063
(0.504) (0.283) (0.248) (0.170) (0.164) (0.117)
Constant –5.062 *** –0.976 –3.901 *** –2.873 *** –4.325 *** –2.145 ***
(1.153) (0.762) (0.625) (0.442) (0.451) (0.286)
N
R
2 0.096
5 447
0.076
3 592
0.139
1 855
0.115
770
0.162
519
0.080
566
Table D4. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed among the youth
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Egypt Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries All countries
Arab Barometer II
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6
A
p
p
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 D
Urban residence 1.234 *** –0.065 –0.694 *** –0.112 –0.02 –0.078
(0.308) (0.435) (0.188) (0.142) (0.155) (0.103)
Male 0.909 ** 1.621 *** 1.101 *** 1.204 *** 0.391 *** 0.718 ***
(0.340) (0.349) (0.198) (0.151) (0.120) (0.093)
Age –0.037 ** –0.022 –0.002 –0.020 * –0.009 –0.011 *
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.716 –0.031 0.492 0.462 * 0.115 0.247
(0.546) (0.453) (0.322) (0.226) (0.226) (0.158)
Others –0.065 –0.157 0.415 0.206 0.155 0.173
(0.603) (0.436) (0.320) (0.229) (0.226) (0.159)
Constant –2.149 *** –0.933 –1.109 * –0.747 * –4.064 *** –0.637 ***
(0.676) (0.673) (0.443) (0.295) (0.414) (0.202)
N
R
2 0.095
556
0.117
202
0.094
474
0.119
3 692
0.102
2 460
0.123
1 232
Arab Barometer II
Egypt Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries All countries
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table D5. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of the unemployed among the educated
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Urban residence –0.043 –0.114 *** –0.069 ***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.021)
Male 0.299 *** 0.277 *** 0.282 ***
(0.031) (0.023) (0.018)
Age 0.009 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (those without formal education as reference cagegory)
Lower than secondary 0.254 *** 0.256 *** 0.309 ***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.031)
Secondary 0.557 *** 0.427 *** 0.513 ***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.034)
Higher than secondary 0.810 *** 0.570 *** 0.692 ***
(0.044) (0.047) (0.032)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.277 *** 0.089 * 0.161 ***
(0.049) (0.045) (0.033)
Others 0.242 *** 0.108 * 0.164 ***
(0.048) (0.044) (0.033)
Constant 1.394 *** 1.498 *** 1.457 ***
(0.073) (0.080) (0.053)
N
R
2 0.131
10 674
0.105
7203
0.184
3 471
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Arab Barometer II
Egypt, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries All countries
Table D6. Linear regression, the inﬂuence of unemployment on being politically active  
(measured by interest in politics)
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Urban residence –0.815 *** –0.467 *** –0.357 ** –0.589 *** –0.114 –0.326 ***
(0.137) (0.156) (0.137) (0.080) (0.076) (0.054)
Male 0.724 *** 0.230 0.157 0.388 *** 0.308 *** 0.337 ***
(0.145) (0.157) (0.144) (0.084) (0.058) (0.048)
Age 0.020 *** 0.053 *** 0.053 *** 0.040 *** 0.034 *** 0.037 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.251 *** 0.029 0.440 *** 0.248 *** 0.107 *** 0.154 ***
(0.056) (0.082) (0.071) (0.038) (0.031) (0.024)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
Employed 0.044 0.234 0.357 0.305 * 0.204 0.249 ***
(0.286) (0.224) (0.221) (0.134) (0.118) (0.088)
Others –0.213 0.229 0.457 * 0.221 –0.052 0.051
(0.290) (0.224) (0.212) (0.133) (0.117) (0.087)
Constant –1.968 *** –3.264 *** –2.785 *** –1.661 *** –2.911 *** –1.221 ***
(0.373) (0.369) (0.412) (0.212) (0.205) (0.145)
N
R
2
Table D7. Binary logistic regression, the inﬂuence of unemployment on being politically active (measured by voting)
0.078
1 108
0.133
1 170
0.092
1 210
0.200
10 717
0.207
7 229
0.160
3 488
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Arab Barometer II
Egypt Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries All countries
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Urban residence 0.852 *** 0.365 –0.399 * 0.124 0.087 0.112
(0.223) (0.191) (0.150) (0.101) (0.095) (0.068)
Male 1.154 *** 1.631 *** 0.940 *** 1.232 *** 0.297 *** 0.624 ***
(0.243) (0.188) (0.147) (0.103) (0.072) (0.058)
Age –0.021 * –0.048 *** 0.016 * –0.022 *** –0.021 *** –0.020 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.262 * 0.133 0.250 *** 0.228 *** 0.112 ** 0.160 ***
(0.108) (0.092) (0.080) (0.052) (0.040) (0.031)
Interest in politics 0.717 *** 0.689 *** 0.508 *** 0.593 *** 0.684 *** 0.654 ***
(0.153) (0.110) (0.078) (0.058) (0.042) (0.034)
Constant –5.598 *** –3.054 *** –3.605 *** –2.911 *** –5.571 *** –2.542 ***
(0.603) (0.432) (0.407) (0.253) (0.295) (0.163)
N
R
2
Table D8. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of those politically active (measured by interest in politics)
1 207
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
0.127
10 608
0.108
7 133
0.169
3 475
0.145
1 097
0.164
1 171
0.090
All countries
Arab Barometer II
Egypt Tunisia Yemen
Egypt, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other countries
2
1
0
Urban residence 0.933 *** 0.388 * –0.528 *** 0.062 0.038 0.073
(0.224) (0.188) (0.147) (0.099) (0.093) (0.067)
Male 1.243 *** 1.696 *** 1.118 *** 1.367 *** 0.426 *** 0.754 ***
(0.240) (0.183) (0.143) (0.101) (0.069) (0.057)
Age –0.015 –0.034 *** 0.017 * –0.015 *** –0.014 *** –0.013 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.409 *** 0.274 *** 0.411 *** 0.386 *** 0.217 *** 0.285 ***
(0.102) (0.088) (0.077) (0.050) (0.038) (0.030)
Voting 0.209 –0.249 0.284 0.077 0.353 *** 0.253 ***
(0.217) (0.214) (0.149) (0.102) (0.079) (0.062)
Constant –4.310 *** –2.124 *** –3.203 *** –2.316 *** –4.456 *** –1.794 ***
(0.503) (0.394) (0.393) (0.239) (0.278) (0.152)
N
R
2
Table D9. Binary logistic regression, protest participation of those politically active (measured by voting)
0.095
10 643
0.075
7 149
0.142
3 494
0.119
1 109
0.137
1 175
0.072
1 210
Notes: Models analysing more than one country are controlled for country (not reported).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
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